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Abstract 
The seemingly insurmountable commercial and political difficulties in establishing order in 
the international grain trade have plagued policy-makers throughout history. The suspen-
sion of international agreement on the rules of orderly marketing in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's, has resulted in extreme price and supply volatility. Many national and inter-
national initiatives have been instituted in an attempt to minimise the damaging effects of 
extreme price and supply fiuctuationa.The purpose of this thesis is to assess the nature of 
grain as an internationally traded commodity, and the effectiveness of national and inter-
national options which have been adopted in order to achieve these dual objectives. The 
study shows that the biological nature of the commodity has precluded reliable produc-
tion estimates and has demanded exceptionality in the treatment of grain in the context of 
more general economic planning. The major grain exporters, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Argentina and the European Union have attempted to protect their domestic 
producer, consumer and corporate interests as well as their international markets through 
a host of national and international policies. 
I will specifically examine in detail a particular proposal for the establishment of inter-
national grain reserves tabled by the United States through the FAO at the World Food 
Conference of 1974. The politics and technical questions relating to that proposal will be 
discussed and new information will be revealed as to the nature of the negotiations and the 
cause of the breakdown of the negotiations when agreement seemed near. A synthesis of 
new material regarding the grain reserve negotiations and private interviews conducted by 
principals to the negotiatiions will reveal that the negotiations were not abandoned as a 
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In February 1996, the Financial Times reported that growth in demand was affecting prices 
of what people eat, "especially for those in countries exposed to the free market". Prices for 
foodstuffs, it reported, had been soaring for many months, and some grades of wheat had 
risen in price by over 70% in a few months. Because United States and EU policies were 
curbed at reducing output and stocks, the result was that their farmers could not respond 
quickly to the "sudden tilt" in the supply / demand balance. 
Prices thus "rose relentlessly to coax evey bushel of wheat out of storage." World wheat 
stocks, it was claimed, amounted to less than fifty days, a level that was regarded as a 
crisis in earlier times. The EU's 30 million tonne of stocks of grain, "a mountain, scattered 
through hundreds of warehouses," The Independent declared, had dwindled to a "foothill". 
Indeed, world wheat stocks fell in the spring of 1996 to the lowest level in 25 years, a level 
that triggered a world food crisis and an attempt by the international community to assure 
food security not only for the Developed West but for those Developing Countries that were 
dangerously "exposed to the free market.,,1.1 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the postwar grain trade regime broke down, especially 
after the suspension in 1968 of the economic provisions of the International Wheat Agree-
ment. This suspension was followed two years later by the decision by the United States, the 
major exporter and dominant actor in the international grain trade, to relinquish its role as 
stockholder of the last resort with respect to both commercial and concessional transactions. 
Following the suspension of the Agreement and the American refusal to act as the stock-
holder of the last resort,'a period of extreme price and supply volatility ensued. Shortage of 
supply and rapidly escalating prices were characteristic of the 1970's while the 1980's were 
dominated by burdensome surpluses, "mountains of grain", low prices, and ever-increasing 
government subsidy to producers. This thesis focusses upon those decades beginning with 
1.1 Financial Times, 11 Feb. 1996j and The Independent, 12 Feb. 1996. 
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the attempt to come to terms with instability through an international commodity agree-
ment in the 1970's and through a blend of free market policies and increasing domestic 
subsidisation in the 1980's. The thesis will end before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
in the 1990's and the formation of the World Trade Organisation, but the legacy of the 
earlier experience endures and, as the Financial Times suggested in February 1996, the 
past has echoes in the present. 
This thesis brings forward new information relating to international food security which 
once again is attracting urgent attention. Previously unpublished and, to a significant ex-
tent, unobtainable documents have been presented here. This includes a complete collection 
of documents relating to the negotiations for the establishment of an international grain 
reserve under the auspices of the International Wheat Council and UNCTAD. These doc-
uments were released to the author for the purpose of this study after having been closed 
following the abandonment of the negotiations in February 1979. This collection includes 
all notes and documents produced by the International Committee (International Wheat 
Council) and later the Preparatory Committee (IWC) from 1974-1978. It also includes the 
UNCTAD conference papers which served as a basis for the negotiations in 1978 and 1979. 
In addition, having obtained security clearance, I was given access to closed, secret files re-
lating to commercial wheat transactions and international negotiations from 1960-1985 by 
the Canadian Department of External Affairs which has provided the basis for the analysis 
of political and negotiating behaviour. Comprehensive archival research was conducted at 
the FAO, the U.S. National Archives and the International Food Policy Research Institute 
in Washington. Finally, a highly significant collection of documents assembled by the late 
American researcher Berton Hennignson became available to me. These provided unique 
and crucial information on U.S. policy in the 1930's and 1940's, when, as in other areas, 
U.S. influence was paramount and growing. This collection also pr.ovides a comprehensive 
view of the debate regarding the exceptionality of agriculture in the context of post-war 
economic planning. All such documentary evidence was supplemented by a wide range of 
interview material including the former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Robert Bergland and 
Under Secretary, Dale Hathaway. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .1 
This thesis will specifically examine in detail a particular proposal for the establishment 
of an international grain reserve. This proposal was put forward by the United States 
through the FAO at the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974. The background, the 
politics, and the character of that proposal will be examined. The reasons for its appearance, 
the long debate surrounding its merits, and the failure to realise its promise are the central 
topics of this thesis. To understand that debate it is necessary to consider the salient aspects 
of the international grain trade. To that end, the thesis will begin with a consideration of 
the nature of the commodity. Grain is thinly-traded; that is, most of the world's grain is 
produced for sale locally. Nevertheless, the proportion of the world's grain that is traded 
greatly influences the price-of the commodity. Grain's biological characteristics are also 
significant. Pests or droughts can have drastic effects upon crops and, of course, upon 
prices. Finally, demand tends to be inelastic unlike other commodities such as tobacco 
or cocoa which can be substituted or abandoned. Typically, demand for grain remains 
relatively constant. 
This thesis does not propose to make a significant contribution to regime theory. It 
should be noted, however, that prior to 1970, the literature on regimes tended generally 
to accept the existence of an international food regime. Since that time, in the case of 
food, the apparent presence of articulatory mechanisms and a hegemonic actor, the United 
States, seems to accord with the work of Krasner's widely-accepted summary definition of 
a regime as something upon which preferences, values, norms and expectations converge.l.3 
Nevertheless, it is wise to record Young's caveat that "regimes are human artifacts," that 
convergence of expectations, particularly in the case of new or perhaps even revised institu-
tional arrangements "will often be slow in coming," and that regimes cannot be seen merely 
as an array of formal elements. l .3 It is precisely the human and informal elements which 
become manifest as domestic pressures, that have made food regimes less effective in the 
last decades of the twentieth century. This thesis will argue that developing nations are the 
1.2 See Stephen Krasner, ed., Intemationcal Regime, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983), p.2; also R.O. 
Keohane, Intemationcal Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview, 1989), ch.4. 
uO.R. Young, IntemationcU Cooperation: Building Regime, for Naturul Resource, CJnd the Environment, 
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Presa, 1989), pp.82-83. 
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least well-served - even in the midst of an extended international food crisis. This thesis 
will support Krasner's argument that there have been and are "fundamental differences in 
the international regime preferences of the North and the South.,,1.4 In fact, the evidence 
presented in the following chapters suggests that the "international food regime" has been 
a regime which was constantly renegotiated. Institutional articulation has often been weak-
ened by protracted pauses in the process of negotiation, and hegemonic actors often fall 
prey to human and domestic pressures. 
In this thesis, the instability of grain production and the uncertainties of the interna-
tional grain trade are central. It is this uncertainty that has provided the impetus and 
the rationale for the numerous national and international policies and programmes that 
have been developed in an attempt to stabilise the international grain trade. Following the 
discussion of the nature of the commodity and an overview over the complex network of gov-
ernment actors, transnational corporations and international organisations that comprise 
the international food system which occur in chapters two and three, the thesis examines the 
role of national actors, notably the major grain traders. There are five exporting national 
actors, although the term is somewhat confusing since one of the five major exporters is the 
EU. In examining the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and the E. U., one sees 
that there are four major influences: producer interests; consumer interests; commercial 
interests; and national security or foreign policy objectives. 
In each country, the influence of these factors will be seen to have changed over time. 
Changes in government policy will be assessed in terms of what the publicly-expressed goals 
of the government are with the establishment of each new policy and what domestic and 
foreign policy interests are reflected in the policy formulation. These policy developments 
will be seen in light of the prevailing political, social and economic climate in which they 
occurred. These policy developments which reflect the state of domestic and international 
markets will be assessed in terms of how effective they were in achieving their stated ob-
jectives. The role of importing nations will be presented only in terms of how their policies 
UStephen Krasner, Structurul Conflict: The Third World Agairut Global Liberalism, (Berkely: Univ. of 
Califormia Press, 1985), p.271. 
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have affected the domestic policies of the exporting nations in these chapters on national 
actors. 
The United States, the subject of chapter 4, has been the hegemonic actor throughout 
the past century. Its significance merits a separate chapter. Moreover, its influence derives 
not only from its dominant role as an exporter but also from its dominance in other economic 
and security areas. Nevertheless, other actors have played imporant roles as well. It was 
Argentina that undermined a wheat agreement of the 1930's, and Canada produced wheat 
in sufficient quality and quantity to influence markets profoundly at certain points. Indeed, 
for much ofthe century the American-Canadian duopoly seemed dominant within the wheat 
export trade. 
Chapter six discusses how Canada and the United States were central to the creation of 
International Wheat Agreements between the 1930's and the 1960's. It will be seen that the 
stabilisation policies of member nations and the effects of these policies on the international 
trade in wheat are absolutely crucial. The failure of national policies alone to control 
satisfactorily the problems inherent in the intenational grain trade resulted in an almost 
continual search for cooperation and, at some points, cartelisation. The fact that there are 
few large exporters of grain and that grain can be stockpiled has meant that international 
commodity agreements are a greater possibility than with other commodities. A recent 
study of international commodity agreements by Marcelo Raffaelli points out that there are 
three types of agreements: buffer stock schemes; trade quota schemes; and purchase contract 
schemes. All have existed or attempts to create them have existed in the case of wheat. 
Raffaelli notes: "Some were successful, or at least managed to survive, for relatively long 
periods. Others were not so lucky." He further argues that "While it is highly probably that 
such failure cannot be attributed to anyone single cause, it seems worth while to find out 
what happened in the different cases, and why?" That is the purpose of the major chapter 
of this thesis, chapter 7, which studies the attempt to create a buffer stock scheme in the 
1970's, at a time when international commodity agreements were thought possible and, in 
the view of many both in the North and the South, beneficial. In fact, a central theme of the 
thesis is the paradigmatic shift that took place as the spirit of deregulation, privatisation, 
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and free markets which infected so much of national politics in the western democracies in 
the 1980's. Although the intellectual and economic assumptions of the 1970's atrophied, 
their strength was real in their time. As Raffaelli argues, the study of such attempts is 
importance, "after all, it is never too late to learn from the lessons of the past."1.6 
Indeed, it is not, especially when an extraordinary range of materials on the process of 
decision-making becomes available. Chapter seven examined in considerable detail how the 
major grain exporting countries responded to the world food crisis of the early 1970's and 
how close these countries came to establishing an international grain reserve system. The 
evidence will suggest that the technical possibility of the establishment of such a system 
was not in doubt. And yet no such system came into existence. Why it did not becomes 
clear in the documents that form the original contribution which this thesis makes. The 
International Wheat Council, the central negotiating body, made available its complete doc-
umentation on the negotiations. They provide an extraordinary insight into the character 
of the grain trade and the grain traders. Moreover, the Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs, another central actor, opened its files on the negotiations. These have been sup-
plemented by documentation from the FAO and from the National Archives of the United 
States. The methodologies employed by the negotiating teams are clearly seen. So too are 
the precise nature of the areas of agreement at the adjournment of the negotiations. In 
Raffaelli's terms, these documents, combined with numerous interviews with participants 
in the negotiations, provide a remarkable opportunity "to find out what happened, and 
why." Whether there are lessons from this past, is a subject best left to the conclusion. 
Let us begin with an overview of the actors within the system. 
UMarcelo Raffaelli, The Ri8e and Demi8e of Commodity Agreemenb (Cambridge, England: Woodhead, 
1995), p.l. 
Chapter 2 
The International Food Regime: 
An Overview 
2 .1. Introduction 
This chapter is intended to provide an overview of the complex network of governmental 
actors, transnational corporations and international organisations that comprise the inter-
national food system. This review will identify the main actors involved, their mandates 
and their relationship to the other agencies and factors involved. It will also provide a brief 
description of the membership, internal structure, budget and decision-making procedures 
of these agencies and describe the political and economic conditions that led to the creation 
of the agency. This overview will be presented within the context of regime theory. As my 
broader project will focus on the politics of grain reserves, I will concentrate upon those 
institutions/actors that are most relevant for that study. 
The concept of international regimes has been used, particularly since the mid-1970's 
to analyse characteristics of the international system. One of the leading scholars in the 
area, Stephen Krasner, defines regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations."2.1 Regimes as generally understood represent more than 
agreements or temporary arrangements, and in certain areas, where anarchic tendencies 
seem paramount, one must agree that regime theory may be inapplicable. Keohane argues, 
however, that "together the concepts of cooperation and international regimes help us to 
clarify what we want to explain: how do patterns of rule-guided policy co-ordination emerge, 
maintain themselves and decay in world politics?"2.2 
2.1Stephen Krasner. ed .• International Regimes (Ithaca and London. Cornell University Press. 1983). 
p.2 
2.2Robert Keohane. After Hegemony (Princeton. Princeton University Preas. 1984) p.51 
7 
CHAPTER 2. THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD REGIME 8 
Some have suggested that the anarchic character of contemporary international grain 
trade precludes the application of regime theory. Although a definable international regime 
existed in the post-war period, this regime was derived from the norms and principles of 
the hegemonic power, the United States. That hegemony ended but "institutions, prin-
ciples and norms have persisted" albeit in weakened form. Hopkins and Puchala speak 
of a current international food regime of which wheat constitutes "a special sub-regime". 
The international food regime, they argue, is a "functionally specific regime" that more 
or less conditions diverse policies and activity. Food trade, food for aid and international 
financing for rural development and agricultural research, for example, are all affected by 
the principles and norms of the international food regime... Several organizations shape 
and spread regime norms and rules, and many rules are explicit and codified. Formal orga-
nizations include two specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). Both legislate rules and enforce 
procedures. Other bodies, such as the International Wheat Council (IWC), the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development, and the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research, also help to manage the world food system and uphold the norms of 
the regime. ~.3 . 
In addition to the role of international organisations a number of transnational organ-
isations such as corporations, banks, social and cultural organisations play a significant 
role and are often overlooked as actors in the shaping of functionally specific regimes. Su-
san Strange makes the argument that concentration on international organisations and on 
the politics of international economic relations has overshadowed important transnational 
relations.~·4 Strange's argument has some weight in the case of agriculture for the im-
portance in the critical wheat trade of major transnational corporations has been widely 
UDonald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis," 
in Krasner, International Regimes, pp.74-5 
HSusan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy 
(London, Pinter Publishing, 1988), p.21. Strange is critical of regime theory generally but especially 110 
of the American scholarship in the area. She critic:iJled it for tending to take the way things are managed 
as a given without asking what the underlying reasons for the prevalence of these norms, principles, and 
institutions. 
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recognized, and they have been seen to have determined norms and principles. No discus-
sion of the international agriculture regime can take place without an understanding of the 
international grain trading companies. We begin. then, with the informal and move to the 
formal agencies that comprise the elements of the international agricultural regime. 
2.2. International Grain Trading Companies 
The international grain trading companies, while informal and secretive in their structure, 
nevertheless they represent the single most pervasive influence in the international grain 
trade. The present day major grain trading transnational corporations which began as 
merchant houses in the 19th Century currently control 85 to 90% of U.S. grain exports; 
80% of Argentina's wheat exports', 90% of Australia's sourgum exports; 90% of Canada's 
rapeseed exports and 90% of wheat and corn exported from the E.C. These companies 
are Cargill, Continental Grain, Louis Dreyfus, Bunge, Andu and Co., and Mitsui/Cook. 
Together, these companies account for over 60% of the world's grain traffic, including food 
aid shipments.2.5 The success of these giants in acquiring and maintaining such pervasive 
market control is rooted in their takeover in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
of grain trade related institutions and infrastructure including railways, storage facilitates, 
banks and financial institutions, shipping and insurance companies. 
In recent years, the process of acquisition and integration has been accompanied by 
diversification as the major thrust of their corporate strategies. Diversification, Susanna 
Davies argues, serves three basic purposes: it spreads risks which arise from fluctuations in 
earnings in grain trading; it provides a way to invest profits productively with a relatively 
low level of fixed assets and labour costs; and, finally, it enables the corporations to become 
increasingly integrated into related businesses."3.6 The diversification and integration was 
also carried into the decision making process of regulating bodies in what researcher Oscar 
Billey Madinson refers to as the attainment of 'controlled instability'. He suggests that 
2.6 A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness (Washington, Essential Books, 
1992) p.303 
2.eSusanna Davies, "The Grain Trading Companies" in Nick Butler, The International Grain Trade: 
Problems and Prospects (London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,), 1986, pp.94-S 
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the grain traders seek as much control as possible over networks of professional and trade 
organisations. They establish numerous links between individual company employees and 
government agencies, with the branches of banks and railroads, and ensure heavy corporate 
representation on regulatory boards.2.7 Today, a handful of large traders dominate the 
membership of commodity exchanges worldwide. As private companies, the grain traders 
are not required to publish financial reports or disclose holdings or spheres of influence; 
therefore, available quantitative data has always been incomplete. In the aftermath of the 
so called Great Grain Robbery of 1972, the companies were the subject of considerable public 
debate and government investigations, and yet there has been little rigorous analysis on the 
precise influence ofthe companies on the international grain trade.2.8 Significantly, however, 
the attempted examination of the practices of the companies "brought into question the 
validity of traditional studies of the trade which have tended towards country-by-country 
analyses (importers and exporters), and which have focused attention (solely) on the state 
rather than on the private sector as executors of undue market influence."~·9 The implicit 
assumption has been that the traders operate according to free trade principles with a 
significant number of independent traders simply responding to market imperatives. 
This scenario would require the market to be seen, in Susanna Davies' words, as "a 
highly competitive forum in which supply and demand considerations determine prices, 
track flows and market performance." Davies argues that although the public sector's 
interference with the free market has been amply studied and documented, in the case of 
grain the role of the private sector as a source of market imperfection remains obscure. Some 
who have studied the private sector have sometimes tended to emphasise conspiracy. Such 
interpretations, which were especially common in the 1970s during the world food crisis, 
are debatable. Nevertheless, Dan Morgan's comment that "it is difficult to understand how 
2.7George Anthon, "Big Grain Exporters Shrouded in Secrecy", (The Des Moines Register, June IS, 
1975) 
2.8 Susanna Davies, "The Grain Trading Companies", in Nick Butler, The International Grain Trade: 
Problems and Prospects pp.94-95. 
2.IISusanna Davies ibid. p.95 
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the international grain companies could have slipped through history as inconspicuously as 
they have" still possesses considerable truth.:l· lO 
2.2.1. Principles, Rules and Norms: 
Although the five giant trading companies are highly competitive among themselves, they 
have adopted certain codes of conduct that have served them well individually and collec-
tively. The most important of these may be secrecy which is embodied in their monopoly on 
information. The internal structure facilitates their secretiveness and enhances their control. 
Morgan characterizes them as being "private, centralized oligopolies that do not publish fi-
nancial statements."2.11 The extent to which the companies have succeeded in maintaining 
secrecy was evident in 1975 when the American Senate Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations began investigating the companies' impact upon foreign policy. No library 
in the country seemed to have information about them. Senator Frank Church declaimed: 
"No one knows how they operate, what their profits are, what they pay in taxes and what 
effect they have on foreign policy."2.1:l 
The five major international grain companies have used their vast power to make it 
difficult for new companies entering the field and have forced state trading corporations 
such as the Canadian Wheat Board to work within the principles and norms of the existing 
regime. They have kept the market closed and tight through the manipulation of the 
transportation and distribution systems. They can, in Morgan's view, move their operations 
and capital freely around the world and form alliances only as developments demand it. 
They are non-ideological, non-nationalistic, and uniquely lacking in national identity. 
2.2.2. Political Influence and Economic Power: 
The political importance of the international grain companies lies most particularly in their 
ability to manipulate the grain market. The "Great Grain Robbery" of 1972 provides a 
2.1°Susanna Davies, ibid., p.95; and Dan Morgan, Merchants of Grain (New York: Penguin, 1980), 
p.13. 
2.11 Morgan, 19; and Davies, "The Grain Trading Companies", p.93 
2.12 "USSR and Grain", Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations Report (April 1976). 
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dramatic example of the power of multinationals to undermine domestic economic and polit-
ical programs and produce serious conflicts between states.2.l3 In 1972 the grain companies 
secretly purchased 433 million bushels of Canadian and American grain. The damaging 
effects of the purchases could have been minimized had the American carryover stocks not 
been depleted, but in 1972 world grain production lagged and trade increased dramati-
cally. Wheat prices tripled between 1972 and 1974 and international leaders declared that 
a "world food crisis" had begun. The great grain robbery resulted in a significant increase 
in the trade of agricultural products and in the profits of grain trading giants. 
Since the mid-1970's the grain companies have increasingly become the subject of de-
bates and some investigation that has revealed their scope and activities. It is clear that 
these companies must be included in any system of international wheat management, but 
it is equally apparent that their transnational character and private ownership make them 
difficult to monitor and influence. Their significance remains undeniable and is present 
throughout the century. 
2.3. The World Food Agencies in Rome 
The grain companies' monopoly was challenged in the early part of the twentieth century. 
The depression of the 1930s had a dramatic effect on the companies and the planning of 
postwar agencies. Memories of the crisis in the world grain trade in the 1930's - the dust-
bowls, the hunger, and the disastrous decline of world agricultural trade and nutritional 
standards - lingered and led many to see a major role for international agencies in the 
world food system. The regime envisaged by visionaries such as MacDougall of Australia 
and Boyd Orr of Britain was one where food agencies would parallel the Bretton Woods 
economic agencies. These agencies took form, but their functions were more limited than 
2.13 "The great grain robbery" is the focus of Morgan's Merchants of Grain. See also llichard Cooper, 
"Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies", World Politics, 24 (Jan. 1972), pp.159-
81; and David Blake and Robert Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations (New Jersey, 
1983). 
CHAPTER 2. TIlE INTERNATIONAJ., FOOD REGIME 1.3 
their founders had hoped. Nevertheless, the agencies formed then and later are fundamen-
tal actors within thE' international food regime. Foremost among these is the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). 
2.3.1. FAO: 
The FAO was one of the varied responses to the needs of postwar reconstruction. The 
FAO, Douglas Williams notes, "had a reconstruction role in that it was in part an attempt, 
through international cooperation, to remedy the general food shortages of the post-war 
years" .2.14 But it was more. Its founding director-general, John Boyd Orr, tied its origins 
to the interwar efforts to create a world food organisation. The American president, Franklin 
Roosevelt, identified "freedom from hunger" as one of the fundamental freedoms, and it was 
he who inspired the Hot Springs Conference of 1943 that led to the creation of the FAO in 
1945. Boyd Orr envisaged the FAO as the principal institution within a new international 
food regime. It was to be, he said, "an international organisation with the power to buy, 
hold, and sell important agricultural commodities entering world trade, and to set maximum 
and minimum prices for these commodities in the international market."2.15 Boyd Orr's 
vision remained unfulfilled, and his tenure as director-general of FAO ended in 1949. At 
the same time, the FAO turned its efforts towards the creation of international commodity 
clearing houses. These proposals were also unacceptable to the nation states that were FAO 
members. Nevertheless, the concept of world food security enunciated by Roosevelt and 
proposed by Boyd Orr has continued to have influence upon the FAO. 
The FAO was an agency where third world influence was felt early even though the 
agency itself was so much a product of American postwar policy. In 1956 B.R. Sen of 
India became director-general of FAO and power in the organisation shifted in the next 
decade towards the Third World. This occurred even though Western nations provided 
most of the operating funds. Ross Talbot describes the FAO as "a type of flexible steel 
triangle of power." Its governing structure "depicts a hierarchical policy-making process 
2'UDouglas Williams, The Specialised Agencies and the United Nations (London, Hurst and Co., 
1987) p.3 
2,uQuoted in Ross Talbot, The Four World Food Agencies in Rome (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State 
University Press, 1990), p.18 
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that culminates in the biennial conference to which every member-state is authorised to 
send a delegate."··16 Even though the grand scheme of Boyd Orr and his successors was 
not realised, the FAO has become a massive and controversial agency, the UN's largest 
specialised agency. The Director-General has become central to the definition of this agency 
which now has almost 7000 employees. The previous Director-General Edward Saouma 
argued for the FAO's importance in the international agricultural regime because of its 
role in accumulating information and carrying out research. It also, he claims, provides an 
essential forum for state-actors, particularly consuming nations, and carries out a technical 
assistance programme that has become quite extensive. All of these programmes have 
been affected by the cutback in American funding for the FAO, a cutback that reflected 
widespread criticism of Saouma and the organisation. Between the biennial conferences, 
authority is vested legally in a 49 member counci1.2•17 In 1986 there were 158 nations 
who were members (the USSR was a significant exception). The FAO has contributed 
important informational resources and has carried out important technical programmes 
which have definitely had an impact on agricultural improvement in the third world. It 
has failed, however, to "manage" international agricultural trade and aid and has created 
much antagonism towards it which surely has lessened its effectiveness. Its budget has 
increased substantially over the past twenty-five years, particularly in the 1970's when the 
food issue was paramount on the international agenda. In the 1980's however, the increase 
fell behind the rate of inflation. Moreover, the FAO has been a target of the American 
policy of reduced contributions; indeed, it is deliberately funded by the Americans at 75% 
of their assessment.2·18 
The FAO has not played the role its founders had hoped for, but it remains significant 
nevertheless in agriculture, fisheries and forestry, mainly in strengthening existing national 
programmes. The current intractability of international .agriculture problems suggest to 
some that, with reform, its future potential is great. This enhancement of its role is more 
2.18Ibid., pp.l0-26. 
2. lT The United Nations Yearbook 1986, (United Nations, New York, 1990). 
2.l
'
paul Taylor, "The United Nations System under Stress: financial pressures and their consequences," 
Review of International Studies, 17 (Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press,1991), p.371. 
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likely if there are "'managed" approaches to international agricultural trade disputes. The 
FAO, might then, exercise its great but unrealised potential as the largest UN agency within 
a regime currently marked by disorder. Over the years the FAO has lost ground to other 
agencies, some its direct offspring. 
2.3.2. The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), also located in Rome, was 
created in 1987 to finance agricultural development projects in the poorest nations and has 
particular responsibility in improving food production systems. Intellectually, it reflected 
a growing consensus at the time that "food aid" was less important and even possibly 
damaging to food security for poorest nations than was the creation of effective production 
systems.2.19 IFAD receives about half its funding from OECD nations and half from OPEC: 
"the extent to which it could tap these new funds was in fact the main justification for its 
creation'.2.2o Voting weight reflects the funding and the governing council membership is 
divided into three categories: OPEC, OECD and developing countries. It has an executive 
board chaired by the president which gives leadership. It provides financing at highly 
concessional terms (mostly 1% per annum, a 50 year maturity period and a 10 year grace 
period.) In its first five years of operation (1978-1983), IFAD spent $2.1 billion. 
It has a small staff of about 150 and, according to Ross Talbot, IFAD, is "admired by 
nearly all those who constitute the world food network" .2.H Similarly, Almagir and Arora 
in a recent major study of food security for the poorest nations point out that "the par-
ticipatory approach of IFAD's projects has facilitated many aspects of poverty alleviation'. 
They find its development of a "low-cost, self-sustained and interactive research" model 
based upon the client-oriented research and client-demand an approach that should be fol-
lowed in other agencies. Indeed, its influence can be seen in the revision of aid programmes 
in many Western nations that occurred in the 1980's.2.22 Whatever the success of IFAD 
2.1eSee Raymond Hopkins, "Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: the role of consensual knowl-
edge", International Organization, 46 (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, Winter 1992), p.237. 
2.20 Williams, The Specialised Agencies, p.43 
2.21 Talbot, The Four Food Agencies, p.99 
2.22Mohiuddin Alamgir and Poonam Arora, Providing Food Security for All, (New York, New York 
University Press,1991), p.140 
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in the field or its beneficial influence on national governments, its life has been marked by 
weak commitments by those national governments which brought it into being. Contribu-
tions to IFAD are voluntary not assessed, and not surprisingly, recession, the absence of a 
food crisis, and the weakening of OPEC in the 1980's have had a real effect upon it. The 
international political balance that created it has shifted and it currently rests upon weak 
financial foundations no matter how effective it may be. 
2.3.3. The World Food Council: 
The World Food Council (WFC), unlike the FAO, is not an international agency. It was 
created at the World Food Conference in Rome in November 1974 when the food crisis 
seemed to demand new institutions to supplement those created in the post-war period. 
The Council was the Conference's creation and it was to follow up on the commitments 
made and work done at that conference. Created by the UN General Assembly, the Council 
was charged with the responsibility of reviewing major food policy and problems, of recom-
mending to national governments and other agencies possible remedial action, and with the 
coordination of regional bodies.2•23 There are 36 members of the WFC who meet annually 
to attempt to fulfil these purposes. Recommendations are made to nation states and to 
the UN but even a strong supporter is forced to admit that these annual meetings "have 
tended to repeat the conclusions of the Conference with little evident impact on the actions 
of government or international agencies" .2.24 The Council's relationship to and with the 
FAO is not well-defined and sometimes difficult and its staff (150) is very small. Douglas 
Williams in his study of the specialized agencies omits mention of it. 
The Food Council's role has been less because the agricultural regime that seemed to be 
taking form in the mid-1970's was stillborn. At the time there were hopes that the Council 
would give effective leadership in the formation and direction of a world food reserve system 
that had been demanded by the Group of 77 developing nations at the Conference and, for 
2.23 Ibid .• pp.76-77 
2.2·Edwin Martin. Conference Diplomacy, A Case Study: The World Food Conference, Rome 
1974 (Washington. D.C .• 1979). pp.52-53. 
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78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 78-87 
8 21 27 30 25 24 25 16 20 25 221 
76.1 259.0 292.8 301.3 291.1 248.0 192.8 118.8 118.1 169.6 1067.4 
2.0 35.1 56.9 85.0 132.0 191.2 200.4 191.1 171.0 1064.6 
8 21 27 30 25 24 25 16 16 20 212 
76.1 259.0 292.8 301.3 291.1 248.0 192.8 118.8 87.5 120.9 1988.1 
2.0 35.1 56.9 85.0 132.0 191.2 200.4 190.9 170.0 1063.4 
5 6 11 
30.6 48.7 79.3 
0.2 1.0 1.2 
6 17 20 18 13 14 18 11 10 17 144 
55.9 221.7 192.3 216.9 131.3 150.7 148.5 81.4 64.1 113.8 1376.3 
1.8 30.3 42.7 58.6 87.5 124.3 144.9 130.44 120.8 741.0 
2 4 5 11 10 8 4 3 8 6 61 
20.2 37.3 67.5 77.1 138.2 82.0 22.8 25.8 39.9 43.1 553.7 
0.2 5.0 12.6 23.1 30.0 59.1 46.5 49.1 35.6 261.3 
0 0 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 16 
0.0 0.0 33.1 7.4 21.6 15.4 21.5 11.7 14.1 12.8 137.4 
0.0 0.1 1.6 3.3 14.4 7.8 9.0 11.6 14.6 62.3 
18 40 29 32 33 25 23 23 38 261 
4.3 10.1 18.2 15.2 16.2 13.0 10.5 6.8 10.5 104.8 
76.1 263.3 302.9 319.5 306.3 264.2 205.7 129.3 124.9 180.1 2172.2 
144.5 491.1 400.6 430.1 433.8 573.0 332.0 289.6 126.0 212.2 3432.7 
123.6 341.9 324.0 409.9 408.4 416.5 298.7 259.3 103.2 177.6 2863.1 
20.9 149.2 76.6 20.1 25.4 156.5 31.5 30.3 21.4 34.1 566.1 
Organisations 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.4 0.4 3.6 
No. of Effective Projects 
under Implementation 1 9 32 61 82 113 143 143 148 153 
No. of Projects in Pipeline NA NA NA 97 98 88 86 80 83 78 
No. of Approved Projects 
Initiated by IFAD 0 7 17 17 13 14 14 12 16 21 132 
Source: Modified from IFAD, Annual Report 1987, (Rome, 1988), p.19 
17 
* Standard Drawing Rights (international reserve currency). Over this 10-year period one SR has equalled 
%1.17 (U.S.) 
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Table 2.2. IFAD: 10 years at a glance, 1978-1987 (continued) 
Members's Contributions 
(US$ million) 
Contributions to Regular 
18 
Resources (end of period) 592.6 870.8 966.8 935.5 1308.8 1560.7 1763.8 1952.9 2106.3 2517.4 2517.4 
Contributions to Special 
Program (end of period) 57.2 167.6 167.6 
Income 
(USS million) 
Income from Investments 16.8 39.4 64.2 60.4 63.8 65.2 65.2 66.0 68.9 70.0 579.9 
Income from Loans 0.0 0.3 1.1 2.7 5.0 8.4 12.7 18.0 25.0 74.2 
General Reserve 
(US$ million) 
(End of period) 10.0 15.0 25.0 35.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 
Usable Resources 
(SDR· million) 
(End of period) 473.0 693.0 820.0 878.0 1164.0 1540.0 1805.0 1893.0 2018.0 2267.0 
Membership and Admin. 
Member Countries 
(at end of period) 125 125 135 136 139 139 139 139 142 142 
Recipient Countries 
(at end of period) 8 25 44 60 68 77 84 87 89 89 
Professional Staff 
(at end of period) 49 66 67 74 74 74 80 80 84 84 
Operating Expenses 
(USS million) 5.2 10.2 12.7 15.3 16.6 18.6 18.7 20.7 25.3 33.6 176.7 
Source: Modified from IFAD, Annual Report 1987, (Rome, 1988), p.19 
• Standard Drawing Rights (international reserve currency). Over this 10-year period one SR has equalled 
%1.17 (U.S.) 
quite different political reasons, by the United States, the hegemon in this area.2•21i The 
Council has regularly restated its commitment to this concept. The Council's resolutions, 
Talbot argues, have been only "minimally fulfilled", the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development being the major exception. For this failure, he blames the "intransigence 
of both developing and industrial nations, particularly the latter'. U6 The future of the 
World Food Council was long thought uncertain and is now destined to be incorporated as 
a department of the FAO. 
2.25 See Thomas Weiss and Robert Jordan, The Global Food Conference and Global Problem 
Solving (New York, 1976). 
2.25 Talbot, Four Food Agencies, pp.72-74. 
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2.3.4. The World Food Programme: 
The World Food Programme (WFP) is a joint UN/FAO Programme which, like the FAO it-
self, sprang from the initiative of an American president, on this occasion President Kennedy 
in 1961. Its purpose, then, was to dispense food aid at a time when the United States in 
particular had large agricultural surpluses. It has maintained that purpose although criti-
cism of "food aid" apart from emergency relief has weakened confidence in some aspects of 
its original purposes. It began in 1963 with less than $100 million to employ for emergency 
relief and development projects. From such modest beginnings, the WFP, according to 
Hopkins, has "dramatically increased its regime role". It now transfers approximately $1 
billion annually and is second only to the World Bank as a multilateral assistance agency. In 
Hopkins' view, prominent among the factors that brought the changes in "regime role and 
norms" was the rapid decline in U.S. food aid resulting in the creation of a more multilateral 
regime.2.27 The WFP with a large staff of 13500 has often had a difficult relationship with 
its parent, the FAO. It is usually thought to be better administered, and the publicity sur-
rounding its emergency relief work has also undoubtedly given it a higher priority. Indeed, 
its importance as the provider of first resort to the poor has become its most important 
activity. 
The World Food Programme governing body reviews its policies annually and the Ex-
ecutive Director participates in consultative group meetings led by the World Bank. It has 
tried to advance information sharing among donor nations and tried to identify areas where 
emergency relief might be required. For example, it passes information about wheat short-
ages to the International Wheat Council which in turn informs possible donor nations.2•28 
In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, it works in cooperation with the FAO and its "Early 
Warning System". 
The World Food Programme has a high profile, is generally respected, and has expanded 
its scope in recent years. In any consolidation or expansion of UN-related food agencies, 
the WFP seems likely to enhance its position. 
2.27 Raymond Hopkins. "Reform in the international food aid regime: the role of consensual knowledge" • 
International Organisation. 46 (Winter 1992). p.230. 
2.28 Interview with William de Maria. International Wheat Council. London, Ma.rch 3. 1992. 
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2.3.5. Conclusion: The Food Agencies and the Food Regime 
The UN food agencies represent a significant part of the international food regime. The 
norms and principles that have shaped that regime originally reflected the hegemonic po-
sition of the United States which from the 1940's to the 1960's was the dominant food 
exporter and food aid donor. Since the foundation of the World Food Programme in 1963 
and, more particularly, the World Food Conference of 1974 the United States hegemony has 
been supplanted by multilateralism and a marked drop in American food aid. Other actors, 
notably the European Community, have more important roles, and there has been a lack of 
attention to agriculture in international institutions generally. For example an Academic 
Council on the United Nations System's assessment of the UN system barely mentions the 
food agencies and there is no sustained discussion, much less analysis, of their work.~·~9 
This inattention has occurred even though agriculture itself assumed enormous importance 
in international fora such as the GATT discussions, and agriculture remained "the main 
sticking point" preventing a global trade agreement under the Uruguay Round.~·30Given 
that the past shapes the formation of new regimes and that the FAO and the WFP are the 
most significant international food-related agencies and that, in previous periods of turbu-
lence (for example, the 1970's), both North and South made aborted attempts to use these 
existing agencies to create the institutions and norms for a new regime, is there a possibility 
that these agencies might have greater pre-eminence? 
The FAO has a reputation for possessing a bloated and arrogant bureaucracy and was 
a major target of the Kassebaum Amendment which withheld U.S. funds pending reforms 
in the agency.2.31 Talbot, a major student of the agencies, finds that rivalries and organ-
isational dysfunction make it unlikely that the four agencies could join together in the 
effective fashion that would advance the interests of each.2.3~ Nevertheless, he recognises 
that a repetition of the 1970's food crisis, could turn international attention towards these 
2.28 John Kaufmann and Nico Schrijver, Changing Global Needs: Expanding Roles for the 
United Nations System (Academic Council on the United Nations System, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder Co., 1990). 
2.3°New York Times, Feb. 25, 1992. 
2.a1 See Taylor, "The United Nations System under Stress," pp 375-376. 
2.32 See Talbot, The Four Food Agencies, chs. 6-7. 
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agencies, and they could in turn playa fundamental part in creating a new international 
regime. Given recent events in China and Eastern Europe this would not be an impossible 
occurrance. One must not underestimate the capacity of the agencies to change. Donald 
Puchala, not a great admirer of the food agency bureaucracy, points out that "Over time, 
there has ... been notable evolution in United Nations' food policies characterised by a 
broadening of the range of concern, increasing conceptual sophistication and the contin-
ual assignment of new tasks to international organisations". The UN's attention now is 
focused mainly on rural development and backwardness, low agricultural productivity and 
malnutrition. These concerns have supplanted earlier concentration on multilateral trade 
and food aid. Adaptation has occurred; new tasks will arise; and the food agencies, however 
flawed, will continue to respond.~·33 
2.3.6. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
The failure of the food agencies to broaden their scope and to advance the interests of 
developing countries particularly has led to the creation of other bodies that form a part 
of the international institutional framework of the food regime. One of these institutions is 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
The international economic institutions set up at the end of World War II under Amer-
ican leadership were designed to promote free trade and economic growth, particularly in 
the Western developed economies. There was, however, little recognition of the importance 
of economic development or the importance and difficulty of trade in the poorer nations. 
The structuralist perspective of Raul Prebisch served as the ideological magnet to the col-
lective movement of developing nations which led to the convening of the Conference of 
the Problems of Developing Countries in Cairo in July 1962.~·34 Attended by 36 African, 
Asian and Latin American countries, the Cairo conference issued a declaration calling for an 
2033 Donald Puchala, "The Road to Rome: The Production and Distribution of Food", in Paul Taylor 
and A.J.R. Groom, eds., Global Issues in the United Nations' Framework, (London, The Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1989), p.184. On the possibilities of a new crisis similar to that of the 1970s, see Stephen Lewis, 
"Food for thought in a world of constant change," Financial Times, Feb. 1996. Lewis points out that 
China may require enormous imports. It now has the "financial resources to be a permanent net importer." 
2.3·Robert A. Isaak, International Political Economy: Managing World Economic Change, (New Jersey, 
Princeton-Hall International Inc., p.49 
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international conference on "all vital questions relating to international trade, primary com-
modity trade and economic relations between developing and developed countries" within 
the framework of the UN. :l.35 
While socialist countries readily supported the initiative, the Western powers had objec-
tions to new UN agencies in the area of trade and development.:l·36 UNCTAD I in 1965 was 
hailed by developing countries as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation 
in the field of trade development. UNCTAD's mandate as then expressed had four broad 
objectives: 
1. To promote international trade and economic development of developing countries. 
2. To promote trade and economic cooperation, particularly between countries at dif-
ferent stages of economic development, between developing countries and between 
countries with different economic and social systems. 
3. To formulate principles and policies on international trade and development and 
to facilitate the restructuring and adaptation of these principles and rules and the 
international institutions concerned. 
4. To promote a more equitable international economic order, a larger voice for devel-
oping countries in decision-making, and a development dimension and consensus in 
institutions and policies.:l·37 
In fact, UNCTAD and the developing nations who were its supporters had relatively 
little impact on the growth and development of the world economy in the first decade of 
UNCTAD's existence. Nevertheless, institutionalization took place. At the first session, 
the important Trade and Development Board and three permanent committees were set 
up. The committees were to deal with commodities, manufacture and financing related to 
trade. Other ad hoc working groups took form as did sessional committees. This in time 
UliHiatory of UNCTAD, 1964-1984, (New York, United Nations, 1985), p.10 
2.S0See Gautam Sen, with a note by Marc Williams, "UNCTAD and Interna.tional Economic Reform", 
in Taylor and Groom, Global Isaues, p.246. 
2·S1 History of Unctad, p.12 
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led to the negotiating conferences, the primary activity of UNCTAD. Convened every three 
to four years, the UNCTAD conferences remain major events in the trade and development 
dialogue but must be viewed as part of a broader dialogue. In the case of agriculture 
which, until recently, has been excluded from the GATT, UNCTAD offered a forum where 
such issues as agricultural commodity trade could be raised and was a forum where third 
world nations had an influence that they lacked in the Bretton Woods institutions. The 
Conferences should be briefly summarised: 
UNCTAD I (1965) resulted in the establishment of UNCTAD as a permanent institution 
and the emergence of the Group of 77 as a unified force of developing countries. 
UNCTAD II (1968) at New Delhi continued the emphasis on third world exports. The 
problem of food in landlocked countries gained particular attention. 
UNCTAD III (1972) at Santiago dealt with the economic implications of the Suez Canal 
and, more importantly, the developing countries succeeded in getting the industrialised 
nations to accept a Generalised System of Preferences for ten years, eliminating tariffs on 
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported by the developing countries.2.38 The 
GSP brought only limited success for developing countries and, paradoxically, seemed to 
result in an enhanced future role for the GATT. 
UNCTAD IV at Nairobi set target dates for an Integrated Program for Commodities 
(IPC). In the planning stages since 1914, the IPC sought to better the terms of trade for 
those countries that depend on the export of primary commodities. A $6 million Common 
Fund was established to secure a more orderly, long-term perspective on international trade 
in primary commodities. It was not until June 1980 that the treaty establishing the fund 
was actually ratified, and the fund itself took form only in 1989 as the Common Fund 
for Commodities.2•39 This conference was a highpoint in UNCTAD's history coming as it 
did when talk of a New International Economic order was common and OPEC seemed a 
precedent for others. 
2.31 Isaak. International PolitiCtJI Economy, p.93 
2.lI8 Kaufmann and Schrijver, Changing Global Needs, pp.47-47. 
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UNCTAD V (1979) continued the push for global negotiations but world economic prob-
lems in the later 1970's lessened its achievements. 
UNCTAD VI (1983) took place in the late stages of the greatest recession of the post-
war period. According to Kaufmann and Schrijver, it was "unanimously evaluated as a 
failure" .2.40 It focused on export earnings of developing countries and technology transfers. 
UNCTAD VII (1987) concentrated on international financial and banking services. Agri-
culture was not a concern, for it had moved over to the forum of the GATT. This move was 
an indication of Third World recognition that the GATT was the more significant forum 
and that, perhaps, UNCTAD's importance lay in the past. 
UNCTAD VIII (1991) was secondary to the 1990 General Assembly on International 
Cooperation for Development which gave rise to several conferences dealing with North 
South issues in a global context, a recent example of which was the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development. In a sense we are returning to basics since the developing 
countries argued in the early 1960's that UNCTAD should be an organ of the General 
Assembly rather than an agency of the Economic and Social Council as was proposed by the 
Western nations. Its role has been disputed from the beginning, in that UNCTAD focused 
attention on commodity pricing, and it has had an impact on the international food regime, 
although in recent years agriculture has been a secondary concern. UNCTAD's future has 
become even less certain with the creation of the WTO. 
2.4. The International Monetary System 
The international monetary system created at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 con-
sists of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) or the World Bank. They were formed with the intention of 
restoring, preserving and creating a liberal international trading system. The system was 
designed to prevent a recurrence of the protectionist policies of the interwar period and to 
2.t Oibid. p.29. See also Taylor and Groom, Global Issues, p.252 
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preserve the equilibrium that derived from Anglo-American hegemony.,·41 While both insti-
tutions are formally specialised agencies within the United Nations system, in reality, both 
organisations conduct their day-to-day business answerable only to their Boards of Gover-
nors. Their position is "semi-autonomous", and this relative autonomy has freed them from 
the political influence of the General Assembly although some would say that the influence 
of the wealthy powers, particularly the United States has been much too great.2•42 
2.4.1. The International Monetary Fund 
The Bretton Woods system has been largely dominated by the stabilisation directive of the 
IMF articles, and is described by Robert Isaak as a "system of macroeconomic management 
and microeconomic liberalism" .3.43 The Fund's importance, of course, goes far beyond 
agricultural questions, but beginning in the 1960's the Fund has paid some attention to 
the needs of developing countries and has, in its program, sought to impose direction upon 
agricultural transformation. Among the initiatives are the Compensatory Finance Facility 
(1963) which provides access to the Fund's resources without the usual restrictions, and 
The Buffer Stock Financing Facility (1969) which was established to support the UNCTAD 
proposal for a common fund. It was to provide resources for members to contribute to 
international commodity agreements in order to alleviate balance of payments problems. 
The Extended Facility (1974) was designed to give LDC's long term balance of payments 
assistance, particularly by extending repayment periods.2 ... There can be no doubt that 
third world influence upon the bank has increased as has that of other nations, but the major 
controversy surrounding its work remains the "conditionality" of its financing, a policy 
which is identified with the influence of western members especially the United States. In 
establishing conditions, the IMF has created specific norms for national agricultural policies 
H1lsaak, International Political Economy, p.44 
2.12 A blatant exa.mple of their disregard for other aspects of the UN system came when the Bank a.nd 
the IMF noted the General ABBembly's declarations regarding lending to South Africa and Portugal but 
refused to obey those directions. See Williams, The Specialised Agencies, p.160. 
u31saak, International Political Economy, pp.46-47. 
2.uStephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, (Berke-
ley, University of California Preas, 1985), ch.6. 
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in third world nations. This influence is far greater than the specific programmes that have 
responded to third world calls for global reform.l .45 
2.4.2. World Bank 
The World Bank's early focus was upon providing loans to war damaged European countries. 
With the adoption of the Marshall Plan in 1947, the World Bank shifted its priorities from 
reconstruction to development. Its loans were targeted for specific projects designed to build 
up the infrastructure of developing countries. Its day to day operation is managed by an 
Executive Board of which five members are appointed by the five most powerful members 
and the rest are elected. The president, who has always been an American, is responsible 
for staffing. World Bank headquarters are in Washington, and membership in the Bank is 
contingent on membership in the IMF. 
From a food security point of view, one of the most important initiatives of the Bank 
was the International Development Association (IDA). Established in 1960, the IDA was to 
provide loans to developing countries on a more liberal basis than normal IBRD loans. This 
program, lauded by nearly all developing countries at the time, provided some liquidity to 
poor nations. Its work in this area, however, fell victim to ideological and economic pressures 
in the 1980's, and its level of replenishment was cut from $416 billion to $9 billion. 
In assessing the effectiveness of the World Bank Group in development terms, the role 
of Robert McNamara (1968-1981) cannot be overlooked. Upon assuming office, McNa-
mara "shifted the bank's priorities away from stressing the modern sector of developing 
countries (usually cities) toward alleviating absolute poverty through direct action at the 
rural level" .2.46 His "basic human needs" orientation greatly increased both the scope and 
amount of the bank's resources which flowed to the poor and agricultural development. 
Much research was also directed towards this area. 
2'UThe structure of the IMF has created much of the controversy. It is comprised of two bodies, the 
Board of Governors and the Executive Board. The Board of Governors consists of one governor for each 
nation with voting power. Upon joining the IMF a country is assigned a quota based upon the volume of 
its international trade and its subscription. The Executive Board is made up of members appointed by the 
five largest donors and some members elected by particular groups. The overall result naturally gives more 
weight to national wealth and poorer nations feel discriminated against. Its annual budget at the time of 
publication was about 16 billion. Williams, The Specialised Agencies, p.164 
2.48 Isaak, International Political Economy, p.200. 
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Despite these initiatives and "despite the continual process of political, institutional 
and financial adaptation", the international monetary system has, even in the judgement of 
many advocates, done less than it had hoped to improve the overall condition of the poorest 
developing nations.l.47 It has affected the international food regime, but less than one would 
have expected. The IMF Food Facility, an offshoot of the Compensatory Financing Facility, 
has been little used. During 1981-1987 only seven countries used it to a maximum of SDR 
401 million. Only two of the least developed countries drew upon it all! The more recent 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (1988) has also been little used. The 
record, Almagir and Arora argue in their study of food security for the poor, is a weak one. 
That judgement seems correct, given that its focus remains on those countries which adhere 
to IMF -supported adjustment programmes.3•48 
2.4.3. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a voluntary commercial treaty 
that came to represent the third pillar of U.S. economic hegemony after World War II. Con-
ceived at the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), the GATT was thought to be an essential 
complement of the monetary institutions that had been created.2•49 The multinational or-
ganisation grew to monitor 90% of world trade in merchandise and has worked to reduce 
tariffs in industrial countries by more than 40% during its existence.2.60 
The origins of GATT date back to the Crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression. At 
this time nearly 45% of world trade was concentrated in the United States and although 
American exports made up 20% of world trade it represented a mere 6% of the GNP. The 
relative self sufficiency of the American economy was further entrenched by the enactment 
of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930 which expanded protection to cover an additional nine 
hundred items.2•51 
2.URobert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, second edition (New York, 1989), 
p.8I. 
us Almagir and Arora, Providing Food Security for All, p.173 
UIISee United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, July 1944. Proceedings 
and Documents (Washington, 1948). 
u°lsaak, International Political Economy, p.82 
u1ibid. 
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This act led to a chain reaction of import restrictions. By 1933 the volume of world trade 
in manufactured goods had declined by 40%. This "beggar thy neighbour" approach to the 
foreign economic policies left strong memories.2. 62 It was in response to these restrictive 
trade practices that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934. Designed to 
promote trade agreements which included a reciprocal restriction of tariffs, this principle 
later came to be known as the "Most Favoured Nation" principle, a cornerstone of the 
GATT. 
The architects of the postwar international trade system, determined to avoid the events 
of the 1930's, adopted the liberal vision of Cordell Hull and others who promoted the use of 
economic surplus to establish a commercial order based on free trade. This ideal, set down 
in the Havana Charter (1948), served as a basis for the establishment of a comprehensive 
International Trade Organisation; the negotiation of a multilateral agreement to reduce 
tariffs; and a mechanism to deal with the obligations relating to tariff reductions.2•63 In the 
end the plans for an International Trade Organisation were aborted due to the withdrawal 
of American support, and the GATT encompassed the second and third directions. For 
our purposes, it is important to note that during these negotiations the U.S. insisted on 
special treatment for agriculture, largely to protect farm income. The GATT concentrated 
on manufacturers and agriculture was left out.2•54 
2.4.4. Structure 
The GATT was not intended to be an organisation but rather a series of conferences at 
which multilateral decisions are taken by the contracting parties to reduce tariffs. These 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations took place at Geneva (1947); Annecy (1949); 
2.i2For example, Clair Wilcox wrote in A Charter for World Trade: "Intensive economic nationalism 
marked ... the decade. Exports were forced; imports were curtailed. All weapons of commercial warfare were 
brought into play; currencies were depreciated, exports were subsidised, tariffs raiSed, exchanges controlled, 
quotas imposed, and discrimination practised through preferential systems and barter deals. Each nation 
sought to sell much and buy little." Quoted in David Blake and Robert Walters, The Politics of Global 
Economic Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1983). See also Richard Pomfret, Unequal Trade, 
(Oxford, 1988), ch.3. 
2.U John Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (London, Royal Institute of International Af-
fairs, 1990), p.12. 
2··'Theodore Cohn, The International Politics of Agricultural Trade (Vancouver, Univeaityof 
British Columbia Preas, 1990) p.Sl. 
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Torquay (1950-1); and Geneva (1956). The talks became longer and more significant as the 
names indicate: the Dillon round (1960-2); the Kennedy Round (1964); the Tokyo Round 
(1973-9); and the Uruguay Round (1986-1995). By the time of the Uruguay Round, the 
exclusion of agriculture had become impossible, not least because third world nations and 
some others believed that GATT had helped manufacturing and Western urban interests. 
The GATT originated with 23 members but grew to include over 100 states. At the 
annual Session of Contracting Parties, decisions are generally taken by consensus rather 
than by vote. When voting was used, it was on the basis of one vote per member rather 
than the weighted voting system of the IMF .2.55 
2.5. The International Wheat Council 
The International Wheat Council (IWC) was established by the International Wheat Agree-
ment (1949). The Agreement represented the response of the international community to 
the need to stabilise wheat prices after the build-up of surpluses and the subsequent collapse 
of prices during the depression. The stated objective of the Agreement was "to adjust the 
supply of wheat to effective world demand and eliminate the abnormal surpluses which have 
been depressing the wheat market, and to bring about a rise and stabilisation of prices" .2.56 
The stated purpose reflects the fact that the IWC was established to address the needs 
of the major producers, Canada and the United States. The IWC has maintained its 
office in London since 1949, but it has been largely the "forgotten" organisation in the 
international food system. It currently has a skeleton staff of 23, including the executive 
director and five economic analysts. Its budget, which has been affected by pressures similar 
to other international organisations, is only 9 million pounds annually which is contributed 
by member states. Although the first wheat agreement failed to achieve price stability, it 
did initiate the important principle that both exporting and importing countries should 
participate in such agreements bound by rights and obligations.2•57 
2.IIIIsaak, International Political Economy, p.84. 
2.55 International Wheat Council, "International Wheat Agreements: A Historical and Critical Back-
ground", EX974/S)/2/ August 14, 1974, p.3. 
2.i7 Cohn, The international Politics, and private interview with Chief Economist William de Maria, 
p.68. 
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Present membership includes sixty states, including all major wheat exporters and a 
lesser percentage of importers. The Council meets for the purpose of administering the 
Agreements and the related World Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention. Its day-
to-day tasks involve the collection and dissemination of data relating to wheat production, 
sales, and stockpile levels worldwide. The voting system within the council is weighted 
(assessed by financial contributions); however, the total number of exporters' votes must 
equal the total number of importers' votes.us 
The executive Committee is made up of six exporting members and six importing mem-
bers elected annually. This committee works under the general direction of the council 
in fulfilling its functions. A second twelve member committee has been established to re-
view and report continuously on market conditions. The International Wheat Council has 
sought to revive the International Wheat Agreement that collapsed in 1967. Since then two 
weaker conventions have replaced the agreement. It too is an organisation whose potential 
is unrealised but which might playa large role if a stabilisation and security system is 
developed. 
2.6. National Governments 
The national governments of the major agricultural exporters Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
the E.C. and the United States operate export policies designed to maintain producers' 
financial viability and to maximise their presence in international markets. Although these 
governments have similar objectives, their policies vary considerably, favouring either free 
market approaches or national monopolies. Despite these structural differences in their 
approach to international marketing, notably in the case of grain, these governments face 
the dual pressures of reconciling domestic and international pressures. 
The importance of national governments in the international food regime can 'best be 
understood from a detailed study of their policy development, particularly in the case of 
the United States and the E.C. The decline of American pre-eminence in the international 
2.liI lnternational Wheat Agreement, 1986, incorporating the Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid 
Convention. 
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food regime and the ensuing role of the U.S. and national states in the transformation of 
the regime will be the subject of a chapter in my thesis. 
2.6.1. Conclusion: 
Robert Keohane has written: 'By investigating the evolution of the norms and rules of a 
regime over time, we can use the concept of international regime both to explore continuity 
and to investigate change in the world political economy'.3.59 The postwar international food 
regime gained stability through American hegemony, particularly in an area such as wheat 
where the willingness of Canada and the United States to maintain reserves guaranteed 
supply and price stability. As we have seen above, that regime did not survive the 1960's. 
Although many of the institutions and actors that are part of the regime remain, such 
as the UN food agencies, the International Wheat Council, and the grain companies, the 
period since the 1960's has been marked by discord. With the increasing tendency of 
the United States to act unilaterally on agricultural issues, other nations sought redress 
through diplomatic channels and sought to enhance other agencies.2.6o After the world food 
crisis of the early 1970's the UN food agencies have turned their attention primarily "toward 
enhancing the well-being ofrural populations in the world's poorer countries."2.61 They have 
been much less concerned with world trading arrangements than was originally expected or 
than they would have hoped. Their record is mixed although Puchala rightly points out 
that the scope of their activities has grown and they did manage to have agriculture assume 
a higher priority. Moreover, "with their emphasis on rural development, and particularly 
with their growing concern for equity in the countryside, UN food and agricultural policies 
are presently in accord with accumulated wisdom concerning the most promising pathways 
to development" .2.62 
Nevertheless, the possibilities for rural development have been very much affected by 
the competition, disorder, and instability of the international trading regime in agriculture. 
2.1i8 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Econ-
omy, (Princeton, 1984), p.64. 
uOCohn, p.64. Speaking of gram, Cohn writes: "When the duopoly broke down in the late 1960's, no 
other group or organisation assumed its functions of controlling or stabilizing prices." 
2.e1 Puchala, "The Road to Rome", p.179. 
2.II
2 ibid., pp.200-201. 
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Agriculture was excluded from the GATT rounds, largely at the behest of the United States 
and domestic political considerations in the United States and in other countries. The 
result is that rules that existed have weakened and new rules have not been formulated. 
In the 1970's agriculture came to the foreground of the international agenda because of 
the food crisis. What Keohane says generally about the post-1971 period can be applied 
to agriculture in particular: "Yet even when neither power nor positional motivations are 
present, and when all participants would benefit in the aggregate from liberal trade, discord 
tends to predominate over harmony as the initial result of independent action" .2.63 In 
1980 Hopkins and Puchala took issue with Helge Ole Bergensen who had pointed out the 
conflictual character of the global food regime during the 1970's. They claimed that "in 
the current global food regime, ... Bergensen is correct to observe an increase in conflict. 
We are equally correct to note in the same period an increase in collaboration and in 
cooperation" .2.64 
Hopkins and Puchala were correct to point to the efforts at cooperation, and in 1980 
it was far from certain that the cooperation would not bear fruit. But Bergesen was more 
prophetic: the regime transformation away from conflict did not occur, even if it remains 
as necessary as ever. 
2.83 Keohane, After Hegemony, p.59. 
2.uHopkins and Puchala, "The Failure of Regime Transformation: A reply", International Organi-
sation, 34 (Spring 1980), p.305; and Helge Bergeson, "A New Food Regime: Neceuary but Impossible", 
International Organisation, ibid., pp.285-392. 
Chapter 3 
The Nature of Grain as an 
Internationally Traded Commodity 
3.1. Introduction 
"Man's persistent fixation with the food problem attests to its impor-
tance and complexity. However, unfulfilled past prophecies of widespread 
calamity, together with recent agricultural advances, suggests the possibility 
that ongoing predictions of food scarcity in the underdeveloped countries 
are illusory. Obviously the consequences of concluding wrongly that future 
needs will be met as part of the normal course of events are immense. On 
the other hand, man's capacity for directing events is greater than at any 
time in history" .3.1 
Within months of this prediction, the world was stunned by the sudden spectre of food 
shortages worldwide and wildly escalating prices of all food products following the massive 
secret sales of grain to the Soviet Union. The example of the "Great Grain Robbery" in 
1972 is the most dramatic example in recent history of the instability of the international 
grain trade. 
This chapter will examine the nature of grain as an internationally traded commodity. 
This examination will identify the destabilizing characteristics of the grain trade which have 
resulted in grain being the subject of almost continual dispute, negotiation and attempted 
cartelization since the mid-1800's. 
Central to the examination of the international grain trade is, of course, the question 
of balancing production levels with consumption demands. The data presented suggest 
that there have been few moments in history when an effective balance of production and 
consumption has been attained. 
The difficulty in establishing and maintaining optimal levels of production relates to the 
very structure of the international grain trade. Global production of wheat, coarse grains 
s.lLeroy Blakeslee; Earl 0 Heady; Charles F. World Food Productions, Demand and Trade, (Iowa 
State University Press, Iowa 1973), p.3. 
CHAPTER 3. THE NATURE OF GRAIN 34 
and rice are approximately 1.89 billion metric tons per annum, yet, only 220 million metric 
tons or 12% is traded on the international market.3.:l This "thinly traded" quality of the 
international grain trade is a significant contributing factor ill the instability of the market. 
The sensitivity of the international grain trade derives, in part, from the fact that it is this 
relatively small amount of grain that reaches the international market, and particularly, the 
level of surplus stocks that determines the international price of grain. Although a great 
number of grains are traded on the international market, this study will focus primarily on 
wheat, which has historically been the "key" to the international grain trade and on "coarse 
grains" (maize, barley, rye, oats, millet and sorghum) which have in recent years played a 
growing role in the international feed market. 
Although the trade usually struggles under the burden of costly surplus stocks, cycles 
of grain shortages date back to the 1920's and before. It is the very possibility of a grain 
shortage - usually resulting from unusual market activity or yield fluctuations that requires 
continuous scrutiny of the levels of surplus stocks. While high stock levels have a depressing 
effect on grain prices, low stocks can jeopardise security of supply. Thus, the management 
of surplus stocks has been one of the central challenges facing exporting nations throughout 
history. 
The perceived need for surplus management is accentuated by the highly political status 
of grain as one of the world's key staple commodities. In exploring the interrelatedness of 
the fields of economics and politics, Quincy Wright recognised that "resources may be used 
to influence a group by either offering or withholding economic advantage.,,3.3 As illustrated 
in the case of the embargo of grain shipments to the Soviet Union following the invasion 
of Afghanistan, grain has, for many exporting nations, been an important instrument of 
foreign policy.3.4 These political considerations will be dealt with in more detail in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
a.2Michael McGary and Andrew Schmitz, eels. The World Grain Trade: Grain Marketing. Insti-
tutions and Policies (London: Pinter Publications, 1982), p.vi 
uQuincy Wright, "The Study of international Relations". (New York: Appleton - Central Crofts, 1955) 
p.239. in David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecra.ft. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) p.3. 
a"Robert L. Paarlberg, Food Tra.de and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union and the United State •. 
(Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1985) p.100 
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In a broader sense grain generally receives special status among both exporting and 
importing nations. This special status not only reflects the importance of grain to the 
economies of exporters and importers but also the fact that although the risk is very low, 
the possibility of grain shortages is very real.3 •S Thus, in order to regulate production 
levels as well as to pursue domestic or international political objections, governments have 
employed often contradictory policies and initiatives. These interventions in the grain trade 
have had the effect of disturbing production levels and prices in a highly sensitive market. 
For example, export subsidies are used to promote exports while tariffs or quotas are used 
to restrict trade. Production levels can be increased through price supports or decreased 
through acreage reduction programs.3 .6 Food aid shipments have also been used to dispose 
of surplus stocks and, as in the case of the United States in the 1950's and 1960's, to expand 
the market.3.1 
Various combinations of government programs have been implemented in order to maxi-
mize market shares, maintain farm incomes and at times to achieve foreign policy objectives. 
Political initiatives, both national and international, that have impacted on the international 
grain trade will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. They have been introduced 
in this chapter only to the extent that they reflect the nature of the commodity. 
As many of the general characteristics of the grain trade are common to all major 
exporting nations the United States is often used to illustrate a point. As the dominant 
exporter of grain in this century, its advancements have most dramatically affected the 
evolution of the commodity and the market. 
In addition to the interventions of international organisations and national governments, 
there is, as we saw in chapter 2, virtually no aspect of the grain trade that is not influenced 
by the interventions of the international grain trade trading companies. Although the role 
UMcGary and Schmitz, The World Grain Trade: Grain Marketing, Institutions and Policies, 
p.xi. 
U Andrew Schmitz, Alex F. McCalla, Donald o. Mitchell and Colin Carter, "Grain Export Cartels". 
(Cambridge, Mass. Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981) p.23 
uDan Morgan, "Merchants of Grain" (New York, Penguin, 1979) pp.140-150. Public Law 480 passed by 
u.S. Congress in 1954 was advertised as an aid problem. It was in fact a perfect tool for disposing of surplus 
grain by converting millions of rice eaters worldwide to wheat. "Few questioned the profound economic and 
political implications of such a new matrix of dependency of the United States." (Morgan p.144) 
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of these private grain traders will be an ongoing theme throughout this study, this chapter 
must include an overview of the role of the companies in the international grain market and 
how, through their operations, they have influenced the nature of the commodity. 
3.2. Grain Production - General Characteristics 
Grain hroughout history has claimed a prominence shared by few other commodities. Vitally 
important to human welfare, grain has also played an important role in the global trading 
system since the mid 1800's. Grains comprise the single most important contribution to 
human consumption. They contain a major fraction of human requirements for protein, 
carbohydrates, fat, minerals and vitamins (except vitamin C).3.8 Grain can thrive in a 
remarkable range of climate conditions. Maize, for example can be grown from 50.N latitude 
to 40.S latitude and from below sea level to elevations of 12,000 ft. It can be grown in sub-
tropical areas of Florida to the semi-arid plains of the Soviet Union. It thrives in parts of 
North Africa with an annual rainfall of less than 10 inches as well as in India where rainfall 
can exceed 200 inches.3 .g 
Wheat, however remains the most tolerant and widely produced grain in the world. It is 
adaptable to an extremely wide range of climate conditions although variations in climate 
will affect the grade of wheat produced - particularly in terms of its protein content. The 
hot, dry North American Prairies constitutes a large portion of the most fertile land base 
for wheat production in the world. They are especially conducive to the production of 
premium duram wheats. Europe, with its cooler, moister climate produces a lower protein 
soft wheat. 
Geographical location and climate also affect the choice between spring and winter 
wheats. Winter wheats, which are planted in September or October and harvested in July, 
have the advantage of higher yields. The disadvantage of winter wheat is the danger of 
"winterkill" which can destroy the crop if the winter is particularly harsh without sufficient 
snow cover. Spring wheat is planted in the early spring and harvested in September. The 
UD. Gayle Johnson and Robert L. Gustafson, Grain Yields and the American Food Supply: An 
Analysis of Yield Changes and Possibilities, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982) p.6 
U Atkin ... 1992 ... p.3S 
CHAPTER 3. TIlE NATURE OF GRAIN 37 
advantage of spring wheat is that with the hot, dry summer weather, it is able to develop a 
very high protein content. It can also be grown in climates too severe for winter wheat.3.1O 
Yet, despite the fact that grains can be grown in most regions of the world, there are very 
few areas where serious food shortages or outright famine do not exist in living memory. 
Western Europe, for example, faced food shortages as recently as 1947.3•11 
Historically, agriculture has played a unique role in the economic development of most 
nations. Agriculture, and particularly grain, has become a heavily regulated industry and 
commodity with extensive government intervention in both the input and output markets. 
These government interventions which take place almost daily, take into consideration the 
unique characteristics of grain as an internationally traded commodity. Unlike manufactur-
ing processes, agricultural production is dependent on biological processes which, by their 
very nature are dynamic and therefore unpredictable. Weather variables which include pre-
cipitation, temperature, humidity and wind speed can have significant short term effects 
on crop yields.3•12 The unpredictability of weather patterns alone precludes any reliable 
predictions regarding crop yields. Infestations can also suddenly and radically alter yield 
expectations. 
Yet, whatever the uncertainties and however widespread the regions where grain can be 
grown, a review of the development of the international grain trade indicates that there 
has actually been a rather specific pattern in the evolution of the major grain producing, 
consuming and trading nations since the mid-1800's. 
An historical perspective offers many significant insights into the problems associated 
with the modern grain trade. 
An examination of the history of the growth in the production of wheat and coarse 
grains requires au examination of the four major inputs into agricultural production -land, 
labour, non-land capital and intermediate inputs. Non-land capital includes durable farm 
equipment and non-residential structures. Intermediate inputs include energy, fertilizers, 
UOibid. p.36 
a.ulbid., p.3 and Morgan, pp.35-36. 
a.12 Johnson ... 1962 ... p.16 
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pesticides, herbicides, seed , and otliC'r various inputs.3 . 13 Despite the obvious yield en lian c-
ing benefits of these inputs, it is important to note t.hat effective demand and adequate price 
levels must exist befon' a producer will ri sk his investment on new techniques, alternate 
crops or new instruments.3 . 14 Thus, once invented , the degree of success of implementation 
of a technologicaJ innovation will depend on the demand side of the market.3 . 1S 
Figure 3.1. Major World Grain Routes 1880 
Source; Morgan , Merchants of Grain pp .8-9 
3.1'Susan M. Capalbo and John M. Antle, eds. Agricultural Productivity - Measurement and 
Explanation 
U4Marilyn Chou, David P. Harmon Jr .• Herman Kahn and Sylvan H. Wittiver, World Food 
Prospects and Agricultural Potential (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977) p.16 
3.16 J .R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages (New York, St . Martin's Press, 1963) Hicks also concludes that 
Malthough Bome technological change is clea.rly the result of independent scientific discovery, most of the 
theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to the explanation of technological change in response 
to relative price changes." 
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3.3. Historical Background 
As figure 3.1 illustrates, Great Britain was the "key" to the establishment of the interna-
tional wheat market throughout the 1800's, particularly following the repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846. In his recent study The International Grain Trade, Michael Atkin described 
the subsequent creation of the British import market as "large and important enough to 
make an impact on trade flows as dramatic as that of Ancient Rome."3.16 In 1843, through 
considerable political pressure, Imperial Preference had been formalized giving a great ad-
vantage to Canadian producers and millers in the British market. This coveted position, 
however, ended with the repeal of the Corn Laws.3.17 
Other producers, notably Northern Germany and Russia began to assume a major place 
in the British market, but it was American producers who were the main beneficiaries of 
the new, open British market .3.18 This period of rapid market expansion was erratic for all 
major exporters. The variability of the British imports from the major exporters is evident 
in Table 3.1.3.19 
As Table 3.1 indicates, the "New World" countries of Canada, Australia, Argentina and 
the United States had vast expanses of prairies, which were ideal for growing wheat were 
brought under cultivation in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The producers 
moved forward in sequence between 1870 and 1888 the United States cropland expanded 
by 230%. In the following 10 years however expansion settled in at less than 10%.3.20 This 
rather abrupt saturation of land available at the turn of the century signalled the end of an 
era in which increased food production was based on land expansion in the United States.3.2l 
3.le Atkin ... 1992. p.16 
3.l 7Duncan Alexander MacGibbon; "The Canadian Grain Trade" (Toronto, The MacMillan Co. of 
Canada, 1932) p.12. With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 Canadian exports to Britain fell from 
802,240 bushels in 1847 to 260,480 bushels in 1848 and down to 203,208 bushels in 1849. 
s,ulbid ... The American advantage came from the judgement that it was cheaper to ship grain by the 
Erie Canal to New York than down the St. Lawrence to Montreal. 
lI,uD.O. Mitchell, "A World Grains and Soybeans Model" Commodity Studies and Projections Dividers, 
Economic and Research Staff. The World Bank, Washington, 1985. Imports from RUBBia, for example, 
dropped from an average of 51 thousand tonnes in the period 1828-1832, to an average of 2 thousand tonnes 
in the next five year period. In then climbed back to 46 million tonnes in the period 1838-1842. 
1I.2°Leroy L. Blakeslee, Earl O. Keady, Charles F. Framenghan, "World Food Production, Demand and 
Trade", (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1983) p.7 
s·21Vernon W. Ruttan and Yujrro Hayami, "Induces Technical Change" in Capalbo and Antle, 1988. 
p.247 
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Table 3.1. Sources of UK wheat imports, 1829-1914 (five year annual aver-
ages; thousands tonnes 
Russia Prussia (;ermany Canada USA Argentina India Australia 
1828-32 51 71 0 15 3 0 0 0 
1833-37 2 25 0 5 0 0 0 0 
1838-42 46 163 0 5 5 0 0 0 
1843-47 56 112 0 10 25 0 0 0 
1848-52 142 137 0 5 41 0 0 0 
1853-57 132 152 0 15 147 0 0 0 
1858-62 229 0 290 76 371 0 0 0 
1863-67 411 0 325 46 229 0 0 0 
1868-72 640 0 229 112 544 0 0 0 
1873-77 457 0 188 168 1087 0 127 71 
1878-82 340 0 152 173 1753 0 224 137 
1883-87 406 0 91 127 1300 15 518 152 
1888-92 823 0 86 107 1087 112 528 112 
1893-97 833 0 41 168 1524 391 234 102 
1898-02 229 0 36 335 1920 472 305 193 
1903-04 1107 0 0 396 640 996 1107 356 
1905-09 772 0 0 645 919 1179 726 432 
1910-14 696 0 0 1072 1138 711 945 640 
Source: Michael Atkin. The International Grain Trade, 
Second Edition (Cambridge, Woodhead Publishing Ltd., 1995). 
p.17 
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Nevertheless, the United States had emerged from this phase as the leading grain ex-
porter and in 1848, Chicago was established as the main grain market in the world.3•22 
The other major exporters, Canada, Australia and Argentina followed the exhaustion of 
American land cultivation with rapid expansion of their own production and exports. 
3.4. Infrastructure 
The infrastructure necessary for the functioning of an international market in grain was 
built in the late 1800's. A network of canals and railroads quickly connected the producing 
areas with the main ports were constructed. This land-based infrastructure expansion was 
accompanied by the transformation ofthe shipping industry as modern steel, steam powered 
vessels replaced wooden sailing ships. This dramatically reduced the cost of freight. 3•23 
In addition the transatlantic telegraph cable laid in 1866 made the rapid transmission of 
information including stock levels and prices possible.3.24 
3.22 Atkin ... 1992.p.19 
3.23 D.B. Grigg, The Agricultural Systems of the World, (London, Cambridge University Pre88 , 
1974) p.655. 
3.24 Atkin ... p.19 
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The internalization of the grain trade also spawned the emergence of the international 
grain trading companies. It brought about the establishment of the futures markets in 
Chicago in 1848, and in Liverpool in 1883. These markets have played a vital role in 
the world's grain trade since then. Futures markets grew out of spot markets in which a 
contractual obligation is established between two parties to buy and sell specified goods 
at an agreed price. These markets became popular instruments of the grain merchants 
in the late 1800's as a means of combating price volatility. Merchants were exposed to 
considerable risk in buying grain at a certain price, covering the cost of transportation and 
selling it again at a profit. The more volatile the prices, the greater the risk. The contractual 
obligations of the futures markets were intended to reduce substantially the risk to the grain 
traders. Futures markets also provided a public source of grain prices, an important piece 
of information for pruducers as well as exporters. In the many ways, the main features of 
the present day grain trade were established in the dynamic period of growth 1847-1900. 
The period 1900-1919 was marked by erratic levels of production in all major producing 
nations. As Figure 3.3 suggests, total world production grew at a relatively stable rate; 
however individual producing nations experienced a considerable degree of instability in 
production levels and prices.3•25 The unpredictability and uncertainty in the market was 
exacerbated by the outbreak or World War I. Supplies were tight, particularly since East 
European trade to Britain was cut off. Canada, Australia and the United States were 
under pressure to meet this sudden increase in demand. Production soared, particularly 
in the United States, as did the price of wheat. Figure 3.2 shows this to be the highest 
price years in history. The size of the price fluctuations were remarkable - well over 50% 
in a single season. Producers, also adversely affected by the volatility of the market were 
beginning to organize into what would become very influential co-operatives and unions by 
the mid-1930's. 
The crisis of the 1920's and 1930's provides a classic illustration of the unpredictability 
of the international grain trade with the simultaneous collapse of both supply and demand. 
In terms of supply, the problems in large part stemmed from the unprecedentedly large 
S'''price data is found in figure 3.2 
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Argentina Australia Canada U.S.A. Total 
1899 101,670 40,051 56,806 655,140 853,667 
1900 74,736 48,355 55,556 599,327 777,975 
1901 56,365 38,581 18,589 762,542 946,077 
1902 103,764 12,383 97,040 686,960 900,147 
1903 129,669 74,149 81,718 663,114 948,650 
1904 150,759 54,528 72,238 555,565 833,090 
1905 134,923 68,527 107,585 706,030 1,017,065 
1906 155,977 66,433 136,246 740,533 1,099,189 
1907 192,500 44,644 93,219 628,758 959,121 
1908 156,161 62,574 112,436 642,721 973,892 
1909 131,028 90,426 166,743 683,947 1,072,144 
1910 145,983 95,129 132,094 625,488 998,694 
1911 166,192 71,650 230,934 618,176 1,086,952 
1912 187,393 91,969 224,173 730,024 1,233,559 
1913 104,720 103,360 231,706 751,115 1,190,901 
1914 169,168 24,875 161,268 897,502 1,252,813 
1915 169,021 179,052 393,562 1,008,652 1,750,287 
1916 80,101 152,413 262,791 634,564 1,129,869 
1917 219,470 114,751 233,763 619,793 1,187,777 
1918 171,593 75,655 189,083 904,152 1,340,483 
1919 214,142 45,966 193,272 952,103 1,405,483 
1920 156,124 145,873 263,195 843,305 1,408,497 
1921 191,031 129,081 300,857 818,981 1,439,950 
1922 195,844 109,460 399,808 846,649 1,551,761 
1923 247,800 125,002 474,214 759,492 1,606,508 
1924 191,141 164,575 262,093 841,615 1,459,424 
1925 191,141 114,493 395,473 668,699 1,369,806 
1926 230,089 160,754 407,157 832,245 1,630,245 
1927 282,302 118,205 479,689 875,088 7,755,284 
1928 349,065 159,688 566,735 914,404 1,989,892 
1929 162,591 126,876 303,532 824,198 1,417,197 
1930 232,294 213,591 420,679 886,552 1,753,116 
1931 219,691 190,626 321,324 941,558 1,673,199 
1932 240,892 213,922 443,056 756,333 1,654,203 
1933 286,123 177,325 281,898 552,221 1,297,567 
1934 240,671 133,380 275,872 526,060 1,175,983 
1935 141,463 144,219 281,934 628,227 1,195,843 
1936 249,931 151,384 219,213 629,880 1,250,408 
1937 207,602 187,246 180,228 873,914 1,448,990 
1938 379,158 155,389 360,015 919,913 1,814,475 
1939 130,734 210,505 520,622 741,210 1,603,071 
1940 299,461 82,232 540,206 814,646 1,736,545 
1941 238,356 166,706 314,820 941,970 1,661,852 
1942 235,160 155,720 556,704 969,381 1,916,965 
1943 249,857 109,717 284,470 843,813 1,487,857 
1944 150,098 52,874 416,637 1,060,111 1,679,720 
1945 150,116 142,419 318,525 1,107,623 1,718,683 
1946 206,304 117,264 413,728 1,152,118 1,889,414 
1947 238,800 220,117 341,749 1,358,911 2,159,577 
1948 191,000 190,699 386,325 1,294,911 2,062,935 
1949 189,017 218,221 371,389 1,098,415 1,877,042 
1950 212,967 184,244 461,685 1,019,389 1,878,285 
1951 77,162 159,725 552,662 980,810 1,770,359 
1952 277,909 195,208 687,916 1,298,957 2,459,990 
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carryover stock (over 300 million bushel) in 1929. Given the collapse in demand due to the 
economic recession, the American Department of Agriculture, the Canadian Wheat Pool 
and the private grain traders were called upon to advise producers what strategy would 
best minimize the crisis. They erroneously decided that prices would rise considerably the 
following year. The failure of these forecasts inevitably led to disaster for almost all who 
were concerned directly or indirectly with wheat.3 •36 The collapse of the wheat market had 
far reaching economic and political consequences. Not only were producers in many cases 
forced to leave their farms, but delinquencies on their debts and taxes weakened country 
banks, insurance companies and the whole credit structure.3.27 Producers emerged from 
this crisis as a determined political force and the effectiveness of the powerful farm lobby 
is a legacy of these years. 
The crisis in the wheat sector led policy makers in the early 1930's to attempt to ne-
gotiate an agreement designed to regulate the international grain trade. Davis suggests 
that it was the first time in at least a century when "there have been such far reaching 
effects on the part of many countries to modify the operation to economic prices for general 
public welfare.3•28 The results of these negotiations were acreage reduction programs and 
reduced world production.3•29 Chapter 5 will describe these and subsequent international 
negotiations to regulate the grain trade. 
These international attempts to regulate the grain trade were undertaken in conjunction 
with a variety of national programs, such as price supports, which have also remained a 
constant feature of agricultural policy. Chapter 4 will provide a detailed examination of the 
effectiveness of farm lobby groups in influencing national policies. 
lI.2e Joseph S. Davis, An Agricultural Policy 1926-1938, (Food Research Institute, Stanford Univer-
sity, 1939). p.190 
3.2T lbid ... p.190 
3.2&lbid ... p.192 
3.2v Figure 3.3 American production was at an all time low in 1934 at 526,010 thousand bushels. Note: 
36.74371 bushels equals one metric tonne for wheat. 
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3.5. Productivity 
Due to the constraints on the amount of land that was available as well as the increased cost 
of land after 1900, further increases in production would be the result of higher yields. It is 
this growth in productivity that is often cited a one of the major factors that contributed to 
the substantial economic growth of the postwar agricultural sector.3 •30 This shift marked the 
beginning of the transition from a resource-based to a science-based system of agriculture.3.31 
Given this transition, we must consider the distinction between production and pro-
ductivity. Productivity is viewed by Capalbo and Vo in terms of the efficiency with which 
inputs are transformed into useful output.3•32 This transition to a more efficient system 
dramatically altered the nature of the commodity as well as the market. 
3.6. Technological Change 
In the post World War II period, increased productivity was biased toward increased mech-
anization as well as the intensive use of chemicals, energy and capital. Such technological 
change is described by Antle and Capalbo as being "changes in the production process that 
came about from the application of scientific knowledge."3.33 These changes might involve 
using existing resources to attain higher levels of output. Alternatively, changes in input 
quality can involve the introduction of new processes of inputs.3.34 These would include 
chemical inputs, new seed varieties and machinery. 
Much of the technology employed in the late 1940's and early 1950's was actually de-
veloped in the 1930's. It awaited a period of effective demand to provide the incentive for 
its adoption. This "Second American Agricultural Revolution", as described by Chou, is 
UOSusan M. Capalbo and Trang T. Vo, "Review of the Evidence on Agricultural Productivity and 
Aggregate Technology" in Capalbo and Antle, p.96 
U1Ruttan and Hayarni ... p.247 
u2Capalbo and Vo ... p.97 
3.13 Antle and Capalbo... p.33 
u4lbid. 
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notable for the "explosion of yields" that accompany the increased productivity of both 
land and labour in this period.3.3s 
Labour productivity was increased though improved farming techniques and the use of 
gasoline and diesel oil in fuelled machinery. The productivity of the land improved through 
the use of chemical inputs as well as increased information on plant development. Thus, 
Chou concludes that "The Second Agricultural Revolution was brought on by conditions 
similar to those preceding the First Agricultural Revolution: A backlog of little used tech-
nological innovations, higher demand for farm products and a shortage of farm labour."3.36 
The capital and chemical intensive technology adopted by major grain producers in the 
post-war period were largely designed to increase efficiency through reducing the labour re-
quirement. A substantial change did take place not only in the quantity but also quality of 
farm labour. Family labour was substituted with higher output hired labour. Higher output 
per labour hour was also enhanced by the increased use of fertilizer and machinery.3.3T 
In real terms, the growth rates for land structure were nearly non-existent in the post-
war era. There was, however, a dramatic increase in the use of agricultural chemicals in 
the 1950's and 1960'S.3.38 The use of all of these chemical enhancements including fertilizes, 
lime, insecticides and herbicides has allowed producers to intensify their farming practices. 
In terms of input costs, equipment and energy showed substantial increases through this 
period; however, the prices of chemicals remained fairly constant. 
As table 3.3 indicates, there is a high degree of variability of both inputs and outputs 
II1 the periods of 1950-60, 1960-70 and 1970-82. Such variability would reflect broader 
international market (price and supply) considerations. 
Table 3.4 also emphasises the variability of the rates of growth of output from 1970-82 
which again inflicts changing international market considerations. 
3·:liChou, Harmon, Kahn and Wittiver ... 1977.p.16 Chou dates the 'First Agricultural Revolution" at 
the end of the 16th century in Western Europe when new crops, particularly fodder and root crops made 
fencing the fields technically and economically more beneficial ... p.14 
u8Chou, Harmon, Kahm and Wittiver ... p.17 
u7Capalbo and Vo ... pp.112-114 
uSD. Pimental. "Food Production and the Energy Crisis." Science 182(1973) pp.443-449, Chou, 
Harmon, Kahn and Wittiver. p.17. The use of fertilizers (nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium) in 1975 
was 8 times ita 1950 level. Insecticides and herbicides showed a much larger rate of growth 20 times it's 
1950 level by 1975. 
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Fi~llfe 3.2. Average A nuual Rates of Growth of Total Revenue, Aggregate 
Real Output, Total Cost, and Aggregate Real Input 
Revenue Output Cost Input 
Period (ou ...... nt doll .... ) (con.t.nt doll .... ) (current doll .... ) (oon.tant dollar.) 
1950-60 0.74 1.66 2.22 0.14 
1960-70 2.44 0.84 5.26 0.05 
1970-82 8.89 (7.73) 2.60 (1.45) 11.28 (9.41) 0.34 (0.13) 
1950-82 4.33 (4.01) 1.76 (1.33) 6.57 (5.97) 0.17 (0.09) 
46 
Note: Growth rates in parentheses are the average annual rates of growth over the given period 
using 1983 as the last year 
Sources: Capalbo and Vo, p.102 
Figure 3.3. Average Annual Rates of Growth of Total Revenue, Aggregate 
Real Output, Total Cost, and Aggregate Real Input 
Period Livestock Crops All Outputs 
1950-60 1.34 1.91 1.66 
1960-70 1.16 0.56 0.84 
1970-82 0.84 3.72 2.60 
(83) (0.94) (1.78) (1.45) 
1950-82 1.10 2.17 1. 76 
(83) (1.13) (1.45) (1.33) 
Note: Growth rates in parentheses are the average annual rates of growth over the given period 
using 1983 as the last year 
Sources: Capalbo and Vo, p.103 
3.7. Plant Breeding and Biotechnology 
Seeds differ from other inputs in significant ways. As a living thing seeds are subject to 
genetic and other transformations including death. Seeds are bred to maximize favourable 
characteristics such as high yielding ability, high response to mechanized cultivation meth-
ods, resistance to disease and pests, and resistance to adverse environmental factors. 
Historically, seed development was conducted by independent government agencies, but 
in recent years it has become more commercial in nature and management. The importance 
of seed production in the development of agricultural crops cannot be overemphasized.3.39 
The ability of seeds to remain viable from one crop year to another has been essential to the 
survival of mankind. As agriculture has modernized, producers have come to rely on the 
commercial market for their seed supplies. This has been particularly true since the advent 
of the hybrid varieties of wheat, maize and rice that led to the Green revolution. In 1955 
3.S8 Walter P. Feistritler, Cereal Seed Technology; A Manual of Cereal Seed Production, Qual-
ity Control and Distribution, (Rome, Plant Production and protection Distribution, F.A.O., 1075)p.25 
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Dr. Norman Borlaug crossed Nordic 10 Brevor with Mexican wheat producing semi-dwarf 
varieties which produced yields up to three times that of conventional seed.3.40 
Thus, just as strong demand and backlog of accumulated technology triggered the agri-
cultural revolution in America, similar motivating forces were behind the "Green revolu-
tion". The increasing populations of Asia and Africa provided the motivation for increasing 
production through the new high-yielding varieties (H.Y.V.'s). In India millions of people 
would have experienced high levels of hunger and starvation in the 1966 and 1967 droughts 
had not large imports of cereal not been available. The world adjusted to the use of these 
seeds with remarkable speed. Between 1965-66 and 1974-75 acreage under H.Y.V.'s in 
non-communist nations increased from 50,000 hectares to approx. 41 million hectares.3.41 
Biotechnology will continue to play an important role now in food production, as scientists 
develop genetically improved disease resistant crops, crops that are resistant to herbicides; 
as well as new varieties of drought and salt resistant cereals.3•42 
At present, there are two major ongoing debates continue regarding the H.Y.V.'s. The 
first debate focuses on the technical aspects of H.Y.V.'s, and the question of whether these 
modern and peehaps more unpredictable high-yielding varieties of grains have contributed 
to the increased variations in annual production yields.3•43 
Figure 3.6 illustrates that there had been a high degree of variability in the growth rates 
of all inputs between 1950 and 1982 which again could be interpreted as market driven. 
If the desired objective of implementing technological change is a reduction in the cost 
of production and an increase in profits, this approach cannot bbe considered entirely sat-
isfactory. Given the instability of commodity prices and input costs (particularly energy), 
UOChou, Harmon, Kahn and Wittiver ... p.19 
3,ulbid ... p.20 India was the leader with 61.7% of wheat planted with H.Y.Vo's. 
U2Martin Gibbs and Carla Carlson, Crop Productivity - Research Imperativea Revisited. An 
International Conference held at Harbour Springs Michigan Oct. 13-18, 1985 and Airlie Virginia, Dec. 11-
13, 1985 also see "Saline Agriculture - Salt Tolerant Plants for Developing Countries" Report of a Panel 
of the Board on Science and Technology for International Development, Office of International Affairs, 
National Research Council, National Academy Pre88, Washington D.C. 1990. This is an excellent source for 
the study of salinity/irrigation and salt tolerant plants with special emphasis on developing world needs and 
application. 
a,uMichael H. Arnold and Roger B. Austin, "Plant Breeding and Yield Stability" p.127. Jock R. 
Anderson and Peter B.R. Huell, Variability in Grain Yields: Implications for Agricultural Research and 
Policy in Developing Countries. International Food Policy Research Institute (Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1989) 
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Table 3.2. Rates of Growth of Inputs, 1950-1982 
Hired Family Equip- Animal Struct- Fertil- Peat- Other All 
Period l.bour labour ment capital urea ~l.nd i..... ioidea Energy mat.rial. input. 
1950-60 -3.02 -4.07 0.74 1.59 0.38 5.91 4.77. 3.27 2.23 0.14 
1960-70 -2.24 -3.78 2.71 -0.22 0.00 7.60 10.81 2.72 0.60 0.05 
1970-82 0.84 -1.70 2.56 -0.13 0.07 2.08 3.22 -0.75 0.84 0.34 
(83) (1.08) (-1.86) (1.96) (-0.26) (0.00) (0.75) (1.31) (-1.14) (0.47) (0.13) 
1950-82 -1.32 -3.09 2.04 0.38 0.10 5.01 6.07 1.58 1.20 0.17 
(83) (-0.70) (-3.11) (1.89) (0.31) (0.06) (4.39) (5.23) (1.36) (1.04) (0.09) 
Note: Growth rates in parentheses are the average annual rates of growth over the given period 
using 1983 as the last year 
Sources: Capalbo and Vo, p.17 
this new capital intensive approach to agricultural production has left the producer increas-
ingly vulnerable and has necessitated ever increasing levels of government intervention. 
The general conclusion of scholars is that "the improved varieties remain the most effec-
tive means of increasing yield and reducing the risk of crop failure". They stress, however 
that breeding strategies should include considerations relating to yield stability and input 
requirements.3.44 The "Green Revolution" and this subsequent scientific discovery funda-
mentally has altered the nature of grain as a commodity as well as the nature of the market 
including changes in yields, input costs and trade flows. 
The second debate relates to the ongoing concerns about a population "explosion" and 
the ability of producing nations to meet the challenge. The United Nations has recently 
warned that the world faces "four decades of the fastest growth in human numbers in all 
history." It is expected that the present world population of 5.4 billion will double to 10 
billion by the year 2050. They are calling for another 'Green revolution" but note that 
it will be much harder this time. Soil degradation, lack of water and urban advances 
have all contributed to reduction in crop yields.3.45 There is the added concern that the 
institutional and infrastructure problems that inhibited the fulfilment of the potential of 
the "Green Revolution" remain today.3.46 
3,Ulbid ... p.132 
u'New York Times, Paul Lewis, May 10, 1992, Food Production and the Birth Rate are in a New 
Race 
u8Chou, Harmon, Kahn and Wittiver ... p.21 
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3.8. Productivity - Summary 
"The ability of U.S. farmers to more than double farm output from 1917 to 1968 on about 
the same land area with about :l:l% as much labour - indicates the magnitude of increased 
use of land substitutes on American farms."3.47 
The increased productivity of American agriculture as a result of this technological 
revolution has been remarkable. All major exporters have provided ever increasing support 
for agricultural (export) production. 
The European Community in 1988 spent a staggering 65% of it's total budget on agri-
culture and fisheries support.3.48 
This vast expenditure on agricultural price supports attests to the inability of producers 
to balance production levels with effective demand. The result of this imbalance has been 
the accumulation of surplus accompanied by their distorting affect on market prices. 
3.9. Surplus Stocks and Prices 
Reflecting on the world wheat problem, Joseph Davis wrote: 
"The world wheat problem is one of persisting surplus. More wheat 
has been produced, is currently available, and is being produced than wheat 
markets will absorb except at prices unremunerative to large groups of wheat 
farms and ruinous to many of them. The existence of the surplus is reflected 
in wheat prices that not only appear extremely low, but are unprecedentedly 
low run relation to prices of commodities in general. The surplus is evidenced 
by abnormally heavy stocks of wheat; and by a continuing excess of supplies 
above ordinary wheat requirements, either for the world as a whole or for 
the international market."3.49 
This passage, written in 1932, could have been written through much of the Twen-
tieth Century. The price depressing effect of surplus stocks has, with only intermittent 
interruptions', been a continuous problem for producers and policy makers since the 1930's. 
Sot 7 ibid., p.17 
u'Source: The Community Budget; The facts and Figures (1989 figures). The Economist World 
Atlas and Almanac, (Milan, New Interlitho, 1991) p.159 
3,UPassages (pp.437-442) from an extended study "The World Wheat Problem", Wheat Studies July 
1932, VIII, 409-444 in Joseph S. Davis. 
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Volatility of prices seems to have been curbed through the 1950's and 1960's when the 
United States and Canada maintained internal stock levels sufficient to absorb at least 
partially internal production and consumption fluctuations, thus, precluding the necessity 
of shifting the fluctuations to the international market. These stocks had a stabilizing 
effect on the international market in that it created the possibility for policy-makers to 
react quickly to developments in the international market.3.50 Proponents of a free func-
tioning, deregulated market would argue that "fluctuations in price are signals sent to 
producers and consumers, encouraging them to adjust their behaviour to fit changing mar-
ket circumstances.,,3.51 The data shows, however, that in both developing and developed 
countries production levels are quite inelastic regardless of price.3.5:l 
Given the relatively inelastic production responsiveness of grain - in the short term, and 
the thinly traded quality of the market, "a small change in global grain supplies results in a 
disproportionately large effect on world prices."3.53 Although there are many input variables 
that can affect the price of grain, the simple relationship between stocks and prices is very 
useful in understanding price movements and is commonly used to determine the price of 
grain and to forecast commodity prices. This stock-consumption ratio is an easy way of 
measuring the balance of supply and demand. 
In general terms, this balance can be seen as a close, inverse relationship. When stocks 
are high, prices are low and when stocks are low, prices rise. The importance of this 
relationship must be stressed. These stock and price variations not only reflect market 
functions, but also government policy. These issues will be addressed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
3.50 J .C. Bloom, Stabilization ofthe International Grain Market: A Study into the causes ofthe instability 
of the international grain market, together with an evaluation of research carried out on the possibilities of 
stabilizing this market, (Rotterdam, Royal Dutch Grain and Feed Trade Association, 1982p.22) and for a 
more detailed description of the management of the international grain trade in the 1950's and 1960's by the 
duopoly of Canada and the United States, see Ted Cohn, The International Politic. of Agricultural Trade: 
Canadian-American Relation. in a Global Agricultural Canted pp.33-39 
3.51 Atkin ... p.82 
3.52 International food Policy Research Institute Report, Washington 1991, "Food Data Evaluation 
Projects ... p.ll 
3,uChou, Harmon, Kahn and Wittiver ... p.184 
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3.10. Summary and Conclusion 
The history of the development of grain as a major force on the international commodity 
market is marked by extraordinary periods of growth as well as devastating periods of 
stagnation. This variability reflects the nature of the commodity as well as the economic 
and political environment in which it has developed. 
The growth in the sheer size of the export market since the late 1800's is the result of 
tremendous expansion of cultivated acreage as well as the development of technologies which 
enhance production levels. Although these techniques were successful in greatly increasing 
crop yields, both producers and policy makers have been less successful in balancing produc-
tion levels with effective demand. As a result, the history of the grain trade is a history of 
overproduction and oppressive surplus stocks interspersed with sudden periods of shortages. 
This pattern of unpredictability reflects the dynamic nature of the commodity. 
Production output can be radically affected by changes in weather, or sudden infesta-
tions. Crop yields will also be affected by the use and cost of the many inputs used in the 
modern agricultural processes. The availability and cost of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides 
and energy, for example, will also affect production levels. 
Political considerations are also a major factor in determining grain production levels. 
Since the 1930's grain has been the subject of almost constant international negotiation (as 
will be discussed in Chapter 5), these negotiations, not surprisingly, have largely focused on 
price stabilisation schemes and security of supply. The national schemes, which have also 
been a constant feature of agriculture policy among the major exporters since the 1930's, 
largely attempted to protect domestic producers and consumers from world prices. 
On a national level, billions of dollars have been spent to increase market share and 
stabilise farm income. Neither objective has been fulfilled, since despite the billions of 
dollars spent on export subsidies 'by the U.S. and E.C., market share has changed very little 
since 1985.3•54 
3,uCanadian Wheat Board Annual Report 1990/95, p.5 
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Since 1991 international prices have remained highly un~tabl<.>, reflecting increasingly 
unstable production as well as the increasing reluctance of major exporters to hold stocks.3 .55 
Under these circumstances it will be difficult to anticipate price changes. The uncertainty 
that has characterised the international grain trade since its inception seems bound to 
continue. 
U5Leonardo A. Paulino, "Cereal Supply, Demand, Trade and Stocks in Agriculture Price Policy for 
Developing Countries", in Mellor and Ahmed ... p.25. See also, "Short Fall in the Grain Fields", New 
York Times, 19 Nov. 1995. 
Chapter 4 
National Agricultural Policies: 
Part I, The United States 
4.1. Introduction 
The history of grain production and the international grain trade is one marked by periods 
of extraordinary growth as well as some periods of devastating stagnation. This variability, 
as detailed in Chapter 3, reflects the nature of the commodity as well as the uncertain 
political and economic environment in which it has developed. It is this inherent variability 
that has provided the rationale for the countless national and international policies and 
programs which have been developed throughout this century in an attempt to manage this 
vital sector of the economy. Policies adopted in order to resolve problems in the agricultural 
sector have fundamentally influenced the social structure, the economy and foreign relations 
of many nations. They have also been a significant factor in the shaping of international 
grain trade and food aid patterns. 
The international grain trade is characterised as an oligopoly - that is, an industry 
which is largely dominated by a few large sellers. They are Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
The United States of America (U.S.A.) and the European Community (E.C.). Despite the 
wide variance in the production schemes, political systems and institutional structures of 
these major sellers, a combination of natural advantages and policy decisions has resulted 
in the creation and evolution of this oligopoly.··1 The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
persistent problems in the production and marketing of grain and the policy options which 
have been adopted in order to address these ,problems by the United States, the catalyst 
and the major actor in the international grain trade. This examination will particularly 
focus on United States national agricultural policies, which have most significantly affected 
UBrian T. Oleson, Ph.D. Thesis "Price Determination And Market Share Formation In The Interna-
tional Wheat Market" (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1979) p.l. 
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international trade and aid flows as well as international agreements or initiatives. Before 
discussing the United States in detail, some general background is essential. 
The four leading exporting countries have succeeded in maintaining their market posi-
tions for most of the twentieth century. Although Argentina, Australia, Canada and the 
United States have witnessed significant structural change within their domestic economies 
and in their markets for grain, their position as the leading exporters has been surprisingly 
continuous. The four share an important characteristic: they are able to produce grain 
considerably in excess of domestic demand. While other nations may produce more, they 
may be unable to meet even the basic requirements of their domestic markets. The former 
Soviet Union has historically provided such an example. The European Community is the 
trading bloc which has emerged in recent decades as a significant exporter - one that 
has had a profound impact on world grain trading relationships. Although some countries 
within the community, such as Britain, remain net agricultural importers, the Community 
as a whole has become the second-ranked grain exporter worldwide. Taken together these 
five exporters have accounted for over one-third of world wheat production and more than 
90% of world wheat trade since the 1960's.4.2 
These five (and, previously four) have at times sought to take advantage of their oligopolis-
tic trading position, but, in more recent years, their relationship has been marked by a 
rigorous competition for market share.4.3 Just as the national agricultural policies of these 
exporters have fundamentally influenced the nature of the international grain trade, so 
have these exporters been required to develop national policies to meet the demands of 
changing international market conditions. Although the policies which the major exporters 
U Wheat Support Policie, and E:I:port Practice in Five Major E:qmorting Countrie,. International Wheat 
Council, Secreta.riat Paper #16, London, May. 1988. Also, Gilmore, "Although leas than 15% oHotal global 
production in grains is actually traded, this amount has a far reaching economic and social impact worldwide. 
National marketing systems playa determining role in linking global productions and consumptions. In the 
proce88, 15% tra.nalate into more than 220 million metric tonnes per annum and represents approx value of 
13Sb." Richard Gilmore, A Poor Harvest, The Clash of Policies and Interests in the Grain Trade. 
(New York, London, Longman), p.20l 
U Andrew Smith, Alex F. McCalla, Donald O. Mitchell and Colin Carter. Grain Ezport Cartez, (Cam-
bridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981) p.p.23-54 see wo Alex F. Mc Calla and Timothy E. 
Josling, Agricultural Policie, and World Marlcetl (Macmillan Publishing Company, N.Y., 1985) p.123, p.133. 
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have adopted have similar objectives, they vary considerably in the form which they have 
taken.4.4 In the case of each exporter they have also varied considerably over time. 
It is interesting to note that although many countries, including the United States, 
struggled to establish an "energy policy" in 1978 and 1979, comprehensive agricultural 
policies have been in existence since the early 1930's.4.6 It was the collapse of the agricultural 
sector in 1929 that illuminated not only the variability of agricultural production and prices 
but also the ripple effect throughout the economy of distress in the agricultural sector.4.6 
Then, as now, the importance of agriculture, and particularly wheat, to the economies of 
the major exporters and their resolve to support the sector cannot be overstated. From 
these early beginnings, agricultural support policies have remained a constant feature of 
economic planning. 
The deadlock in the recent Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade over agricultural issues provided an illustration of the importance of agriculture and 
grain to the world trading system, and to the national governments that control the system. 
Despite the successful negotiation of critical areas including textiles, intellectual property, 
services and dispute settlement, agriculture remained the one exception for a considerable 
period. Governments had refused to allow their national agricultural policies to be subject to 
negotiation or arbitration within a multilateral framework. Moreover, the major exporters 
had, until recently, made little effort to modify their domestic programs to make them more 
consistent with the GATT rules for trade in agricultural products.4•7 
'·'International Wheat Council. Secretariat Paper #16 
uNick Butler, The International Grain Trade: Probleml and Prolpectl (London, Croom Helm for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986), Although less than 15% of total global grain production is 
actually traded on the international market, this amount haa a far-reaching economic and social impact 
worldwide. National marketing and production policies playa determining role in linking global production 
and consumption. 
U World Agriculture and International Trade An International Survey: Report by a Study Group of 
Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, Oxford, University Press, 1932) and Paul 
de Hevesy World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning in General (Oxford University Press, London, 
1940). 
uD. Gayle Johnson. Agriculturul policy and Trade: Adjulting Domutic Programl in an International 
Framework. Trilateral Commission Report Nov. 17 1984 and "Grotesque" A Survey of Agriculture, The 
Gimondst, Dec. 12, 1992. This assessment of national agricultural policies indicates that the trade barriers 
in some agricultural commodities have risen ten-fold while support for manufactured goods has fallen by 
three-quarters aince the late 1920's. 
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The compromises that were finally reached did not address the structural problems of 
the system. The drive for the liberalisation of trade practice in the agricultural sector has 
faced many hurdles not experienced by industrial trade. Although industrial trade items 
(i.e. automobile, textile, steel etc.) have experienced ups and downs in the drive for trade 
liberalisation, the final objective has been rarely called into question.4.8 "Agriculture, on 
the other hand, has remained outside the international legal order throughout this century 
and before"4.9 
The exceptionality of agriculture is a theme which will be developed in more detail in 
the following discussion. It will be found that to a large extent the issues which plague 
agricultural policy makers today are rooted in the past. The export policies of the leading 
five have been shaped primarily by domestic political and economic circumstances, and an 
understanding of those forces is essential to any analysis of the international grain trade. 
To understand better these forces, I propose to introduce an analytical framework for 
each individual exporter, in this chapter for the United States, in the following chapter, 
the other exporters. In each country there are competing interests that shape agricultural 
policies and, accordingly, have an impact upon the grain trade. The policies of the major 
exporters will be treated chronologically and analytically within each historical period. 
The chronological limits of the study of each exporter will be approximately 1920-1990, 
although in each case certain periods will be emphasised and, in the case of the European 
Community, the discussion will focus on that more recent period. For each exporter, the 
following objectives will be examined: 
1. producer income and price stability 
2. production management 
3. socio-political factors 
4. foreign policy and national security considerations 
'.1 Jean-Marc Lucq, "Agricultural Impediments to Global Free Trade." TerTa NOIIO, Volume I, Number 
3, Spring (North) Autumn (South) 1992, p.42. 
U ibid., also Bee Berton E. HenningBon Jr. "The Wealth of N ationB and the Poverty of Producers: The 
Contlict Between Free Trade and the New Deal Farm Program", Agricultural Hi.tof"1/, Volume 61, Number 
I, Winter 1987. 
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5. the role of commercial interests 
Again, in the case of each exporter, the weighting of these factors will be seen to have 
changed over time. The major questions to be asked for each exporter for each period are: 
1. What are the goals of governments as these goals are publicly expressed? 
2. What domestic and foreign policy interests do these policies reflect? 
3. How does agricultural policy making fit into the broader context of overall eco-
nomic planning and how is agricultural policy making affected by national economic 
policies? 
This information which will be relevant market data presented for each exporter and 
will be analysed in light of the exporter's trade, economic and social policies. 
The changes in the position and the policies of the exporters from the 1930's to the 
1980's will be individually analysed. In doing so, reference will be made to the various 
moments in history when the major exporters attempted to supplement their national poli-
cies with some forms of international cooperation. These initiatives included the successive 
International Wheat Agreements, the Food Aid Conventions and the proposal in 1974 to 
establish international grain reserves. Although these efforts will be detailed in Chapter 6 
and 7 respectively, it is important to note the state of the international grain market, the 
political and social climate, and the effectiveness of national policies to resolve problems in 
the agricultural sector when these initiatives were brought forward. 
Because the United States domestic and foreign economic policies have been, arguably, 
the most significant factor in understanding the evolution of the international grain trade, 
the United States will be considered first and in more detail than will be the case with the 
others. 
4.2. The United States of America 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States has been the dominant actor within the 
international grain trade. Although it has not always been the largest producer or exporter 
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it has most often possessed or potentially possessed the significant surplus resources which 
have a fundamental impact on grain pricing.4.1o This last fact largely explains the great 
significance of American national policies. 
Although the United States possesses a considerable natural comparative advantage in 
the production of grain, it has, to a large extent, been the impact of its national grain 
policies which have supported and encouraged the expansion of grain production and thus 
ensured America's place in the international grain market. From investment in the early 
technological and chemical innovations which have been described in Chapter 3,4.11 to the 
market expansion programs of the 1940's and 1950's,4.1:l the presence and influence of the 
American Government in agriculture has been pervasive. Government intervention has 
grown to the point where it became the single largest influence on the production and 
marketing of grain.4•13 
The budgetary implications of this intervention have become staggering. In a compre-
hensive analysis of the conflict in the U .S.-E.C. agricultural trade relations in the 1980's, 
Ronald Libby estimated that: 
"Recent government farm spending worldwide has averaged between $200 
billion and $300 billion annually. The E.C. alone is responsible for more than 
$90 billion with the United States accounting for about $70 billion and the 
Third World countries roughly $60 billion.,,4.14 
The foreign policy implications of American agricultural policy have most obviously and 
most recently been seen in its trade relationship with the E.C.; nevertheless, as Richard 
Fraenkel suggests, despite America's unique position in the world food economy, the impli-
cations of America's agricultural policy for U.S. foreign policy have scarcely begun to be 
UO "Carryover Stocks of Old Wheat in the Four Major Exporting Countries (1922-1946). and World 
Wheat Stati.,tic, "End-Year Carryover: Exporting Countries" International Wheat Council, 1962, p.46. 
',11 Susan M. Capalbo and Trang T. Vg "Review of the Evidence on Agricultural Productivity and Aggre-
gate Technology" in Susan M. Capalbo and John M. Antele, eds. Agricultural Productivity - Mea,urement 
and Eqlanation (Washington, Resources for the Future: 1988) p.96-98. 
u2Dan Morgan, Merchants oj Grain (New York, Penguin Books, 1986), p.144-160 
U3 Joseph Balow, U.S. Grain: The Politico.l Commodity (London, Univemty of America Preas, 1989), 
p.Vll 
u'Ronald T. Libby, Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and the World Grain Trade (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca N.Y., 1992) p.4; also see William P. Avery, ed. World Agriculture and the GATT (Boulder, 
Colorado, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1993) p.2. 
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investigated.US A review of the often contradictory policies which have governed Ameri-
can grain production and marketing will illustrate the numerous ways in which they have 
not only affected America's external relations, but also how these policies affected foreign 
agricultural development. Analysts worldwide identify many serious problems in the agri-
cultural policies of the United States. Despite the damaging consequences of these policies, 
successive administrations have remained inflexible in dealing with this issue.u6 
4.2.2. Background 
The role which agriculture has played in the social structure, economy and polity of the 
United States has changed markedly throughout this century. Although the percentage 
of the gross national product which agriculture represents has declined steadily and re-
markably, the American agricultural interests have maintained considerable influence in 
Washington.u1 This apparent paradox of increased farm subsidies and power in light of 
declining economic output and rural depopulation is generally seen as one of the more un-
fathomable aspects of the present agricultural crisis.u8 This point does, however, highlight 
the fact that the role of the American grain farmer in American political economy has at-
tracted a good deal of historical and even theoretical interest. Indeed, one of the major 
theoretical interpretations of American development, the so called "frontier thesis" , empha-
sises the impact ofthe agricultural frontier on American political and economic thought and 
practice. The great farm movements identified with the Progressive Party and the other 
midwest political movements had a decisive impact on the American political system in the 
first half of the twentieth century. 
Grain production was central to the lives of the early settlers. The unpredictability 
of grain production and the resultant price variability, apparent in the early 1900's, was 
.,URichard M. Fraenkel, Ron F. Hadwiger and William P. Browne, The Role of u.s. Agriculture in . 
Foreign Policy (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979) p.1 and also see, Robert Paarlberg Food Trade and 
Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union and the United States (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Prese, 1985). 
uaWilliam P. Avery, World Agriculture and the GATT (London, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1993) 
u 7 Nick Butler, The International Grain Trade: Problem. and Pro.pecb (London, Croom Helm, for The 
Royallnstitute of International Affaire, 1986), p.17. Over 30 Senators and almost 200 Congressmen out of a 
total of 435 still come from what are generally considered "farm states". In the electoral college that elects 
the President, over 35% of representatives come from "farm states". These figures have changed little over 
the past 50 years. 
us "Grotesque" A survey of Agriculture The Economi.st Dec. 12, 1992. 
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exacerbated by the outbreak of World War I. Due to increases in effective demand that 
accompanied the war effort, production soared as did the price of wheat.4.19 The collapse 
in price in the aftermath of World War I prompted producers to begin to organise into the 
cooperatives and unions which would become very influential by the mid 1930's4.20 It is 
from these humble, early beginnings that the agricultural lobby in the United States has 
evolved into the highly organised, well-funded enterprise that it is today.4.21 
By the late 1920's, the problems inherent in the production and marketing of grain had 
become a major political concern. To a large extent the basic underlying issue behind many 
of these problems was production management. We shall see that many of the comprehen-
sive set of policies established in the following decade were designed to attempt to manage 
production levels, or to offset the adverse effects of production variability. 
4.2.3. The Crisis of the 1930's 
The tremendous cropland expansion of the late 1800's coupled with technological and chem-
ical advances in the early 1900's led to sharp increases in production levels which became 
problematic after 1925 when per capita consumption began to level off and even decline 
domestically and in importing countries4.22 due to reduced purchasing power. Exception-
ally large crops in both 1928 and 1929 exacerbated the growing surplus crisis as did the 
continual acreage and crop expansion of some producers, clearly in violation of the laws of 
supply and demand.4.23 
The crisis deepened, and in late 1929 the agricultural sector collapsed providing a classic 
illustration of the unpredictability of the international grain trade with the simultaneous 
collapse of both supply and demand. This crisis followed nearly a decade marked by over-
production and prices that had become too volatile for producers to absorb. 
ue Atkin, p.80 
•. 20 Joseph Davies, An Agricultund Policy, 19!6-1938 (Stanford University, Food Research Institute, 
1939), p.190 . 
•. 21 Alex McCalla. Private interview May 3, 1993, Rome. Dr. McCalla describes the agricultural lobby 
as having "incredible savvy about the political proceBB, second only to the defence industry in its lobbying 
effectiveneBB!" 
t.22Don F. Hadwinger, Federal Wheat Commodity Program" (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 
1970) p.l07. 
u3ibid., p.l08 
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The uncertainty of production and price levels in the early 1900's had become critical by 
the late 1920's. The farm lobby that emerged from this crisis was increasingly unified and 
aggressive.4•24 It was at this time that a very broad trend began in American agricultural 
policy-making that was more or less maintained until World War II. This period was in 
general terms characterised by producer organisation and government intervention designed 
to regulate or manage production in order to stabilise prices and production. These policies 
were seen as a means of restoring and maintaining the rural social structure which had been 
devastated by the "Dust Bowl" of the early 1930's. 
The first proposals, the McNary-Haugher Plan (1924), presented to Congress a plan for 
selling farm products for domestic consumption at a regulated price and exports at world 
prices.4.25 This plan was vetoed by Congress, as was a second proposal which called for the 
use of debentures for importers to offset the cost of tariffs. A third plan (1925) provided for 
government price guarantees at the cost of production plus a fair profit. This Bill failed to 
survive the Depression - as did President Herbert Hoover, who was hesitant to embrace 
such government intervention.4•26 
A new era in economic planning and agricultural policy-making began with the election 
of the Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. The Roosevelt administration was elected 
with large mandates in four consecutive Presidential elections. Roosevelt's platform in 
1932 promised radical action to reinvigorate the American economy. The "New Deal", as 
Roosevelt's program was called, promised a much greater degree of government intervention 
in an attempt to cure the high level of unemployment and the collapse of the American 
agricultural sector that had marked the depression. Roosevelt appointed the farm leader 
and economist Henry Wallace as his secretary of agriculture. Originally a Republican, 
Wallace was angered by the unwillingness or inability of Republican Presidents Coolidge 
and Hoover to support a Congressional proposal for a two-price system for the marketing of 
grain. In his view this would have increased the level of "parity", offarm worker income with 
~.UDavies, p.193 
05 Arthur Schlesinger, The Coming of The New Deal (Boston, Little Brown, 1959), ch.l 
ueibid. 
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urban wages.4 .21 It was with Roosevelt's endorsement that Wallace presented a plan which 
would become the basis for the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933. This Act, 
which would remain the cornerstone of America's agricultural policy until the mid 1980's, 
was designed primarily to bring farm income into better balance with urban incomes. This 
act and subsequent amending acts set the pattern for future state involvement in the United 
States.4.28 
Within this framework, provision was made to compensate producers for taking acreage 
out of production. This was an important precedent for the United States, and later for 
other producers. Controlling production seemed to Wallace a more effective method to 
prevent the accumulation of surpluses or the need to "dump" them abroad, an action which 
he believed could undermine international markets in agricultural products.4.29 
Secretary Wallace viewed the collapse of the agricultural sector as having been the 
result of a number of dislocations both domestic and international. The impact of the 
depression had been enormous and it would leave a legacy. American farmers could not 
forget the "worst economic, social and political wrenching in their history. Realised net 
income of farm operations in 1932 was less than one-third of what it had been in 1929."4.30 
What is significant for our purposes is the impact of this memory on the future response of 
government and the direction of American policy. 
In addressing what he considered to be weaknesses in the domestic support structure, 
Secretary Wallace initiated a number of proposals. Although the AAA supported market 
prices of agricultural commodities through a loan program, acreage adjustments, export 
supports and import restrictions, Wallace and his supporters considered these inadequate 
to deal with all contingencies.4.31 
'-27 John Blum, ed., The Price 0/ Vision: The Diary 0/ Henry A. Wallace 19-4!-19-46, (Boston, Houghton 
MifRin, 1973) p.9, 11 
'.
2I ibid.j and Paul de Hevesy, World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning in General (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1940) p.2, and Berton Henningson Jr. "The Wealth of Nations and the Poverty of 
Producers: The Conflict Between Free Trade and the New Deal Farm Program", Agricultural Hiltory, V.61, 
No.1 (Winter 1987). pp.25-29. Also see Richard Gilmore, A Poor Harved (Longman, N.Y.) p.181. 
uOJohn Blum, p.17. 
'-30 History 0/ Agricultural Price, Support and Adjudment Program" p.l. Farm prices had also fallen by 
more than fifty percent during the time, while the cost of goods and services had declined by only thirty-five 
percent. 
'.lI1 John Blum, p.18 and Henningson, Wealth of Nations, p.78. 
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Critics of the AAA, however, charged that the influence of the act was already too 
pervasive, that it was protectionist and that it meant that high cost, inefficient producers 
would be protected. Moreover, the act was held to have placed emphasis upon an aggressive 
search for export markets as a means to achieve prosperity in the agricultural sector. Other 
critics who favoured free trading practices argued that the act maintained artificially high 
prices that caused food prices to rise which in turn required higher wage demands in the 
industrial sector. 4.3~ 
Despite the critics' arguments, Wallace proceeded to establish the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) in 1933 which remains the primary source of funding agricultural ad-
justment payments. Other initiatives undertaken at this time included the Federal Surplus 
Commodities Corporation (1933) and the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (1933) which 
were both intended to assist in the distribution abroad of surplus stocks in conjunction with 
special aid projects of the USDA and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.4•33 
Another important component of the overall plan was the Domestic Allotment Plan 
(1933) in which producers were contracted to limit wheat average in exchange for propor-
tionate compensation.4•34 The Jones-Costigan Act (1934) greatly increased the authority 
of the Secretary of Agriculture in making support payments and the first amendment of 
the AAA in 1935 empowered the President to impose quotas when they interfered with 
adjustment programs.4•35 • 
In summary, the objectives of all of these programs were to increase producer income, 
production and to manage grain surpluses, and to enhance the general wellbeing of rural 
America. In terms of the socio-political factors which influenced the Roosevelt admin-
istration to adopt such comprehensive measures to support the agricultural sector, one 
must consider that in 1933 agriculture and rural America purchased approximately 40% of 
U2Henning80n, Wealth 0/ Nation., p.71-6. 
ua Hi.tory, p.5. The CCC provided a special type of operating credit: "If the market price for the 
commodity is above the (annually set) base rate the farmer can repay the loan with interest and sell the 
commodity on the open market; if it is below, the farmer can forfeit the commodity to the CCC in full 
payment of the loan." 
1.34 Acreage was reduced by 15% in 1934 and an additional 10% in 1935. The droughts of 1933 and 1934 
made more drastic action - such as the proposal to pay farmers to plough up their fields unnecessary. This 
plan had the dual purpose of increasing farm income while restricting production Hiltory, p.6. 
4.31 ibid., p.10 
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all goods in t.he United States. The administration could argue that the program would 
stimulate demand and thus help to end the depression. 4.36 It is also important to note that 
President Hoover's failure to take effective action between 19:30 and 1933 created widespread 
hardship and unrest in agricultural areas and contributed substantially to the Republican 
defeat in 1932.4.37 Secretary Wallace believed that providing an immediate stimulus to 
farm purchasing power was an integral part of the overall recovery plan.u8 The plan was 
surprisingly effective in achieving its stated goals. Producer income rose by 50% in 1935 
over 1932 levels.4•39 
Agrarian leaders warmly welcomed the legislation and in turn gave their initial sup-
port to the international initiative of the New Deal. This included the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act and the International Wheat Agreement. In late 1933 the International 
Wheat Agreement (IWA) was signed. This agreement, was significant in that it provided 
the international component of Wallace's agricultural stabilisation plan. The recognition 
that the agricultural depression was a worldwide phenomenon4•4o prompted 22 of the major 
exporting and importing countries to agree to acreage reduction programs, export quotas 
and price provisions. This agreement had all the essential features of a commodity manage-
ment regime, but it failed after less than a year. Bumper crops in Argentina caused that 
country to break its export quota.4•41 
The significance of this impulse to seek an international solution to grain price and 
supply variability to supplement the national stabilisation schemes is extremely important. 
Surplus management was clearly regarded as an international as well as a national issue. 
U6History, p.7 and Paul de Hevesy, p.5. 
U7Berton, E. Henningson Jr. "Unites States Agricultural Trade and Development Policy During World 
War II: The Role of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations" PhD Thesis, University of Arkansas, 1981, 
p.26. 
U8 Arthur Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, Little Brown, 1959) Ch.l 
Uti HiJtory, p.9 
*-,0 Joseph S. Davies, "International Factor in the Agricultural Depression" Address before the Institute 
of International Relations, Riverside, California, Dec. 14, 1931. Proceeding, (Los Angeles, University of 
Southern California, 1932) VIII, p.159-63 in Joseph S. Davies On Agricultuml Policy, 19!6-1938 (Food 
Research Institute, Stanford University, 1939), p.173-79 
U1Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala Global Food Interdependency: Challenge to American 
Foreign Policy (New York, Columbia University Press, 1980), p.52 
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As the unpredictability of production levels continued into 1938, negotiations for a new 
agreement resumed but were adjourned due to the outbreak of World War II. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTA), which had been presented as an emergency 
measure, was based upon a firm ideological commitment to the freeing of international 
trade and thus, export promotion on the part of Secretary of State Cordell Hu11.4.42 The 
RTA was seen by Hull, Roosevelt and many within the Administration as an effective 
means of restoring world commerce.4.43 Given the trade surplus in the aftermath of World 
War II, reciprocity was also seen to provide a convenient instrument to establish U.S. 
hegemony.4.44 The initial support in the agricultural community which this program enjoyed 
was quickly lost as the trade agreements began to reduce tariffs on agricultural imports. 
Farm organisations began to strongly voice their opposition to the RTA as early as 1935 
and 1936.4.45 Instead of a country by country approach to trade negotiations, the Office 
of Foreign Agricultural Relations (OFAR) regarded international commodity agreements as 
a more realistic method for expanding farm exports in a manner which would not conflict 
with the domestic price support program.,,4.46 
The global nature of the Depression suggested to Wheeler and others in OFAR that the 
United States could not alone restore world commerce in agricultural trade. Furthermore, 
they concluded that "since agricultural price support programs and their accompanying 
trade restrictions appeared to be a permanent fact of life around the world, the road back 
to freer trade could only be taken through international cooperation.4.47 
U2Henningson, Wealth of Nationuee also, Robert A. Isaak. International Political Economy: Managing 
World Economic Change 
""Henningson, United State8 AgricultufUl Trade and Detlelopment Policy, p.36. Also Alfred Edward 
Eckes Jr. "Bretton Woods: America's New Deal for an Open World," (PhD. Thesis, University of Texas, 
Austin, 1969) 
""Robert A. Isaak, International Political Economy: Managing World Economic Change (New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall International Inc., 1992), p.82. This act provided a significant precedent for GATT rules in 
that its tenets provided the basics for the "most favoured nation" (MFN) principle. 
'.n James Bellamy Beddow, "Economic N ationalisation or Internationalism: Upper Midwestern Re-
sponse to New Deal tariff Policy 1934-1940" (PhD dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1969) p.66. 
u8Henningson, Wealth of Nation8 ... p.84. Between 1937 and 1941 OFAR had represented the De-
partment of Agriculture in negotiations for international agreements to stabilise the supplies and process of 
sugar, wheat, cotton and coffee - exports which were susceptible to wide price fluctuations when excess 
stocks accumulated. 
u 7 Henningson, United States Agricultural Trade and Development Policy, p.38 
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Simultaneously, the United States Chamber of Commerce became a vocal opponent 
of the Roosevelt Administration's agricultural policies. arguing that the subsidisation and 
control aspects represented expensive forms of interference with the market.4 •48 The lines 
were drawn for a debate that has continued in American economic and political fora to this 
day. 
4.2.4. Post World War II Planning 
The outbreak of war and resulting temporary shortages eliminated the need for domestic 
support programs as all efforts were geared to increasing production for the war effort. 
Figure 4.1. illustrates the dramatic increase in U.S. production in the post war period. 
Figure 4.1. Net Trade in Wheat, Course Grain and Rice, Pre-War, 1948-52, 
1969-71 and 1978/79. (in million metric tons). 
Country and Region 1934-38 1948-52 1969-71 1978/79 
North America 5 23 .54 104 
United States (39) (86) 
Canada (15) (18) 
Western Europe -24 -22 -22 -14 
EEC ( -17) ( -5) 
Other ( -.5) ( -9) 
East Europe & USSR 5 -3 -24 
Asia, Africa, Latin America 3 -6 -32 -70 
Japan ( -14) ( -23) 
China ( -3) ( -12) 
Australia and New Zealand 3 3 11 11 
Sources:. Figures for 1934-38 and 1948-52, Lester Brown with Erik Eckholm, By Bread 
Alone (New York: Praeger, 1974), p.61, tables 5-2; for 1969-71, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Political Research, Potential Implications of Trends in 
World Population, Food Production and Climate, ORP-401, August 1974, Appendix I, table 
4; for 1978, USDA, World Agricultural Situation, WAS-18, December 1978, p.38, figures 
represent forecasts 
The debates and arguments of the 1930s subsided in the early 1940s yet the Office of Foreign 
Agricultural Relations continued to plan for the agricultural trade problems which they 
expected would recur in the post-war years. Acknowledging the permanence of domestic 
U1Direct government payments peaked at 35% of net cash income in 1939. It dropped to 30% in 1940 
and 13% in 1941, History ... p.1S. 
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price support programs4.49 and wishing to avoid self-defeating trade wars, OFAR again 
suggested international commodity agreements as an alternative approach to liberalising 
agricultural trade. The details of these negotiations will be presented in Chapter 6; however, 
for our present purpose the goals of such an initiative are noteworthy. OFAR claimed that 
such an agreement would serve as a means to 
distribute equitably among exporting nations the available market, to 
establish prices fair to the exporter and importer alike, to seek to regulate 
reserve stocks and to seek such production controls in exporting nations as 
will adjust world supply to effective demand.4.lio 
In wartime, Henry \Vallace continued to argue that agricultural commodities were sus-
ceptible to wide production and price fluctuations which made management of the trade 
on both a national and international level essential. OFAR's arguments met with strong 
objections from Hull and his supporters who believed, with some justification, that the do-
mestic price and income supports and the international commodity agreements weakened 
the American policy of lowering international trade barriers and reducing protectionist do-
mestic policies.4 .51 The trade expansion rationale of the free-trade lobby; however, did not 
hold up well in historical perspective. The Great Depression had shown that in times of 
international crisis it is impossible for anyone to find new markets. 
In a debate which almost came to be characterised as a battle of wills between the 
State Department and the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, USDA, the question of 
exceptionality of agriculture in the post-war commercial policy of reducing trade barriers 
was established - on economic grounds. "They argued that agriculture, which had led the 
nation into the depression suffered not so much from the loss of foreign markets to absorb 
surpluses, as from a structural inability to control price and production."4.5l 
""'Memo to Members of Subcommittee E on Agriculture Policy of the Committee on Trade Barriers. 
From Schwenger, Jan. 10, 1945. Re: Back-up statements to defend OFAR formulated clauses for exclusion 
in a draft convention on relaxation of trade barriers, p.3. 
u°Report of the Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations. United States Department of 
Agriculture (1941), p.5. In 1940 Henry Wallace became Vice President, an acknowledgement of the success 
of his agricultural program. 
u1Henningson, Wealth of Nation8, p.48 
u2The comprehensive analysis of this debate is substantiated by OFAR documents including; Foreign 
Trade, Sept. 28 1944 'Problems of Agriculture's Position Relative to a Proposed International Convention 
Relaxing Trade Barriers'. Letter to Ralph Taylor from Leslie Wheeler August 25 1945 'Post-war trade 
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In the end, those advocating a free trade policy acknowledged th(' political and economic 
basis for not fully exposing agriculture to fluctuating market conditions. The USDA argu-
ment had prevailed. It was accepted that the principle of supply and demand functioned 
imperfectly when applied to agriculture. The physical constraints alone such as climate, 
infestations, soil and capital costs prevent producers from rapidly responding to changing 
market conditions.4.53 Moreover, the turn-around time for crops is roughly four and one 
half years.4 .54 In a free-trade system, the inability to rapidly shift production in response 
to declining demand will inevitably lead to prices depressing surpluses.4 .55 
A second free-trade principle, that of competitive advantage, \\!ould suggest that market 
prices competition should determine the most efficient allocation of resources. When applied 
to commodities such as agriculture, or perhaps energy, it was argued that the societal costs 
of unmanaged price fluctuations should be taken into consideration. 
T. Robert Schwenger, the OFAR's chief economist, addressed this issue in 1944, arguing 
that "price fluctuations should only be tolerated within a range that is acceptable to the 
general level of national economic activity. Drastic slumps or increase in key commodi-
ties can hurt the entire economy." Schwenger stresses: "the necessity for applying special 
measures of government intervention to important sectors of an essentially free-enterprise 
economy in order that other sectors may continue to function effectively. "4.56 
It was within this context that OFAR pursued the objectives of reducing extreme price 
fluctuations through the creation of international commodity agreements to complement 
the stabilization feature of national programs. 
This goal created irreconcilable differences between Wallace and the OFAR, on the one 
hand, and the State Department and Cordell Hull on the other hand. Wallace's general 
agreements and USDA's Commitment to Protect Interests of Agriculture'; and Memo to Subcommittee E 
from Schwenger Re: Agenda to examine 'existing and prospective agricultural prices and income support 
systems in the United State and other important countries . 
•. IilID. Gayle Johnson, and Robert L. Gustafson, Grain Field .. and the American Food Supply: An 
Analy.ti.t of Field Change. and Pouibilitie.t. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962) p. 6 . 
• ,uBerton Henningson, Wealth of Nation.t 
Ulibid. 
··'I!Robert B Schwenger. "World Agricultural Policies and the Expansion of Trade" Journal of Farm 
Economic .. , 27 Feb. 1945, p. 86. 
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views were too far 'left' and he was not asked to be Vice President in 1944, but the agricul-
tural interests continued to express his viewpoint. The State Department lost Cordell Hull 
III 1944 and Roosevelt died, but its criticism of agricultural exceptionality persisted. 
The State Department, through its spokesman Clair Wilcox, argued that "The wisdom 
of our agricultural policy is not here in question ... but the fact that it in inconsistent with 
our belief in private enterprise and with our efforts to restore a freer trading system should 
be clear"4.57 The contradictions and debate persisted; Ted Cohn reflected on this apparent 
contradiction in American economic policy-making four decades later: As one of the guiding 
forces in the agricultural trading agencies, the United States has often followed policies in 
agriculture that diverges rather widely from its trade policies in other areas.4•58 
Upon Roosevelt's death, Harry Truman (Democrat) assumed the Presidency in 1945. In 
general terms, he continued the broad outlines of Roosevelt's policies and was sympathetic 
to the agricultural interests of the mid-west. As a senator, he had supported the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938 and argued for fair prices for farmers. His policies remained 
interventionist as with Roosevelt, although the Cold War soon became his major preoccu-
pation, one which had a major effect on his domestic and foreign economic policies.4 . 59 
The Cold war injected national security concerns into trade questions. This could be seen 
early in the European Recovery Plan, the so-called Marshall Plan, which, in the case of 
agriculture, coincided with a subtle yet unmistakeable shift in American agricultural policy. 
4.60 The national security/strategic component in the decision making process was much 
enhanced in the post World War II era. This as a general theme in American agricultural 
policy-making was evident until the early 1980'S.4.61 
The unprecedented scale and scope of the Marshall Plan, and the timely fashion in 
which it was delivered were oflasting significance. The aid package, although predominantly 
U7Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World 7rade, (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1949) pp.19-20 
ulTheodore H. Cohn, "The Changing Role of the United States" in William P. Avery ed. World 
Agriculture and the GATT (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Reiner Publications, 1993) p.17 
u8David McCullough, Truman, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992) part four. 
uOSee Theodore H. Cohn "The Changing Role of the United States in the Global Agricultural Trade 
Regime" in William P. Avery, World Agriculture p.22-23 
u1David H. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1985) pp.319-335. 
This concept is developed in general economic terms relating to international aid issues, not explicitly food 
aid. 
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American, was also open to the participants of other "American" or like-minded states.4.6l 
Despite the fact that the recovery program was theoretically offered to Communist states 
as well, the plan quickly became an anti-Communist instrument of the West.4.63 The aid 
program proved useful in allowing the American government to address concerns regarding 
"containment" of Communist states, as well as the "containment" of Communist elements 
in Western Europe. Through this program, aid could be simultaneously apolitical in motive, 
political in result and more subtle than the food aid policy proposed by American Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson, which involved extending food aid selectively. 
The Marshall Plan is regarded as having established a precedent for long term regular 
American foreign assistance. David Baldwin, examining this supposition in some detail, 
notes that the success of the program, even in terms of its secondary intention of promoting 
European integration as well as gaining European support for restrictions on trade with 
Communist countries may have been crisis specific. He also questions the popular belief 
that American policy-makers erroneously assumed that a similar plan would be equally 
effective in dealing with Third World Countries.4.64 Although there were undoubtedly some 
elements of the plan that were incorporated into later aid programs, aid to Third World 
countries differed dramatically in terms of size, and range of the assistance. Nevertheless 
the Marshall Plan was a precedent. Aid, surplus management and trade policy coincided 
in a fateful way.4.6S 
4.2.5. Surpluses, Market Expansion and Aid 
The end of wartime grain shortages placed the United States in a situation of postwar 
surplus. The Truman Administration attacked thE:' problem on several fronts. 
U'Bothwell, Drummond, English. p.71. It was in this context that the underlying motivations of 
the plan became apparent. Not only did it serve the purpose of reducing grain surpluses, but it was also 
considered an anti-Communism program. 
u3Charies S. Maier, "The politics of Productivity" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. Between Power and 
Plenty: Foreign Economic Policiu oj Advanced Indwtrial State •. (Madison, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1984) pp.40-41 
ulDavid Baldwin, p.320. See also, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony; Cooperation and Ducord in 
the World Political Economy. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984) p.128. Keohane notes the 
increased sphere of influence on "paternal leadership". Klaus Knorr, The Power oj Nation.: The Political 
Economy oj International Relation, (Basic Books, N.Y., 1975» argues that the United States enjoyed such 
paternal leadership as a result of the Marshall Plan. 
u6ibid. 
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Following the Truman victory in the Presidential election of 1948, the growing surplus 
problems led to renewed interest in an International Wheat Agreement. A 1949 Act mod-
ernised the parity formula to include paid hired labour, and set up loans to cooperatives to 
construct storage facilities. In that same year, the United States, Canada, A Ilstralia, France 
as well as 37 wheat importing countries were signatories to the new International Wheat 
Agreement in a renewed effort to stabilise the overseas wheat trade. This agreement, which 
included pricing provisions (that is, a band of acceptable price variations with established 
floor and ceiling prices), was considered an important supplement to the Agricultural Act 
of 1940. The agreement also contained export quotas. Despite the many problems that 
continued to plague the international grain trade, particularly regarding surplus manage-
ment, it is important to note that the price range established in 1949 was maintained until 
the breakdown of the IWA in 1969. 
Secondly, while the United States led the way in advocating the liberalisation of trade 
through tariff reductions, a process that created the General Agreement on Tarrifs and 
Trade (GATT), it also "used its international political muscle to obtain a waiver of most 
of its GATT obligations with respect to agriculture." 4.66 Agriculture remained largely 
exempt from later GATT rounds. Thirdly, it moved to control production and quell farm 
discontent. 
The "Brannan Plan" (1949) named after newly appointed Agricultural Secretary Charles 
F. Brannan was the most comprehensive and innovative set or proposals to address agri-
cultural problems since the 1930's. This plan featured: 
1. Use of income standard, based on a ten year moving average beginning with the 
years 1938-47 rather than parity as a basis for compiling price support levels for 
farm products. 
2. Restrictions of supports to large-scale farms to what an efficient family farm unit 
could produce. 
ueWilliam P. Avery. "Agriculture and Free Trade" in William P. Avery. ed. World Agriculture and the 
GATT, (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1933.), p.2. The exemption of agriculture from the 
GATT was regarded as a "stunning victory" for American agrarian interests. 
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3. Requirement of compliance with approved conservation practices in order to receive 
benefits. 
4. Production controls on all crops in the form of acreage reductions and market quotas. 
4.67 
Farm groups strongly supported these, and the other features of the comprehensive plan. 
Their twofold task involved informing producers of the details of the plan and, secondly, to 
lobby congress to support the plan. The Iowa Fanner Union went so far as to establish "a 
corn-belt beach head in Congress for the Brannan Plan"4.68 But it met strong congressional 
opposition because of its expense and its "socialist" tone. The result was the continuation of 
existing programs with their inherent tendency to create surpluses. In fact, in 1948-1949-6% 
of U.S. agricultural exports were financed through food-aid programs. Policy makers sought 
new markets on concessional terms in such areas as Japan and Taiwan where American grain 
had no previous market. 
Unlike the reconstruction and development incentive which was certainly inherent in 
the Marshall Plan, the program of concessional market expansion was primarily developed 
as a surplus disposal scheme; however, as in the Marshall Plan, a new era of economic 
dependency was established.4.69 
The Korean War in June 1950 brought temporary relief to the problems of surplus 
production. In fact, Secretary Brannan was compelled to invoke the National Security 
provision of the AAA to ensure the maintenance of high levels of production.4.7O However, 
such production created surpluses that ballooned by 1952 and led to renewed calls for 
solutions. 
1.51 "What New Farm Plan Means" BU6inell Week April 16, 1949 p.25. 
'.88 The Farmer6'6 Union', Voice "America Need's The Brannan Plan" Special Edition, February, 1950. 
p.l. Charles Bran'nan has since been criticised as having "backed away from his "plan" almost before it 
was even really born - right after Allen Klein of the Farm Bureau let out the first blast against it. They 
"traded" it for the "police action" in Korea." F.W. Sotwer, President, U.S. Farmers ASlociation and Editor 
U.S. Farm NeVJ6 personal letter to Randy HenninglOn, 10 Sept. 1973 
ullDan Morgan, p.144. General Douglas MacArthur began to import wheat into Japan in 1946 and 
orchestrated a maslive expolure to this "occidental" delicacy. In Taiwan President Chaing Kai-Shek asaisted 
the U.S. program by declaring that "wheat eating is patriotic". 
uORobert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politici and Provin-
cialism (Toronto, University of Toronto Preaa, 1981, Revised Edition, 1989) pp.122-125 
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Table 4.1. The Changing Pattern of World Grain Exports 
Region 1934-38 1948-52 1960 1966 1973 1975 
North America .5 2:J 39 59 88 94 
La.t.in America. 9 0 5 -1 -3 
Western Europe -24 -:n -25 -27 -21 -17 
Eastern Europe & U.S.S.R. .5 0 -4 -27 -25 
Africa 1 0 -2 -7 -4 -10 
Asia 2 -6 -17 -34 -39 -47 
Australia & New Zealand 3 :l 6 8 7 8 
Source. Lester Brown, The Politics and Responsibility of the North American Breadbas-
ket, World Watch Paper No.2, World Watch Institute October, 1975, as quoted by Raymond 
Hopkins and Donald Puchala, The Global Political Economy of Food, p.11. 
As Figure 4.2 illustrates, is there tremendous rate of production growth in North America 
and the concurrent growth in the world trade of grain. In the 1930's Western Europe was 
the only importing region. Asia became a net importer in the wake of World War II and the 
Korean War. By 1975 it was the largest grain importing region worldwide. By 1960 Africa 
had lost its food self-sufficiency, and it was later joined by Latin America in 1973. Figure 4.2 
also notes the first stages of the Western Europe transition from that of the largest importer 
of grain to its present position as second ranked exporter.4.71 The movement of Eastern 
Europe to where it has come to rely heavily on Western imports in also noteworthy.4.T3 
By the time the Democrats left office in 1953, the Republicans under Dwight David 
Eisenhower inherited a massive "farm problem" caused by surplus production. A full review 
of farm support programs was undertaken in an attempt to reduce government involvement. 
Not only could Secretary Benson not get rid of the programs, but the establishment of the 
Soil Dank by the A.A.A. (1956) again, substantially increased federal spending.4.73 This 
4.71 A study (1983) notes the relatively constant import requirements in Western Europe while export 
sales steadily climbed. The Globe and Mail January 25, 1983. 
4.12 Nick Butler, The Inte",ational Grain Trade, p.53-71. Although the collectivisation process of the 
Soviet agricultural sector in the 1930's severely damaged its productivity levels, the Soviet Union continued 
to export grain not only as a source of revenue but also to exert political influence, p.53. 
4.73 ibid., The Soil Bank together with other price supports cost the federal government $5 billion in 
1959. It is estimated that the Eisenhower administration lost over $12 billion from 1953-1955 through the 
purchasing and storing of agricultural products 
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program designed to reduce acreage levels had little effect on production levels and was 
discontinued in 1958.4.74 
Another policy was the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) subsidy III 1956. Under this program 
producers would be reimbursed in grain the difference between domestic and world prices. 
This program helped to move grain stocks into the export market and raised farm income.u6 
Growing fiscal problems relating to agricultural support payments combined with ever 
growing surplus stocks caused the government to embrace P.L. 480 as the "linchpin" of 
the U.S. strategy to use food aid as a means of surplus disposal. As the program evolved, 
the funds generated by the program were used to help off-set the cost of other support 
programs.4 .76 In 1958 it became known as "Food for Peace" when Senator Hubert Humphrey 
expanded the market development component of the plan and argued that supplying coun-
tries with food was a great way of checking communist aggression.4 .77 
The election of Democratic President John F. Kennedy in 1960 brought about changes 
in orientation, if not in substance regarding agricultural policy making. His "new frontier" 
echoed Roosevelt's "new deal" and Kennedy promised to "get America moving again" 
after the Post-War period. This period was a unique period of growth and prosperity in 
the United States. It was one in which U.S. political and economic hegemony was being 
established throughout the world, and was also a period overshadowed by a preoccupation 
with the threat of Communism. 
The unique circumstances in the world food system at the end of World War II had 
allowed the United States to take the lead in establishing an international system which 
effectively regulated the production, distribution and consumption of grain in virtually every 
country of the world.u8 Analysts suggest that the period 1949-1965 must be understood 
Uf Hijtory ... , By 1957 over 21.4 million acres were held in this "bank". The last of the land in the 
reserve was not released until 1972. . 
U6 Joseph Halow, U.S. Grain: The Political Commodity (London, University Press of America, 1989), 
p.15 
ullRichard Gilmore, A Poor Harved, p.85 also see Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, p.77 
""Richard Gilmore, p.85 and Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, p.79. Hubert Humphrey, testi-
mony before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 16 July 1953 in Raymond Hopkins "Reform 
in the International Food Aid Regime; The Role of Consensual Knowledge" in International Organisation, 
#46, 1, Winter 1992., p.2. 
f. 78 Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Anal-
ysis" in Stephen D. Krasner ec. International Regimej (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983) 
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in terms of a distinct syst.em or regime which is set apart. from t.he period that proceeded or 
followed it, by a dearly defined set of rules and norms of hehaviour.4 .79 The most important 
features of this new regime indude the growth of North America as the major supplier of 
grains to the world market, the development and distribution of more productive farming 
practices and the creation of international food organisations.4.8O 
Many of the principles and norms of the food regime of this period were "codified" 
in the charters and conventions of the newly founded international food agencies and the 
international agreements are of particular importance, notably the Food and Agriculture 
Organisations of the United Nations (F.A.O.) the International Wheat Agreement and the 
Food Aid Convention.4 •81 Although the norms of the regime were clearly biased in favour 
of the developed grain trading countries, most participants in the regime were regarded as 
receiving at least some benefit from participation in the regime.4•82 
The increased production capacity, particularly in North America gave rise to the very 
large surplus stocks which were simultaneously a source of concern as well as a source of 
power for American and to a lesser extent, Canadian policy makers. The relative price 
stability that existed in the 1950s and early 1960s can be accounted for in large part by 
the willingness of the U.S. and Canada to accumulate reserves in times of market surplus 
and release them on both commercial and concessional terms in times of tight markets.4.83 
Although Canada was the largest commercial exporter from the 1920s to the 1950s, the 
United States has consistently had potentially larger volumes of wheat available for export 
since World War II.4.84 Canadian volume dominance has, at least to a large extent been 
p.76. A comprehensive frll.mework for the II.nalysis ofthe internll.tional rela.tions of food has been put forwlI.rd 
by Hopkins and Puchala in The Global Political Economy of Food (Special Issue) International Organisation 
32 (Summer 1978) p.581-616 . 
•• TV ibid.; also see Andrew Fenton Cooper "Agricultural Relations Between Western N II.tions: Canadian 
Approa.ches." in Irene Sage Knell and John R. English eds. Canadian AgricultuJl! in a Global Context: 
Opportunities and Obligations (WlI.terloo, Ontario, University of Waterloo Press, 1986) pp.69-70. 
uOibid. 
Ul Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins in Krasner International Regimes p.76 
u2ibid.The basis for this assessment is in contrasting the post-war regime with former colonial structures. 
u3Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, in Krasner, p.79. 
,.U Alex F. McCalla, "A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing" in Journal of Farm Economic, 48(3) 
August 1966, p.7lg. In this widely cited study, McCalla explores the finer points of the complementll.ry 
trade relationship of Canada and the U.S. Details of this study will be elaborated upon in Chapter 5. 
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a fundion of U.S. policy.4.85 U.S. policy makers similarly diverted responsibility vis-a.-vis 
domestic and foreign policy interest groups by allowing Canada to take a lead in price 
setting prior to 1964.4.86 
This duopoly arrangement assured the United States that Canada would set prices 
within an acceptable range.4.87 The IWA (1949) and subsequent agreements also con-
tributed to the price stability of the 1950s and 19608.4.88 Conversely, it has been argued 
that the agreements were successful only because "the two most important nations, the 
United States and Canada were willing to build up stocks and restructure production either 
directly or indirectly, to prevent prices from declining below the minimum specified by the 
agreements. "4.89 
Although this "duopoly" functioned effectively in relation to pricing until 1965, increas-
ing marketing disputes highlighted the tenuous nature of the relationship.4.90 A major area 
of trade dispute between Canada and the United States was with regard to trade with 
Communist countries. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, the more explicit Export 
Control Act of 1949, and finally the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 dramatically 
restricted trade with the Soviet Bloc. Agriculture was included in the ban.4.91 "If the trade 
figures for the fourth quarters of 1947 and 1952 are compared, the dollar value of agricul-
tural exports to the bloc dropped by more than 99%.,,4.92 Canada seized the opportunity 
by moving strongly into both the Soviet and Chinese markets. 
The apparent cooperation disappeared. Severe price competition evident in 1965 led 





uliBrian T. Olsen, pp.7-8 
uOibid. 
u1Trudy Huskamp Peterson, "Sales, Surpluses and 'The Soviets: A Study in Political Economy" in 
Richard M. Fraenkel, Ron. F. Hadwinger and William P. Browne, eds. The Role of U.S. Agriculture in 
Foreign Policy (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979) p.56-57 
u2ibid., The figure excluded East Germany. In 1947 U.S. agricultural exports to the bloc totalled 
114,061,000 and in 1952 they totalled 319,000 a reduction of 99.7%. Exports shipped through the U.N. 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) have been excluded in both cases. 
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Arrangement.4.93 The implications of the breakdown of these agreements were profound, 
but would not be fully appreciated until 1972. 
Throughout the period 1963-68, Lyndon Johnson's Democratic administration pursued 
policies that were inherently inflationary. By fighting the war in Vietnam while develop-
ing costly new domestic programs, Johnson placed enormous strains upon the American 
economy resulting in a balance of payments deficit.4.94 
The election of Republican Richard M. Nixon in 1968 brought about substantive changes 
in domestic and foreign policy formulation. Domestically, Nixon tried to cut back on the 
welfare policies of the Democratic years with only limited success. Internationally, the 
Nixon administration was marked by aggressive policies in international trade which in-
cluded a willingness to link trade with politics.4.96 The United States moved toward a more 
unilateral approach to its foreign relations. A decisive move in the new orientation of the 
administration was the decision in 1971 to suspend the U.S. dollar's official convertibility 
into either gold or foreign currencies."·96 The resultant devalued dollar helped to open 
up foreign markets to U.S. grain.4.97 In terms of the food regime, the 1970 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act reflected the strong market orientation of Secretary of Agriculture Clif-
ford Hardin. In an intensive review of existing farm programs, Hardin was determined to 
expand American export markets. Grain shipments through the PL480 "Food for Peace" 
program were extended."·98 The volume of the American surplus disposal caused concern 
to other exporting nations.4.99 This plan was continued however, and supplemented by a 
further reduction of acreage in Canada and the United States, reducing reserve stocks to 
their lowest level since 1952."·100 
U3Brian Oleson. p.8. also see Andrew Cooper. p.70. The fact that the major exports, particularly the 
United States allowed the IWA, one of the "pillars" of orderly grain marketing was a clear indication of the 
breakdown of the food regime. 
U4 John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy (New Jersey, Princeton Univenity Press, 1982) 
p.163-4 
uiibid. 
u8Robert Isaac. p.52. In putting together the best presentation possible for his "New Economic Policy" 
Nixon simultaneously imposed a temporary surcharge of 10% on dutiable imports and frole domestic prices 
and wages for 90 days. 
u7John Odell. p.165-168. 
u'History 
ue The Globe and Mail May 6, 1970. 
4.100 ibid. 
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These actions and the deteriorating trade relations between the U.S. and the other major 
exporters were predictable consequences of the "New Economic Policy" which guided the 
Nixon Administration. In this plan, a very high priority was given to problems in the grain 
sector.4.101 The United States was committed to seek policies worldwide that would expand 
its grain markets. It also sounded warnings about rising competition with the European 
Community and Japan. It was recognised that optimising agricultural exports could have a 
favourable effect on the balance of payments which were becoming increasingly problematic. 
The result, therefore, was that U.S. agriculture did become increasingly dependent on world 
markets.4.10l 
In February, 1971, the United Nations convened a World Food Conference in order to 
negotiate a new grains agreement. Participants attempted to establish some basis for a 
system of orderly marketing in grain, but for the first time in over twenty years there was 
"no pledge agreement among exporters and importers On floor and ceiling prices, or On the 
quantities of wheat importers might buy from the main exporter."4.103 Differences between 
Canadian and American demands were reported to be the major cause of the breakdown of 
the negotiations.4.104 The duopoly had broken down and the stage was set for the coming 
crisis. 
4.2.6. The World Food Crisis 
In keeping with Richard Nixon's desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union and 
China, on June 19, 1971 a White House spokesman announced that the President had 
"decided to terminate the need to obtain Department of Commerce permission for the 
export of wheat, flour and other grains to China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union". 
6.101 "United States International Economic Policy In an Interdependent World" Report to the President 
submitted by the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, July 1971, Washington D.C., 
p.141. . 
6.102 ibid., p.53, also aee Theodore Cohn in William Avery, p.25. During the 1970s the United Statea also 
became more aware of ita comparative advantage in agriculture and more dependent on agricultural trade. 
Farm output increased 54% between 1950 and 1975, and exports almost quadrupled. 
6.10a Ottawa Journal February 18, 1971. 
6.10' ibid. 
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He also ('liminated the requirement that at least 50% of the grain sold to these countries be 
carried on American ships.4.105 
The grain companies contracted substantial sales offeedgrains to the Soviet Union with-
out government interference or approval for the first time since 1963. Further sales were 
encouraged through concessionary credit arrangements through the CCC, and a long-term 
agreement for $750 million in grain over a three year period. Capitalising on these new 
incentives, the Soviet Union continued its "secret" purchases.4.106 Substantial purchases 
were also made in Canada, and given the poor crops in Argentina and Australia, there was 
very little wheat on the international market.4.107 
Had policy adjustments been made quickly, the effects of these sales could have been 
minimised. The Nixon administration, however, was very slow to react. Not only were 
export subsidies maintained despite the rapidly rising prices, but acreage reductions were 
maintained despite the tightening of the market.4.108 In summary, the Nixon Administration 
succeeded in stabilising the Russian food economy while destabil1sing its own.4.109 The world 
wheat trade was rapidly transformed from a buyers' to a sellers' market. The problem was 
not really the Soviet sales, but rather the fact that reserve stocks had been depleted beyond 
a safe level and the government failed to respond to the new realities of the world food 
situation.4 .110 
Agricultural policy in the mid 1970's was a strange coalition of Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger and his foreign policy objectives, Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture and his farm 
interests and the Treasury. Policy making became an exercise in crisis management. Noth-
ing in its previous experience had prepared the economic policy community to anticipate 
UOII "Trade with the People's Republic of China", Presidential Announcement of June 10, 1971 in the 
Weekly Computation of Presidential Documents, June 14, 1971, p.891, and I.M. Destler "United States Food 
Policy" in Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, Global Political Economy 0/ Food, p.46. 
uOIIDest1er, p.46-47. In June 1971 the Soviet Union quietly contracted with the Continental Grain 
Company to supply them 4 million tons (149 million bushels) of wheat as well as 4.5 million tons (197 bushels) 
of corn. During the next month an additional 7.8 million tons (286 bushels) of wheat from Continental and 
five other grain companies. They also purchased about 2 million tons of feedgrains and 1 million tons of 
soybeans. 
U07 ibid. and Dan Morgan, p.207-212. 
lolO. Dan Morgan, p.215-214. 
lolOIl Destler, p.48 
4.110 ibid. 
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the importance of agricultural issues.4. 111 In the words of I.M. Destler, the economic com-
munity was "paying the price for years of neglect of agricultural issues - it was simply not 
alert to its stakes in reasonable grain stocks as a foundation for stable food prices.4•113 
By the beginning of 1973, the cost of this neglect had already become apparent III 
the rapidly escalating food price inflation. The consumer price index for food (based on 
1967=100) grew from 114.9 in 1970 to 141.4 in 1973, despite price controls on food.4.u3 
The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 was passed to deal with this cri-
sis. It emphasised the need to increase production in order to "respond to ever-growing 
worldwide demand for food and fibre" and to hold down price increases. Secretary Earl 
Butz proclaimed that this legislation represented "an historic turning point in the philoso-
phy of farm programs in the United States.,,4.U4 Despite these late measures taken, retail 
food prices increased by 20% in eight months. The food price inflation was a policy crisis 
and major political embarrassment, in a significant election year.4 . U5 The Nixon Adminis-
tration, at first ecstatic over the disappearance of the large surplus stocks and the end of 
government agricultural support expenditure, soon had to defend vigorously its inflationary 
policies.4.u6 
Mounting domestic inflationary pressures led President Nixon to make one of the most 
serious miscalculations of his presidency. On June 27, 1973 the government announced a 
total embargo on soybean exports. Unlike other embargoes which generally have foreign 
policy objectives, the soybean embargo was initiated in order to control skyrocketing do-
mestic soybean prices.4.111 This action, while short-lived, had very serious consequences 
4.111 Philip H. Tresize, Rebuilding Grain Re6erve6, Toward an International Sydem (Washington: The 
Brookings Institute, 1976), p.50 
U121.M. Destler, pA9 and Hidory, p.29. 
4.113 Hidory, p.29 
4.114 Quoted in Hi6tory, p.29. Also see Lowell D. Hill "The United States: Grain Marketing, Institutions 
and Policies" in Michael J. McGarry and Andrew Schmitz, eds. The World Grain Trade: Grain Marketing, 
Inditution6 and Policie6 (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1992) p.398. ' 
4.111 Joseph Hallow, U.S. Grain: The Political Commodity (London, University Preas of America, 1989) 
p.V 
4.1111 ibid. 
4.11TRichard Gilmore, p.147 and see also David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (New Jesey, Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p.41, Baldwin categorises embargoes as a form of economic statecraft involving 
negative sanctions. 
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in terms of U.S. trade relations. It represented a major setback ill contemporary U .S.-
Japanese relations,4.118 and U.S relations with Western Europe were also severely damaged. 
The embargo left a legacy of distrust regarding American reliability as a supplier of essential 
goodS.4 . 119 
The instability of the world grain markets from 1972-74 proved to be damaging to many 
constituencies, but it was a very profitable time for the major grain trading companies. 
Cargill's earnings alone rose from $19.4 million (after taxes) in 1971 to $150 million in 
1972.4.1l0 The price increases for agricultural exports were also having a very positive effect 
on the balance of payments. "In 1974 they rose sharply and entirely covered the petroleum 
deficit as well as the cost of agricultural imports. In 1977 and 1978 trade deficits of $40 
billion and $47 billion were offset by agricultural trade surpluses of $10 and $13 billion 
respectively. "4.1l1 
4.2.7. Food Aid and the World Food Conference: 1974 
One of the primary casualties of the world food crisis was the aid community and the Third 
World. The drain of foreign exchange from the quadrupling of oil prices, left few resources 
for grain purchases, particularly at inflated prices.4 . lll As this situation worsened, the main 
donor nations responded to the tight market conditions by cutting back on food aid and 
other assistance programs. In the United States alone, the food aid program which had 
financed 33% of agricultural exports in 1957, dropped to 13% in 1972 and 4% in 1974.4.1l3 
This world crisis provided the United States with an opportunity to improve its foreign 
relations. Thus, in an attempt to pick up the pieces of shattered domestic and foreign 
policies, Henry Kissinger convened the World Food Conference in November 1974.4.134 The 
U18 Richard Gilmore. p.149-50. Japan relies on the United States for 92% of its considerable requirement 
of soybean imports. see alao Dan Morgan. p.217-18. 
U111 ibid. 
u2°Dan Morgan. p.219 
U21Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala. Global Food Interdependence. p.37. 
u221.M. Destler. p.57 
U2l1ibid. Food aid shipments were alao increasingly politically motivated. In 1974 South Vietnam and 
Cambodia received 69% of U.S. food aid shipments. Department of State Bulletin. May 6. 1974 
U24 Henry Kiaainger. Year, of Upheaval Especially chapters XXI - XXV. Alao Private Interview. Charles 
Weitz. F.A.O. Representative to the United Nations. The decision to convene the World Food Conference 
was unilaterally taken by Henry Kiaainger. Earl Bub alone was "notified" prior to the official announcement. 
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World "[<ood Conference perhaps served the short-term goal of focusing world attention on 
the food security issue; however, little substantive progress was made in furthering the 
expressed goals. In fact, the growing commercial orientation of agriculture policy since 
1974 led to a deterioration of food security in developing nations. 
The World Food Conference did, however, lead to the creation of the World Food Council 
and to negotiations for the creation of an international grain reserve under the auspices of 
the International Wheat Counci1.4. 125 The grain issue proposal which was perceived to be 
central to the problem of world food security, will be examined in detail in Chapter 7. 
The World Food Conference had provided an opportunity to institute needed reform in 
the world food regime, even if the political will was inadequate to carry it through. There 
were fundamental differences of opinion even within the American delegation regarding the 
desirability of commodity agreements versus a free market approach to the marketing of 
grain.4•126 
The resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974 and the short tenure in office of President 
Gerald Ford (1974-76) represented a very turbulent period in American history. Grain 
prices remained strong through this period and farm exports helped to alleviate problems 
in other sectors of the economy. Agriculture was one of the few areas that continued to 
have a positive trade balance4.1l7 
The election of Democrat Jimmy Carter (1976-80) brought about several significant in-
novations in both domestic and international agricultural policies. Secretary of Agriculture 
Robert Bergland came to office with a long history of concern for producer incomes, as well 
as a long standing commitment to the idea of grain reserves.4.1:l8 The Food and Agriculture 
Act (1977) provided Secretary Bergland with the opportunity to implement a system of 
farmer--owned grain reserves to temper price fluctuations of grain. The issues of producer's 
U2liDonald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins in Stephen Krasner. p.82-83. The conference identified 
three major defects in the world food system. (1) Inadequate food reserves to aBBure reasonable stability in 
markets and security for consumers. (2) Use of food aid that reflected low priority for the food problems of 
less developed countries. (3) inadequate and inappropriate investment flows with respect to food production 
in food deficit areas. 
U215Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, Global Food Interdependena! p147-148 
4.127 Theodore Cohn, in Avery. p.26 
U2SRobert Bergland, private interview, August, 1992, Washington. As a member of the U.s. congress 
in the 1960's Bergland advocated the establishment of U.S. farmer-owned reserves. 
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income security had become complicated by the price instability inherent in greater reliance 
on the export market.4.129 The reserve program was to be administered by the Secretary 
of Agriculture, a strong advocate of government intervention in agriculture.4.130 In a very 
detailed study of the U.S. farmer--owned grain reserve policy, Jerry Sharples notes this shift 
in policy away from price supports and towards supply management. He concludes that this 
approach was more effective in achieving their objectives than other policy options might 
have been. A critical factor in this conclusion relates to favourable international market 
conditions.4.131 
Despite the apparent success of the reserve program, the Emergency Assistance Act 
of 1978 was enacted in response to continued problems of low farm income. As prices 
strengthened in the 1978-80 period, the administration judged further stabilization mea-
sures unnecessary.4.132 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 brought about a surprising policy 
departure for the Carter Administration. On January 4, 1980, President Carter declared an 
embargo on shipments of grain to the Soviet Union.4.133 The unilateral way in which this was 
taken prompted a "parallel congressional initiative" in an amendment to the AAA (1981) 
that stipulated that producers would be reimbursed "at 100% of parity in the event that 
grain exports be interrupted for foreign policy reasons,,4.134 This amendment wa.s admittedly 
imposed in order to make selective grain embargoes too expensive ever to be contemplated 
again.4.135 
U2I1History ... p.3l. although exports were growing, increa.sed production had a depressing effect on 
prices, see also Stephen Krasner in Peter Katzenstein. p.66. 
ulioRobert Bergland. private interview 
U31 Jerry A. Sha.rples. "An evaluation of U.S. GRAIN Reserve Policy, 1977-80". USDA Economic 
research Services, Agricultural Economic Report #481, Washington, March, 1982. and Jerry A. Sharples, 
"An Examination of U.S. Wheat Policy Since 1977 with emphasis on the Farmer Owned Reserve", Track 
Policy Branch. International Economics Division, Economics and Statistics Service USDA. November 1980. 
UlI2History ... p.36. The wheat reserves were held at between the limits of 300-700 million bushels. In 
1978 the reserves were expanded to inelude 550 million bushels of feed grains. 
ulIlIRobert Paarlberg, Food Trade and Foreign Policy p.132. Carter had never considered using food 
trade sanctions against another country. not even in the 15th month of the Iran hostage taking incident. 
Also, Robert Bergland, private interview, regarding the unilateral nature of the decision. 
uUibid. p.133 
u36ibid. 
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The election of Republican Ronald Reagan (1980-1988) brought about a dramatic dif-
ference in approach to domestic and international economic policy. There were, however. 
marked similarities, especially in the unilateralism that had marked both the Kennedy and 
Nixon administrations. Nevertheless, the Reagan years were marked by dramatic tax cuts 
in the early years and a willingness to use monetary policy (Le. higher interest rates to stifle 
inflation while simultaneously running large budgetary deficits )4.136 to realise his objectives. 
His policies remain controversial. The budgetary deficits were created in large part by a 
remarkable increase in defence expenditures and, after 1984, a large increase in agricultural 
spending.4.131 Reagan's trade policy was marked by an emphasis on the free market and 
by a willingness to compete aggressively when American markets were threatened. These 
apparently contradictory objectives were particularly problematic in the area of agricultural 
subsidies. As one analyst observes, the greatest expansion of agricultural subsidies came 
under the Reagan administration which "was elected with the explicit promise to reduce 
government interference. "4.138 
Upon taking office President Reagan moved quickly to terminate the Soviet grain em-
bargo. This, occurred against the advice of newly designated Secretary of State, Alexander 
Haig.4 . 139 The declining commercial grain exports heightened concern for domestic producer 
interests, thus curtailing the likelihood of agricultural trade policy being employed to fur-
ther foreign policy objectives.4•14o.Secretary of Agriculture John Block in 1980 encountered 
a farm community faced with deepening economic distress.4 . 141 The inflated grain prices of 
the 1970's and the expectation that tight market conditions would continue to entice pro-
ducers to invest heavily in land and equipment. Much of this expansion was carried out at a 
period of record high interest rates in the United States. This overcapitalisation combined 
with declining market conditions led to many bankruptcies in the farm community. 
U30Miles Killer, "The International Political Economy", Foreign Affair. (Fall 1990) p.150. 
u37ibid 
t.u1Robert B. Hawkins, Jr. President, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, April 1989 
in James Bovard, The Farm FiCJIco (San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies Preas, 1991) 
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Agricultural surpluses in the early 1980s were again actually affecting major exporters, 
particularly the United States, which was experiencing the effects of the emergence of the 
European Community as a formidable competitor.4 .142 The United States' share of global 
wheat exports fell from 4.5% in 1980/81 to 29.6% in 198.5/86.4. 143 
The Reagan administration attempted to halt this decline by challenging the legitimacy 
of E.C. agricultural policies in the GATT. The United States attempted to use the Tokyo 
Round's Subsidy Code in order to challenge the E.C.'s agricultural subsidy practices, how-
ever a 1983 ruling of the GATT panel failed to resolve the issue.4 . 144 
Although the U.S. continued to press for policy reform through the Uruguay round of the 
GATT negotiations, it was frustrated by its diminished ability to use this forum to achieve 
its desired objective.4•145 This situation will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6. 
The deepening distress of United States producers in the context of the world agricul-
tural crisis required the government to increase agricultural price supports. In 1983, a new 
Payment-In-Kind (PIK) program was implemented, designed to reduce production and im-
prove farm income by supplementing farmers' income with grain from government reserves. 
The effectiveness of this plan was undermined both by particularly high yields in 1983 and 
increasing international competition.4•146 
In 1982-83, grain sales to the Soviet Union fell, despite the promotional efforts of Presi-
dent Reagan. The long-term structural adjustments of the grain embargo continued to hurt 
American producers.4•147 Farm income, heavily dependent on the export market, dropped 
by 40% in 1981-82.4.148 High interest rates reduced trade volume, as did the decline in 
general purchasing power in what was generally considered a world recession.4 .149 
4. t42 Theodore Cohn, in Avery, p.29 
un ibid., This loss in trade reflected several unfavourable conditions in the domestic economy including 
the rising value of the U.S. dollar, high domestic support levels and shrinking technological advantages. 
uUTheodore Cohn, in Avery, p.30 
uUTheodore Cohn, in Avery, p.36 
U4e Alex F. McCalla and Timothy Josling, Agricultural Policiel and World Market! (New York, Macmil-
lan Publishing Company, 1985), p.70-71. See also Nick Butler, p.20. 
uHRobert Paarlberg, p.136-l39 
4.1411 ibid. High interest rates also hurt U.S. exports. 
u4"ibid. 
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The E.C. capitalised on this general downturn by investing heavily in the promotion 
of grain exports. By the early 1980s the Community had developed a great variety of 
trade instruments including special blended credit programs. "By 1989 the full scope of 
the complete E.C. wheat trade policy was clear: it would include targeted marketing with 
selected refund offers, flexible commercial and concessionary credit, credit guarantees, multi-
annual supply agreements and an active storage system.,,4.150 
The United States responded to this increasingly aggressive grain export policy of the 
E.C. by establishing the Export Enhancement Program in May, 1985.4.151 Victims of the 
U.S.-B.C. agricultural battle include the group of 14 other grain producing countries known 
as the Cairns Group which joined together in an attempt to minimise the damaging effects 
of this dispute. Ronald Libby assesses this plan as a retaliatory measure designed to increase 
the financial burden of the E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to a level that was 
politically unacceptable, thus exacerbating political tensions within the E.C.4.m 
The stage was set for an unparalleled level of government intervention and spending in 
the grain sector. Government payments constituted an increasing share of farm income. In 
1980, total government payments averaged 18% of total cash receipts; in 1986, government 
payments grew to 18.6% of cash receipts; and in 1987 they declined to 12.1 %.4.153 Although 
these figures indicate a certain level of support for producers, it has been insufficient to halt 
the spread of bankruptcies among producers. 
In addition a shift took place in the allocation of government payments in which a 
remarkably larger proportion of payments was being paid to the large grain trading com-
panies. In addressing this issue Joseph Halow noted that the U.S. public was quite used to 
large government payments to producers; it is not, however, comfortable with the payment 
of billions of dollars to these companies while the farm community is experiencing severe 
UIiOPeter W. Philips, Wheat, Europe and the GATT (Pinter Publishers, 1990), p.2 
Ulil Theodore Cohn, in Avery, p.30 
t·1Ii2 Ronald T. Libby, Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and the World Grain Trade, p.l. The British 
were particularly seen as resenting the growing burden of financing agricultural exports for the benefit of 
the main producing states, France and Germany. 
t.lr.3 Michael J. McGarry and Andrew Schmitz, p.401 
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distress. 4. 164 The issue of the continuing privatisation of the international grain trade be-
came increasingly significant. 
Despite the growing conflicts among the major grain produc('fs, there were areas that 
continued to be of mutual concern. As the United States commitment to "liberalisa-
tion" in agriculture increased in response to E.C. competition, its contribution to stability 
declined.4•166 Such was the situation as the Cold War ended in the late 1980's. 
4.3. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter, a review of the national agricultural policies of the United States, is the first 
of a two part analysis of the national policies of the major grain exporters. In undertaking 
this review, a number of themes have emerged, which, taken together, explain some of the 
complexities of the United States agricultural policy making. 
The United States has, throughout this century been the dominant force in the interna-
tional grain trade. A combination of its natural comparative advantage and a long history 
of price support legislation has resulted in levels of U.S. grain production which were often 
in excess of effective demand. The surplus stocks which have resulted from these high levels 
of production have given the United States considerable leverage vis/,avis its foreign policy 
objectives particularly since the 1940's, they have also been responsible for considerable 
domestic dislocation and debate. This chapter has considered the broad spectrum of U.S. 
agricultural policies with particular emphasis on how these policies have had an impact 
upon the development of the international grain market.. 
Surplus grain stocks, as we have seen, have represented a costly and seemingly unresolve-
able problem for policy makers since the 1930's. A legacy of the collapse of the agricultural 
sector in the depression was the emergence of a politically powerful farm lobby which has 
demanded, and received protection from the vacillations of world grain prices since then. 
This protection was first legislated in the mid 1930's, in a comprehensive set of legisla-
tion that emphasised supply management, acreage management, income supplement and 
UU Joseph Halow, p.20 
UIIII Theodore Cohn, p.36 
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infrastructural development. These acts formed the basis for future United States national 
policies. Given the limited success of these policies to manage surplus production, producers 
compelled U.S. policy makers to seek new export markets. 
Increased participation in export markets led to an international initiative which was 
considered an integral part of the overall strategy. The proposal to establish an International 
Wheat Agreement to coordinate the policies of the major exporters and to regulate the 
international market. Although the International Wheat Agreement (1933) lasted only one 
year before the market quota provisions were violated, it set an important precedent for 
later agreements. 
The domestic support structure, on the other hand, remained a constant feature of U.S. 
policy after the 1930's. There are compelling reasons for this unparalleled sectoral support. 
Politically, the farm lobby maintained sufficient congressional, senatorial and electoral col-
lege voting strength to ensure that its voice would be heard in Washington. In economic 
terms, the debate regarding whether protection of the sector, or trade liberalisation would 
optimise the functioning of the agricultural sector is a debate that continues to this day. 
Many of the debates regarding agriculture policy making in the United States are also cen-
tral to the policy-making process of the other major exporters. Similarly, U.S. policies have 
had an enormous impact on their national policies and the development of the international 
grain market. 
Chapter 5 
National Agricultural Policies: 
Part Two, Canada, Australia, 
Argentina and the European 
Community 
5.1. Introduction 
Agricultural policy has, historically remained an exception to overall economic planning 
and its interests are often seen to be at odds with industrial interests. It will be found that, 
to a large extent, the issues which plague agricultural policy makers today are rooted in the 
past and that the export policies of the major grain traders have been shaped primarily by 
domestic political and economic circumstances. Since the domestic and foreign economic 
policies of the United States have been, arguably, the most significant factor in the evolution 
of the international grain trade, it has been considered separately and in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
In discussing the national agricultural policies of major grain exporters apart from the 
United States, one should begin with t.hose countries which historically have played the 
most significant role. The development of the grain industry in Canada, Australia and 
Argentina grew out of a much more comprehensive national plan involving land settlement, 
immigration and general economic development than did the American industry. In each 
case, a massive government commitment was made to the industry in order to achieve 
broader political and economic objectives. Given that together with the United States, 
Canada played a significant role in the development of the international grain trade, a more 
detailed history of the growth of the sector will be presented then in the case of the othe 
exporters. In the case of the European Community, it was the 'maintenance' of its rural 
society that motivated early government involvement in the agricultural sector; however, 
more recent policy developments also reflect strong political-strategic considerations. The 
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policies reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the ongoing importance of the grain sector 
to the economy and polity of these countries. Many of the programs which have been in 
effect since the 1930's have operated with varying degrees of success since that time. The 
effectiveness of the system can be related to the close linkage between supply on the world 
market and its effect on the level of co-operation and conflict among producers.5.1 In this 
context, the collaborative efforts of the Canadian - American duopoly, and the International 
Wheat Agreement provided a period of relative stability and effectiveness to the grain trade 
between 1949-1967. By contrast, the fierce competition of the 1980's, complicated by the 
burgeoning force of the Europe Community, resulted in the emergence of a far more complex 
and less structured trading regime.5.2 The "subsidy war" between the U.S. and E.C. led to 
a cooperative response by the other exporters and the establishment of the "Cairns group". 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the persistent problems in the production and 
marketing of grain in Canada, Australia, Argentina and the European Community and the 
policy options adopted by governments to manage this important sector of the economy. 
The Chapter will focus particularly on the policies which have most significantly affected 
international trade and aid flows as well as international agreements or initiatives. As in 
Chapter IV the chronological limits of the study for each exporter will be approximately 
1920-1990, although in each case certain periods will be emphasised. For each exporter the 
following policy objectives will be examined. 
1. producer income and price stability 
2. production management 
3. socio-political factors 
4. foreign policy and national security considerations 
5. the role of commercial interests 
In the case of each exporter, these considerations will be seen to have changed over time. 
6.1Theodore H. Cohn, The International Politic. of Agricultuml Trade: Canadian - American relatiON 
in a Global Agricultuml Context, (University of British Columbia press, Vancouver, 1990) pp.180-81 
6.2 Alex McCalla, "A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing" in Journal of Farm Economic. 48 (3) 
August 1966, p.719 
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5.2. Canada 
5.2.1. Summary of Events Before 1930 
Canadian agricultural policy has heen central to the political ('conomy of nat.ion-building. 
Wheat. became central both in policy terms and as Canada's kading ('x port at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, wheat farming on the Canadian prairies was Canada's 
most important economic activity and central to the political debates in Canada in the 
first three decades of the century. That wheat had such significance was a product of 
deliberate government policy. Vernon C. Fowke, the major analyst of the development 
of the Western Canadian "wheat economy," pointed out that agriculture had not been 
British North America's most significant economic activity. Agriculture, he wrote, was "not 
indigenous to Canada: it was established and expanded only under conditions of extreme 
and prolonged difficulty.,,5.3 After Canadian Confederation, the government adopted the 
so-called National Policy which stressed higher levels of immigration, the building of a 
transcontinental railway, and the opening of the Canadian West. In achieving these aims, 
the federal government seized upon the agricultural possibilities of the west and,especially, 
on wheat farming. 
Land settlement could only come about with the establishment of a transportation 
system to facilitate migration. After 1900, however, through "a favourable conjuncture 
of circumstances,,6.4 Canada was deemed to possess the 'last great West' and immigrants 
poured into the Canadian West, and wheat became the staple driving Canadian economic 
growth. Although some recent economic histories hav(l cast some doubt about staple ex-
planations for Canadian economic growth, none deny the enormous significance of wheat in 
the economy of Canada between 1900 and 1930.6.6 
UVernon C. Fowke, Canadian AgricultuRlI Policy:The Hidorical Pattern (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1947), p.270. 
uIn the years 1885-1910 the railways built a network of branch lines that facilitated land settlement 
and served as a gathering system for shipments of grain to the lakehead and methods of loading bulk grain 
were adopted from the U.S. 
uFowke, 277-8. Other major studies of the development of the Canadian wheat economy include 
Fowke's The National Policy and the Grain Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957); Duncan 
MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade (Toronto:Macmillan, 1932); and in two works by former civil servant 
Charles Wilson, Grain Marketing in Canada (Winnipeg: Canadian International Grains Institute, 1979); and 
A Century of Canadian Grain: Government Policy to 1951 (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Western Producer 
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Between 1901 and 1921 the area of wheat production in the prairie provinces grew from 
2,495,000 acres to 19,389,000 acres, and problems of wheat marketing, transportation, and 
producer income became significant to political life on the prairies and, to a large extent, 
in national politics as well. 
Canadian patterns mirrored those of the United States, although there were significant 
differences that developed. In both countries wheat farming was concentrated in the western 
states on what had formerly been the frontier. Wheat farming populations were more diverse 
in background than was the case with the older populations in the east. The railways were 
fundamental to the growth of the wheat economy and were soon the targets of producers 
who resented their monopoly. This marked the beginnings of what was to become a more 
general regionalised discontent based on grain producers being required to pay fixed, often 
inflated rates for agricultural inputs while their output was left to the fluctuations of the 
world market. In Canada and the United States, the wheat farmers depended on export 
markets and grew increasingly resentful of the protection of domestic manufactured goods. 
Their support for free trade was evident in national elections in Canada as in the United 
States. Notwithstanding this support for free trade on the international level, Canadian and 
American farmers were attracted to collective or, more accurately, cooperative solutions to 
their dilemma. As time passed, the Canadian response to the problems of wheat marketing, 
production, and transportation diverged significantly from that of the United States, and 
those differences are worth noting. 
Canada established its reputation for high quality wheat in the 1870s and since that time 
Canada Western Hard Red Spring Wheat has been a standard for marketing excellence. By 
the late 1890s the market appeal of this wheat had led to rapid settlement of the Canadian 
West, and wheat became the main impetus to the region's growth. Most Canadian scholars 
argue that the framework of development of the West was "essentially mercantilist in form." 
Prairie Books, 1978). On the more recent period, see Grace Skogstaad, The Politic. 0/ Agricultural Polic!l-
Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); and Andrew Schmib and W.H. Furtan, 
"Canada:Grain Marketing, Institutions, and Policies," in Michael McGarry and Andrew Schmib, eds., The 
World Grain Trade:Grain Marketing, Inltitutionl, and Policiu ( Boulder,Col.: Westview, 1992),343- 90. 
On the staple interpretation and its difficulties, see R. Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada 
1900-19-45 (Toronto: University of Toronto PleBS, 1987). 
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The Canadian federal government insisted on monopoly ill transport.ation and looked upon 
the West as a frontier that would provide opportunities for investment and, ultimately, a 
market for the manufactured goods of the protected Eastern Canadian industries.5•6 The 
policy must be judged as an enormous success. In 1901 the total value of investment in 
farms was $231 million; in 1911 the figure stood at $1,789 million and in 1921 $3,256 
million. Simultaneously, investment in land as a percentage of total investment declined, 
an indication that a more diverse economy was being created.5.7 There were problems 
however. The protest of Western Canada against the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) 
monopoly resulted in, first, the establishment of the so-called "Crow's Nest Pass" rate 
structure in 1898, which gave lower rates to grain and for manufactured goods moving west 
in exchange for a subsidy to a branch line the CPR was building. The Liberal Laurier 
government first elected in 1896 gained much support in the west and sought to respond 
to their complaints, first by supporting other western railways and, secondly, by signing a 
reciprocity trade agreement with the United States in 1911. The Laurier Liberals, who were 
strongly supported on the prairies, lost the election of 1911 on that issue. In the war years, 
markets for Canadian wheat grew as never before since Britain was cut off from continental 
sources and the prairie farmers took advantage of this opportunity. When these markets 
collapsed in the aftermath of war, the prairies witnessed an unprecedented political revolt. 
In the general election of 1921, the Progressive Party swept most of the agrarian seats in 
the Canadian west as the western farmer rebelled against the postwar protectionist policy 
of the Conservative government in Ottawa. The Progressive Party grew out of the western 
cooperative movement that had emerged in the first decade of the century. This movement 
was marked by the development of farmer-owned grain elevators, cooperative merchandising, 
and cooperative marketing. In the war years, the chaos of transportation and marketing 
led the Borden government to create a board of grain supervisors whose purpose was "to 
regulate and control in an intelligent and reasonable way the price at which wheat shall be 
USee Frederick Anderson, "Some Political Aspects of the Grain Growers' Movement, 1915-1935," un-
published M.A. thesis (University of Saskatchewan, 1949), p.9. 
&.TR.W. Murchie, Agricultural Progreu on the Prairie Frontier (Toronto: Macmillan, 1936), 67-70j 
Anderson, "Political Aspects", pp.l0-1. 
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sold, and the methods of dealing therein, and the transportation thereof; ... "5.8 A Canadian 
Wheat Board was formed in 1919 which maintained the notion of pooled marketing of wheat 
on the basis of an initial payment and later distribution of profits, a policy which had first 
developed in Australia. It was a compulsory board in wartime and the compulsory nature 
survived a few months after the war. Soon, however, constitutional limitations as well as 
grain trader interests and provincial government pressure led the Liberal government elected 
in 1921 to abandon the compulsory aspect. By the end of 1923 the Wheat Board was dead, 
and disappointed producers turned towards farmer-operated pools as an alternative. S.9 
In fact, postwar events had worked to the great advantage of the Canadian farmer, to 
the point that by the later 1920s Canada was being referred to as "the breadbasket of 
the world". Canada's 1928 wheat crop of 367,000,000 bushels was the largest ever, and 
Canada's share of the world wheat trade in that year was approximately 42%. In that year 
Canada exported 407,000,000 bushels of wheat; its nearest competitor, Argentina, exported 
only 182,000,000 bushels. Russia, which had been the major exporter of wheat in the world 
between 1909 and 1914, could now not meet its own domestic needs. Canada was the major 
beneficiary of these changes in international circumstances. Between 1923 and 1928 Canada 
exported, ou average, 297,500,000 bushels. The U uited States was in second place with an 
average of only 174,000,000 bushels. So buoyant was the Canadian grain trade that, in the 
words of Duncan MacGibbon writing in 1932, "the possibility of a difficulty in finding a 
market for all the wheat that Canada would be able to grow and export never seriously 
entered into current calculations."s.lo The 1920s brought unprecedented prosperity to the 
Canadian prairies, and wheat was the preeminent Canadian staple, an export commodity 
which created prosperity throughout the nation. 
uQuoted in Wilson, A Century oj Canadian Grain, p.95. 
uWilson, A Century oj Canadian Grain, 180-1. See also, Wilson, Grain Marketing in Canada, for the. 
influence of these early models on later Canadian practice. See also, Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Polic!l, 
247ft". 
Ii.1°Duncan MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade (Toronto, Macmillan, 1932), pp.418-9. 
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5.2.2. The Depression 
The collapse, however, came quickly with the world depression of the 1930s. Suddenly, the 
marketing, fillancing,and transportation systems that had moved towards lessened govern-
ment involvement during the good years of the 1920s seemed woefully inadequate. The 
major problem for Canada was not initially lack of production but rather changes in the 
economic policies in Europe which led to protectionist legislation and reduced imports of 
Canadian grain. The situation was further complicated by the development of an extensive 
futures market in grain at the turn of the century in Winnipeg. It had been at times a 
force for stability, but in the late 1920s, many houses that. took part in the speculative fever 
that gripped the grain market in 1928 went bankrupt. Income for Canadian wheat farmers 
dropped from almost $450 million in 1928 to less than $100 million in 1931. The effect on 
the Canadian West and the wheat farmer was devastating.s,u 
The national policy had created a strong agricultural base in Canada but, paradoxically, 
other aspects of the "national policy" worked against the interests of agriculturalists and 
they resented it. A major area of dispute was the protective tariff. With the depression, 
the national policy and national agricultural policy became a shambles, unable to deal with 
the turbulent international market. The Canadian government turned to international fora 
to solve its dilemma. Beginning in 1931, Canada joined with other wheat exporting nations 
to discuss possible acreage limitations and export quotas. Prime Minister Bennett turned 
initially to the British Empire Commonwealth. At the Ottawa Imperial Conference of 1932, 
Bennett managed to secure a preference for Canadian wheat in imperial markets. Although 
this preference had minimal economic impact, it did bring new British markets for lower 
quality Canadian wheat.s.n The negotiations for an International Wheat Agreement did 
not proceed quickly but by August 1933 an agreement was reached: 
11.11 Report of the Royal Commi"ion on Price Spread" (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1935),pp.274-5. There 
was an earlier commission that dealt directly with trading in grain futures. See also, Wilson, A Centurv of 
Canadian Grain, p.237ff 
lI,uSee Wilson, A Centurv oj Canadian Grain, pp.344-6j and, especially, H.B. Huff, "Marketing of 
Canadian Wheat: An Economic analysis with Projections," unpublished Ph.D. thesia (Ann Arbor: Michigan 
State University, 1969), pp.8-10. On the conferences, see also Ian Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 
1917-1939: StudifllJ in E7:pan,ion and Protection (Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1974) pp.145-289. 
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The wheat importing countries being desirolls of cooperating with the 
wheat exporting countries in order to establish a balance between the pro-
duction and consumption of wheat by the orderly marketing of the excessive 
stocks overhanging the market and to bring about. a rise and stabilization of 
prices at a level remunerative to the farmer and in accordance with the prin-
ciples approved by the Economic Commission of the Monetary and Economic 
Conference 
9(j 
This agreement was a forerunner to later attempts to solve national problems through 
international agreements between importers and exporters of wheat. Its significance for 
Canada was the recognition that the Canadian pre-eminence in the wheat trade of the 
1920s was an aberration. The problem of the 1930s was simply survival.5.13 
Although the 1920s had been kind to the Canadian wheat producer, the producer re-
called that when the wartime monopoly wheat board was abandoned, prices dropped. In 
the depression, the collapse of trade led not only to pressure upon the government to secure 
international agreements which would assure market share and lessen exporter competition 
but also to the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in 1935. The Board 
had no physical facilities and,initialiy, producer sales were on a voluntary basis. Farmers 
received a "pooled price" for their wheat, with an initial payment based on grade minus 
certain fixed costs. The formation of the CWB was a recognition that in the depression, 
as in wartime, the futures mechanism of the existing grain exchanges were ineffective in 
regulating supply and maintaining income. 
The Liberal government of Mackenzie King elected in 1935 criticized the Wheat Board's 
stockpiling practices, but was unable to keep its election promise to restore a free marketing 
system. A Royal Commission recommended temporary continuation of the cwn in 1938, 
but the government remained committed to disposal of the inherited wheat surplus and 
restoration of the wheat marketing system and, eventually, of the wheat pools.5.14 But 
··13High Commissioner to Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 21, 1933 in Documenu on 
Canadian External Relation. 1931-1935 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1973), pp.S68-9. This section 
covers the diplomatic negotiations in considerable detail.) 
Ii.U Report 0/ the Royal Groin Inquiry Commi"ion (Turgeon Commi"ion) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 
1938). The pools grew out of the cooperative movements of early 1900s and were producer-owned. By the 
1930s, however, these pools had themselves become large organisations and were often disappointing to farm 
interests. 
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in 1938, world surplus conditions returned and restoration of earlier conditions seemed 
impossible. With the outbreak of war in 1939, it became inconceivable. 
5.2.3. World War II 
The Canadian government recalled well how World War J had both closed off certain markets 
for Canadian grain and ensured others. The initial response of the government was to ensure 
that the British continued to buy Canadian grain at prices that were satisfactory to the 
producer. Given the wartime circumstances, such a condition was obtained fairly easily in 
1940. Canadian surpluses at the outbreak of war were huge: 300 million bushels in 1939. 
Despite the surplus, the outbreak of war led producers to sow a record crop in 1940. Thus, 
in World War II as in World War I, state intervention and control of marketing coincided 
with prosperity for producers. This time in the aftermath of the depression, the experience 
was even more meaningful. 
During World War II, the CWB role became compulsory for Canadian wheat farmers. 
In terms of the producers, a price pooling system was created whereby there would be a 
guaranteed minimum price, a uniform price for all producers subject to certain transporta-
tion and quality considerations, and a uniform price throughout the crop year.S. lS The 
initial price was established by the federal government prior to planting, and that price 
was the one which applied to all grain delivered to the CWB during the crop year. During 
the war, the Canadian government in effect financed purchases because the British were 
unable to provide hard currency. Canada accumulated large inconvertible sterling balances 
and much of the remainder of the Canadian wheat purchases was financed by a Canadian 
cash grant and by a loan to Britain. Again as in World War I, particular wartime circum-
stances created unusual prosperity for the Canadian grain farmers. Political pressures on 
the government lessened, but the return of peace meant that the traditional problems of 
maintaining market share, of surpluses, and of regional differences within Canada would 
return. 
1>.15 See Brian Oleson, "Price Determination and Market Share Formulation in the International Wheat 
Market," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Minnesota, 1979),p.59. 
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5.2.4. Post World War II 
The decision of the Canadian government to lise long term bulk contracts for the sale of 
wheat to Britain and, when possible to other countries, was successful in wartime and 
the Canadian government hoped that such practices could continue in the postwar period. 
The advantages of such contracts was that they provided security for producers and trans-
portation companies alike. The disadvantages, however, appeared when prices rose and 
Canadian farmers resented selling wheat at prices below market level. Conversely, a fall 
in prices created problems in British-Canadian relations. The British Wheat Agreement 
of 1946 gave four years of security to Canadian wheat farmers, but, during the course of 
the agreement, Canadian farmers received less revenue than they would have if free market 
forces had prevailed. Nevertheless, when the agreement approached its end, Canada was 
willing to turn to a broader agreement as was Britain. As a result, Canada took a leading 
role in the negotiation of the International Wheat Agreement of 1949, which was signed by 
forty-two countries and was to endure for four years.5. 16 
The Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent complemented the international agreement 
with a series of national support programmes. The major technique used was the provision 
of better financing a.rra.ngements. The Canadian Farms Loans Board, which had been 
created in 1929, provided loans for the purchase of land, equipment, and other similar 
needs. The Farm Improvements Loans Act of 1944 was even more effective in that it 
guaranteed bank loans to farmers. Between 1945 and 1952, banks lent over $350 million 
to Canadian farmers, over three-quarters to the prairie farmers and almost one-third to 
Saskatchewan. Assessing government policy in the mid-1950s, Canada's leading economic 
historians wrote that their study of "some of the basic problems of western agriculture 
reveals a heavy reliance on governmental support to strengthen the farmers' position in the 
economy." While co-operative organizations and group action on the Canadian prairies had 
1I.10The original Anglo-Canadian Wheat deal had resulted in a massive lubsidy for the British. The 
Canadians had agreed to sell their wheat to Britain at 12. per bushel, but by Christmas 1947 the price 
had risen to 13.16. As a result the cost to Canada of this long term contract was 1365 million. See Bruce 
Muirhead, The Development of Poltwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option 
(Montreal: Queen's University PreiS, 1992) 17. W.G. Easterbrook and Hugh Aitken, Canadian Economic 
Hiltory (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956),p.503. 
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played their part, the centrality of government and of the "aggressive political tactics" of 
farm groups could not be denied. Such tactics had, they concluded, "done much to improve 
the farmers' bargaining position in the boom years and to ensure that agricultural welfare 
would not be overlooked as the nation became increasingly industrialized."6.17 
The nation was, in fact, becoming increasingly industrialized, and the rapid economic 
growth which occurred in central Canada during the post-war period meant that those 
interests had a stronger voice in Ottawa. National output rose a remarkable 64 percent 
between 1944 and 1957, but the increase in export volumes was only 6%. Investment 
outlays and domestic consumption fuelled the growth, and the influence of the agricultural 
exporter was inevitably lessened.5.18 
In the federal cabinet, Agriculture Minister James G. Gardiner was increasingly isolated, 
unable to make the case for his Western agricultural constituency. Although the Canadian 
government had been a strong supporter of the move towards European integration, the 
evidence that such integration would be accompanied by and was,perhaps, even dependent 
upon protectionist agricultural policies shocked Canadians. Although the British held back 
from the Treaty of Brussels, the original six common market members had taken fully 30 
percent of Canadian wheat exports in 1956.5•19 The threat from Europe was parallelled 
by a challenge from the United States where PL 480 made wheat available on concessional 
terms. Traditional and potential Canadian markets were threatened, and disputes over 
PL 480 troubled Canadian-American relations after 1953. In the general election of 1957, 
western agricultural constituencies joined with other areas to defeat the government and to 
elect the Conservative John Diefenbaker, Canada's first prime minister from Saskatchewan 
and a committed supporter of grain interests. 
U7Easterbrook and Aitken., 513. For a critical view of the Canadian government's handling of the 
wheat agre~ment, especially of its willingness to place the interests of the wheat farmer second to its desire 
for multilateral approaches and conciliation of American interestl, lee Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: 
Canada 1939-1957(Toronto:McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p.127. 
U1See Bothwell,Drummond and English,Canada Since 19~5, pp.20-1j and Robert Bothwell and John 
English, "Canadian Trade Policy in the Age of American Dominance and British Decline, 1943-47," Cana-
dian Review of American Studie" 8 (Spring 1977), p.62ff. 
Ii.LiSee Muirhead, The Development of Po,twar Canadian Trade Policy, pp.30-2j and Walton Anderson, 
Canadian Wheat in Relation to the World', Food Production and Distribution (Saskatoon, Sask.: Modern 
Press, 1964), 55-8. 
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Diefellbaker knew that Canada's share in world wheat exports had declined from about 
37% in the period 1924-28 to about 25% in 1959-61. At the same time, he knew that the 
United States had virtually tripled its share to become the world's largest exporter. In the 
whole period, of 472 million additional bushels traded, the United States accounted for 414 
million of the increase.s.2o Diefenbaker was determined that Canadian wheat farmers, so 
many of them his supporters and so many of them from his native province, would receive 
their due from the new Conservative government. He embarked on an ambitious program 
to develop new markets and to bring stability to western agriculture. His plan included: 
1. Trade promotion. Diefenbaker and his Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton, 
actively sought out new markets in areas where American foreign policy closed such 
markets to Americans. The most notable of these markets were the Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China. By the end of the 1960s,these markets were 
Canada's best. 
2. Agricultural support programmes. The Diefenbaker government embarked upon a 
programme of active support for Western Canadian infrastructure. Rail lines and 
port facilities were improved; drainage systems were supported, and agricultural 
improvements were subsidised. Wheat became a more important component of 
Canadian aid programmes. 
3. Stabilisation. Diefenbaker remembered the depression in Saskatchewan and was 
determined that its effects would never again be felt. He therefore introduced un-
precedented insurance schemes for Canadian agriculturists. The Crop Insurance 
Act of 1959 meant that the federal government would pay 50 percent of premiums 
in participating provinces. It also provided insurance against major disasters. The 
Agricultural Stabilization Act of 1958 provided price support for Canadian farm-
ers. The Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act offered further support, 
and,finally, the Crow's Nest Pass Rates for the transport of grain from the prairies 
1i.2°Compiled from World Wheat Statiltic •. See also, Canadian Wheat in Relation to the World', Food 
Production and Diltribution, p.S1f£. 
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to the ports were maintained. These rates became a subsidy for grain producers 
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.s,u 
In the end, the most important action of the Conservative government was the sale of 
wheat to China, which became Canada's most reliable market. Canada's exports of wheat 
during 1961-2 were the third highest in history, and the payments made to farmers for that 
wheat were the highest ever. The legacy was strong support for the Conservative Party 
among Western wheat farmers, support which endured until the 1990s. 
As the Diefenbaker government crumbled in 1962-3, the allegiance of Western farmers 
endured. The new Pearson government and the Trudeau government which followed it 
were interventionist in their orientation and during the 1960s and 1970s a flood of new 
legislation and initiatives dealing with Western Canadian agriculture occurred. Despite 
this activity, the place of agriculture in Canadian economic and political life was in serious 
decline. In 1956, Canada had 9.3 million urban dwellers and 6.8 million rural. Ten years 
later, the urban population had increased to 12.6 million, but the rural population remained 
stagnant. In fact, the 2.6 million Canadians who lived on farms in 1956 were reduced to only 
1.9 million a decade later. On the prairies where agriculture had long been the economic 
staple, the percentage of economic activity accounted for by agriculture declined to less 
than 20 percent. These changes had a profound impact on Canada's self-perception and, of 
course, on Canadian agricultural policy.5.2~ 
The Pearson government emphasised international approaches and took an active part 
in the negotiation of the International Wheat Agreement of 1968. However, domestic pres-
sures led the Trudeau government, which was elected in 1968, to give more attention to 
domestic agriculture. There was an ambivalence to Canadian actions because of the Cana-
dian criticism of the protectionism of others, notably the European Community and the 
&.21 Wutem Canadian Agricultun: to 1990 (Calgary: Canadian West Foundation, 1980), pp.20-3. For 
fuller accounts of Diefenbaker's policies, see his autobiography, One Canada: Memoir. oj the Right Hon-
ourable John G. DieJenbalr.er. The 7Umultuou" Year" 196.f!-1967(Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), p.256. Also, 
Patrick Kyba, Alvin: A Biography oj the Honourable Alvin Hamilton,P.C. (Regina, Sask: Canadian Plains 
Research Center, 1989), especially chapter 5. 
&.22 J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Year. oj Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto:McClelland 
and Stewart, 1986), pp.2-3,ll. A good brief survey of agricultural policies prior to 1972 is found in T.K. War-
ley, Agricultun: in an Interdependent World: U.S. and Canadian Per.pectivu (Montreal and Washington: 
C.D. Howe Research Institute and National Planning Association,1977), pp.I-14. 
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United States. In assessing various national grain policies iII 1969, the Food and Agricul-
ture Organisation noted that "The Canadian Government ha.') recognized the vulnerability 
of the agricultural industry to variations in income and has endeavoured to shield agri-
cultural producers from the most severe of the price fluctuations which characterise the 
industry." 5.l3 
Because Canada had found markets for grain and because the price had been solid 
during the 1960s, these protections had cost the Canadian government very little. Similarly, 
the relative prosperity of the wheat farmer meant that government-supported loans were 
almost always repaid. The Trudeau government sought to improve its position with Western 
farmers by strengthening the support system. Thus, in February 1969, the Canada Grains 
Council was established with the aim of strengthening Canadian marketing, research, and 
production of grain and grain products. Concurrently, the Trudeau government pursued 
broader foreign policy aims through a large commitment of food aid. Indeed, Canada's share 
of food aid under the Food Aid Convention of 1969 was 11%, far above the small amounts of 
the 1950s. The difference between Canadian and American policies becomes clear when one 
examines how sales were made. Between 1961-2 and 1968-9, 73.2% of Canadian wheat and 
flour exports were sold on normal commercial terms, 22% was sold with government credit, 
and only 4.6% was food aid. In the case of the United States, 65 per cent of American 
wheat exports were under PL 480 or other aid programs, and American wheat export 
subsidies averaged 54 cents per bushe1.5.l4 The United States,however, was unhappy with 
the commercial success of Canada, and Canada was worried by the United States decision 
in the later 1960s to seek export markets for wheat more aggressively. Both countries 
had worked hard to coordinate their policies, to maintain grain prices, and to preserve a 
stable international trading environment. In the surplus conditions of the 1960s, however, 
this coordination was considerably strained and eventually ended. Believing that surplus 
1I.23 Food and Agriculture Organiution, National Grain Policie.! (Rome: FAO,1969), p.84. See also, 
Warley, Agriculture in an Interdependent World, pp.lO-14j and for a comprehensive study of the overall 
evolution of Canadian agriculture Wedern Canadian Agriculture to 1990 (Calgary, Alta.: Canadian West 
Foundation Special Task Force Report,1980) . 
•. 2t lbid., pp.91-3. Also, Theodore Cohn, The International Politic.! of Agricultural Trade: Canadian 
American Relation.! in a Global Agricultural Context (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
p.36ft'. 
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production was at the root of the problem, the Canadian government in 1970 introduced 
"Lower Inventory for Tomorrow" through which it pa.id farmers to remove 22 million acres 
f d · S lS rom pro uctlOn .. 
The timing was bad. World production and demand were moving away from the sur-
plus condition of the 1960s to a situation of scarcity. To use Susan Strange's metaphor, the 
Canadian government which had played its agricultural hand well for most of the country's 
life, played it badly.s.l6 So did others, notably the United States which grossly overesti-
mated surpluses and contracted a large portion of its production to the Soviet Union. The 
Canadian government had developed policies prior to the 1970s which were expensive and 
inefficient in the altered conditions of the 1970s. Confronted by new market conditions, 
weak in western Canadian support, and worried about the impact of higher food prices 
on central Canadian cities, the Trudeau government responded with several major studies 
of Canadian agriculture, new stabilization programmes, and an aggressive export policy. 
The prestigious Canadian-American Committee chose 1972 as the year during and after 
which major policy departures were made in Canada. The Canadian government, the Com-
mittee reported, adopted a "more 'hands-on' policy for Canadian agriculture, ... [because] 
Canadian governments decided that the public at large must share with farmers the risks 
of agricultural production and future output expansion in an era that seems bound to be 
characterized by considerable instability in producers' returns and in their costs." As a 
result, "an expanded public commitment to enhancing stability in farming has become the 
dominant theme of Canadian agricultural policy."S.l7 This commitment to a comprehensive 
set of public price and income stabilization policies contrasted strongly with the new Amer-
ican commitment to the effectiveness of market forces. These policies were framed in a way 
that sought to insulate Canada from the effects of an expansive American policy, one that 
•. 2iTheodore Cohn, Canadian Food Aid: Domutic and Foreign Policy Implication, (Denver: University 
of Denver School of International Studies,1979), p.26. 
6.28Susan Strange, State. and Market.: An Introduction to International Politioal Economy (London: 
Pinter, 198), p.79 . 
•. 21T.K. Warley, Agriculture in an Interdependent World: U.S. and Canadian Per'pectivu, p.17. See 
also, Cohn, International PolitiCl of Agriculturul 1hJde, p.39ff. A good popular survey of Canadian agricul-
ture during this period is Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvut: Canadian Grain at the Crouraad, (Saskatoon, 
Sask: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), especially ch.14. 
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was framed with little regard for Canadian interests.s.:l8 The most important of the new 
programs for the Canadian grain farmer was the Western Grain Stabilization Act of 1976, 
which provided a strong program of income stabilization. Skogstaad notes that the tripling 
of Canadian government support for farmers between the late 19.50s and the late 1970s 
reflected a broader trend of state intervention in Canada, as in the case of Medicare and the 
Canada Pension Plan.s.:l9 Nevertheless, this approach and the chaotic market conditions 
of the 1970s had a profound effect upon Canadian agriculture and on Canadian national 
policies. 
Canadian agricultural production rose from 2.6 billion in 1969 to 6.1 billion in 1975, 
and agriculture as a percentage of total GDP rose from 1.2 to 2.2 per cent. In 1981-2, 
it reached its peak of 3 per cent. But between these peaks were many valleys, and after 
1980, the real price of Canadian wheat dropped from almost ten dollars in 1973-4 to less 
than four dollars in 1983 (1981 dollars). The high prices and government price supports 
had encouraged grain farmers to expand their investment greatly. The level of prairie farm 
indebtedness doubled between 1971 and 1978, but the return on that investment never came 
as a lower price of grain and increased international competition created a severe recession 
in the 1980s. Moreover, high Canadian interest rates led to numerous bankruptcies on 
the Canadian prairies. As a result, the Canadian government stabilization programs and 
producer support schemes, which had been very inexpensive in earlier periods, suddenly 
became a major burden for the federal and provincial governments. By 1985, most farm 
income in the prairie region came from direct government payments, which in 1987 reached 
a total of over four billion dollars or about $31,000 per prairie farm. s.3o 
5.28 Don Paarlberg, "On Sleeping with an Elephant" McLean Memorial Lecture, University of Guelph, 
Oct. 1977. 
r..2I1Grace Skogstaad, The Politic. of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1987), pp.16-18j pp.41-61. 
uOThie information is drawn from the 1981 and 1991 Censuses of Agriculture (Ottawa:Statistics 
Canada)j and from M. Fulton, K.A. Rosaaaen, and A. Schmitz, Canadian Agricultu~ Policy and 
Prairie Agricultu~ (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,1989)i and Andrew Schmitz and W.H. Fur-
tan, "Canada:Grain Marketing, Institutions, and Policies," in Michael McGarry and Andrew Schmitz, eds., 
The World Grain Trade: Grain Marketing, IRititutioRl, and Policies (Boulder and London: Westview and 
Pinter,1992), pp.344-92. 
CHAPTER 5. NATIONAL AGIUCCnTlJRAL POUCIES: PAWl' TWO 10.5 
Canadian national policies in th(' 1970s responded to unexpected market conditions, 
to the breakdown of previous coordination between the United States and Canada with 
respect to surplus management, to political demands from the p;rain farmers, and, not least, 
to perceived opportunities for the expansion of markets for Canadian grain. The United 
States was challenging traditional Canadian markets: the so-called great grain robbery 
of the early 1970s and the subsequent world food crisis occurred when the United States, 
overanxious to secure Soviet markets where Canada had long dominated, contracted massive 
sales, seriusly overestimating surplus levels. Moreover, the European Community, whose 
members had been major customers for Canadian wheat in the postwar period, now was 
becoming an exporter because of its production-oriented protectionist agricultural policies. 
The result was new policy responses to changing market needs which in fact did little to 
create an enduring framework for Canadian agriculture. 
Clearly, there have many difficulties, but a thorough analysis of the world wheat trade 
gives Canada fairly good marks. It points to the stability of Canada's share of the wheat 
trade-approximately 18 to 22 per cent-and argues that the Canadian programs are, on the 
whole, "relatively efficient in that they affect the distribution of income without causing a 
major misallocation of resources,,5.31 That can he said of few others. 
5.3. Australian National Policies 
Australia, like Canada, is a settler country and a product of British imperial history. Its 
settlers brought with them British agriculture and consumption patterns, and not sur-
prisingly, the earliest settlers tried with mixed success to grow wheat. Australian settlers 
initially found that wheat was difficult to grow in comparison with maize. Nevertheless, 
traditions persisted,and by the mid-nineteenth century, Australia was a major wheat pro-
ducer. Unlike Canada, it did not yet produce a surplus which it could export. In the last 
r..31 Schmitz and Furtan, "Canada", pp.388-9. For a comparative study and assessment of approaches, 
see Andrew F. Cooper and Richard Biggott, "Australian and Canadian Approaches to the Cairns Group: 
Two-Level Games and the Political Economy of Adjustment," in William Avery, ed., World Agriculture and 
the GATT (Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner, 1993) pp.121-42. For some criticism of the inflexibility of 
Canadian marketing, see Tom Sewell, The World Grain 7Nde (New York and London: Woodhead-Faulkner, 
1992), pp.138-140. 
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part of the nineteenth century, however, this situation changed and South Australian wheat 
became highly prized in Britain, so prized that the high transport costs were justified. In 
the 1870s the British market consumed over half of South Australian production. By the 
end of the century it seemed that declining yields, a result of the cultivation of marginal 
lands, meant that the Australian wheat industry would not match the great success of the 
American and Canadian prairies.5 .33 
After 1896, this situation changed as new varieties of wheat, the more extensive use 
of fallowing and fertilizers, the growth of immigration, and the expansion of wheat farm-
ing made Australia a major exporting nation. In this development, government played a 
significant role, more so than in Canada or the United States. The Western Australian 
government gave direct assistance to wheat growing through the Agricultural Bank and, 
after a drought in 1914, through the Industries Assistance Act and the Industries Assistance 
Board. There was other support through research institutions and, as in Canada, through 
government control of wheat quality. Although Western Australia was certainly the most 
active state, other states assisted through support of agricultural societies and the provision 
of emergency relief. Moreover, support for railway building was a form of indirect support 
for wheat exporters. 
The congruence of international circumstances, the success of Australian governmental 
policies, and the improved agricultural techniques made Australian wheat production a very 
important part of the Australian economy and of the international wheat trade. Between 
1909 and 1914, Australia exported 61 per cent of its production and accounted for 8 per 
cent of the total world market. In the period 1924-29, it exported 69 per cent of its market 
and accounted for 12 per cent of the world market. In both cases, it was the fourth largest 
exporter and did not have the ability to influence market conditions and prices as did 
Canada and the United States, the two major exporters. li.33 The Australians, therefore, did 
not have the incentive to maintain reserve stocks as the major exporters often did. 
U2Thia diacusaion follow. that of Edgars Dunadorf, The Aultralian Wheat-Growing Indult'1l1788-1948 
(Melbourne: The University Preas, 1956). 
r..33 lbid, chapter V; a.nd The Wheat Situation 1931 (London: Imperia.l Economic Committee, 1932), 
pp.58-9. 
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Australia's cooperative tradition led the states t.o establish legal foundations for coop-
erative marketing of grain prior to World War I although Australian farmers, like North 
American farmers, dealt with private grain merchants whom they often resented. With the 
outbreak of war in 1914, the Australian government was a pioneer in the centralization and 
government control of the marketing of grain. It established the Australian Wheat Board 
which a,cquired the grain crop, fixed the price, and paid advances to farmers upon delivery 
of the crop. This Australian model was later copied by the Canadians and, in essence, is 
the forerunner of the Wheat Boards through which both countries market their wheat.5•34 
The demands of the British market were met by the Board and, of course, by Australian 
farmers. Production rose from 9.6 million bushels in 1914 to 12.4 million bushels in 1915, 
of which 4.1 carne from New South Wales, 3.6 million from Victoria, 2.8 million from South 
Australia, and 1.7 from the Western Australia. Ii.35 There were problems, and the war's end 
brought an end to government marketing. In the postwar period, however, voluntary groups, 
notably the cooperative institutions, moved forward along with the grain merchants to fill 
the void. In several states, notably Queensland, the compulsory pools remained important, 
but in others declined in importance. The leading student of the Australian wheat trade 
emphasises the political weakness of the wheat farmer as the major factor in the decline of 
cooperatives during the interwar period: 
"[The Australian wheat farmer] was not mature enough to help him-
self. As in other countries, the Australian farmers' co-operative movement 
was not supported by the political parties. The Nationalist Party which 
later became the United Australia Party, supported the open market prin-
ciple. The same attitude was taken by the Country Party. The Labour 
Party supported compulsory pools. Thus all parties regarded the voluntary 
co-operative movement as an obstacle to the implementation of their own 
favourite scheme. "5.36 
UtRichard Higgott, Brian Fisher, Julian Alston, and Andrew Schmitt, "Australia:Grain Marketing, 
Institutions, and Policies,· in McGarry and Schmitz, eds., The World Grain Trade, pp.304-7. The grain 
board was actually created in 1915, but prior to 1914 the grain producing Itates had pUled a leries of wheat 
acquisition acta which led directly to the creation of the federal government's wheat board. See Dunsdorf, 
The Awtralian Wheat-Growing Indwtry, p.227. 
5·:sr.Dunsdorf, The Awtralian Wheat-Growing Indu,try, p.531. 
us Ibid. p. 234. 
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These problems were dwarfed by the devastation ca.used by the depression. Wheat be-
came a major topic for debate in the Australian parliament, and a serious burden upon 
the Australian treasury. The initial response of the government. to depression was to urge 
greater production and to restore the Australian Wheat Board. In addition, the Wheat 
Marketing Bill provided a guarantee to growers and subsidised rail freight and some other 
expenses. The plan died in the Australian Senate, partly because of the extraordinary 
costs that the plan would entail because of the rapid slide in the price of wheat. A Wheat 
Bounty Act was finally passed in 1931, but the principle of a bounty was rejected by the new 
government in 1932. For the balance of the depression years, Australian production fell, 
and the state supported wheat farmers with eclectic measures of support,including direct 
payments. The Australian government worked with the other major wheat producers to 
save the situation through an international agreement but there was much criticism within 
Australia of the negotiations which, some argued, hurt Australia in its hope of expanding 
markets in Southeast Asia. It also played a role with Canada in Imperial economic discus-
sions relating to wheat. Nevertheless, the Australian position at the end of the depression 
was considerably worse in relative terms than was the position of the Canadians and the 
Americans.5.37 
The Australian Wheat Board was established in September 1939 and regained those 
powers which it possessed during World War 1. Farmers received price guarantees, but 
Australia because of its geographical position could not take advantage of the demands 
of the British market as Canada and the United States could. Acreage devoted to wheat 
production fell, further hurting the producers. 
5.3.1. Post World War II 
After the war, the compulsory aspect of wheat marketing was maintained, and the influence 
of wheat farmers was strong in the later 1940s. The Australian Wheat Board paralleled the 
Canadian Board, but it did allow more room for private merchants. Like Canada, Australia 
supported the wartime discussions for an international wheat agreement. Both shared a 
5,UDunsdorf, The Aultndian Wheat-Growing Indultry. ch.vij and Paul de Hevesy, World Wheat Plan-
ning and Economic Planning (London: Oxford University PleBS. 1940). appendix 7. 
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common interest, for, as Nick Butler has pointE'd out, "the Canadians and Australians with 
strongly export orientated industries have long favourecl attempts to set floor prices, and 
to limit the risks of competitive subsidies by a division of the market between them". In 
1949, Australia agreed to the International Wheat Agreement which,for four years, meant 
that it had a quota of 80,000,000 bushels for each crop year. This amount was about half 
the Canadian quota and about 40 per cent of the American quota.5.38 
In the postwar period, Australia was increasingly marginalised in the wheat trade and 
agriculture became much less important within Australia. Agriculture has fallen from about 
24 per cent of GOP in 1949-50 to less than 4 per cent in 1988-9.5.39 Moreover, Australian 
wheat yields have remained consistently lower than those of its major competitors, includ-
ing Argentina. Although Australia has often had high export volumes, the pattern has 
been erratic and farmer income has been exceedingly variable. The Australian government 
moved energetically to support its farmers and to develop new markets. The latter be-
came particularly important after Britain entered the European Community thus depriving 
Australia of its major traditional market. Australia did manage to diversify its trade by 
finding new markets in Asia (notably Japan and China), the USSR, Egypt, and the Middle 
East more generally. Indeed, in 1982-3 Egypt took 21.1 per cent of Australian exports, the 
largest percentage of any country.5.40 
Despite its declining percentage of GOP, agriculture has remained important to Aus-
tralian national policy because of its large contribution to foreign exchange reserves, an 
important consideration in a country that had an increasing propensity to import. The 
Australian government in the postwar period has emphasised stabilisation policies and farm 
incomes. Prior to 1969-70, the grain grower had a virtually free choice in planning what 
wheat he/she would produce. In that year, however, a system of quotas on deliveries of 
U'The best description ofthe 1949 agreement and the meaning of its terms for all participants is found in 
Wilson, A Century of Canadian Grain, pp.978-1016. Nick Butler, The International Grain Trade:Problem. 
and Pro.pecb (London & Sydney: Croom Helm for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986), 
pp.82-83. 
U8Higgott et al., "Australia", p.281. These figures are also taken from World Wheat Statidic. (Lon-
don:International Wheat Council, 1991), passim. 
UOStatistica are given in Higgott et al., "Australia", p.299. 
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wheat from growers to the Wheat Board was introduced. The Whea.t Industry Stabiliza-
tion Plan is revised every five years and guarantees price up to a certain level of production 
of export wheat. Originally, this price was linked to home consumption prices, but this 
linkage was broken in the late 1960s and later formulas were more complicated. Since that 
time, the Australian government has sought to reduce its support for agriculture (and, more 
generally, for other sectors of the economy).In the later 1980s, the Australian government 
conducted major studies of the grain industry. In 1988 a Royal Commission into Grain 
Handling, Storage and Transport reported and concluded that "For the most part, the 
current system of grain distribution does not meet the criteria of economic efficiency, cost 
effectiveness and integration, ... "6.41 Furthermore, the Industries Assistance Commission, 
the earliest supporter of the Australian wheat farmer, declared that more efficiency should 
be introduced to the marketing and handling of wheat.6•42 
By the mid 1980s Australia was joining with Canada and other "middle power" wheat 
producers to challenge the policies of the European Community, which displaced Australia 
as the third largest exporter in the early 1980s, and displaced Canada as second exporter by 
the mid 1980s, and the United States. Increasingly, the Australian government recognised 
that domestic support for agricultural exports was too expensive to maintain, and the gov-
ernment expressed its intention of drastically reducing support for Australian agriculture. 
It was a recognition of how much Australia had changed and also an indication of the new 
challenges that the international wheat trade presented. 
5.4. Argentina 
No country, it might be argued, has faced the challenges of the twentieth century so badly as 
has Argentina. An indication, both of the Argentinian sense of humour and of the nature of 
Argentinian government, was given by an Argentinian academic who was interviewed for this 
chapter. When asked about Argentinian national policies in the area of grain, a professor at 
1>.41 Royal Commiuion into Grain Storage, Handling and 7ran.port 1988 (a) 3. Also, Wheat Support 
Policiu and Ezport Practice, in Five Major Ezporting Countrie. (London: International Wheat Council,May 
1988); and National Grain Policie, (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation, 1969), pp.215-24. 
1i.42Higgott et aI., "Australia", p.309. 
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the University of Buenos Aires said: "There are no nationa.l policies in Argentina."s.43 Of 
course, there have been national policies, but these policies have been much less successful 
than those of the other grain producers in the twentieth century. 
Argentina began the twentieth century with a rapidly-growing economy based upon a 
manufacturing sector and an internationa.lly competitive agricultural economy. The fertility 
of the Pampas was legendary and at least equal to the best soil of the great plains of the 
United States. Moreover, fully 65 per cent of Argentina's 279 million hectares of land was 
suitable for either crop agriculture or livestock, a figure far in excess of Canada or the 
United States. Despite these natural advantages, Argentina was increasingly marginalised 
in the international wheat trade. It remains one of the five major exporters, but its relative 
position has declined greatly and much of its rich land lies fallow. 5.44 
The problem has been politics. Politics in Argentina may be viewed, since the 1930s 
at least, as having been dominated by a battle between the rural landed classes and the 
urban workers.s.4s Whereas the settling of the Canadian and American plains caused grain 
farmers in those areas often to protest against discrimination against them and to argue 
for better terms, the political systems in North America did give the farm communities 
considerable weight and governments responded to their pleas. In Argentina, the immigrants 
who crowded into the barrios of Buenos Aires and other cities at the turn of the century 
resented the wealth of the landed class and used their political strength to support the 
economic interests of urban Argentina, specifically its manufacturing sector. As a result, 
a major portion of the profits from grain production was channelled to the cities rather 
than to reinvestment. Indirect and direct taxes on the grain sector were used to fund 
industrialisation and to keep the price of foodstuffs artificially low. Moreover, investment 
III infrastructure which would support the grain sector in such areas as bulk handling, 
li,uInterview with Dr. Monica Hurst, October 4, 1993. 
"uThis information is drawn from Richard Lacroix, Michael McGarry, Matthew McMahon, and Lowell 
D.Hill, "Argentina: Grain Marketing, Institutions, and Policies", in McGarry and Schmib, The World Grain 
Trade, 4-106j P.P. Egorofr, "Argentina's Agricultural Exports During World War II," War-Peace Pamphlet., 
Food Research Institute, Stanford Univeraity,November 1945j Lucio G. Reca, Argentina: Count", Ca.e Study 
of Agricultuml Price. and Sub.idie •. (Washington: The World Bank,1980)j and National Grain Policie., 
1969, pp.1l2-18. 
"uLacroix et al., Ibid. p.22. 
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research, storage, and rail facilities was not made. Over-valuation of the currency was yet 
another factor that made exporting difficult for Argentinian farmers. It is not so much that 
Argentina did not have national policies as that it had economic policies which worked to 
the disadvantage of the grain farmer. 5.46 
Moreover, Argentina became increasingly disadvantaged economically relative to the 
other major grain-exporting nations in the post-war period. Although it had been one of 
the ten wealthiest countries in the world in the first three decades of the century, its relative 
decline was rapid in the remainder of the century. Its gross national product in 1989 was 
only U .S.$ 2160 per capita whereas Canada was $19020 per capita and Australia $14440 
per capita.5•47 Although agriculture accounted for most of Argentina's export trade, the 
Argentinian economy in the post-war period was noted for its highly protectionist character. 
With the industrial sector and social services obtaining most of the state subsidies, there 
was little left for agriculture. Thus, as the international wheat agreement broke down, an 
agreement which had tried to impose negotiated rules in order to stabilize trading patterns, 
supply, and producers' incomes, the Argentinian government found itself unable to compete 
as other countries adopted vigorous export and production subsidy policies. Ironically, 
Argentina itself had contributed to the breakdown of these negotiated rules by carrying out 
independent policies and, in the view of others, by failing to conform to the spirit of the 
agreements. At times, its refusal to conform to broader agreements benefited the country, 
as in the case of Argentina's refusal to join the boycott of the Soviet Union in the wake of 
the Afghanistan invasion. But the benefits were short-lived. 
Of the policy instruments available to government, most have operated in a negative 
fashion where grain is concerned. A World Bank study has shown that the effect of direct 
and indirect price intervention between 1960 and 1985 was to make the price of grain 
half of what it would have been without these particular trade, exchange rate and pricing 
policies.5•48 There is a national grain board which was originally modelled on the wheat 
U&La.croix et aI., "Argentina," pp.22-3. 
u7 199B Britannica Boole oj the Year (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica 1992), pp.544, 546, and 568. 
us Adolfo C. Stursenegger, Trade,E%change Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policie. in Argentina (Wuh-
ington,D.C.: World Bank, 1990). The effect was highest in 1974-5 when wheat prices Boared but the effect 
wu negative in every year during the 1960-85 period. 
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boards of Canada and Australia. Like those boards, its purpose has chanp;ed over time, but 
it is currently used to: 
1. Regulate the grain trade; 
2. Control the movement of grain through reporting requiremf'nts and set grain grading 
standards; 
3. Ensure domestic supplies of wheat and prevent monopolization of the wheat market; 
4. Ensure export supplies; 
5. Stabilise prices; 
6. Provide certain subsidies to particular regions;and 
7. Promote more scientific agriculture.5.49 
The Board has carried out its functions poorly. The fullest study of Argentinian wheat 
policy concludes that "Since its beginnings in the 1950s, the board has been either a direct 
arm of the government ... or a weak autonomous institution subject to political manipula-
tion." It has served as a trader and a trade regulator and ha.') been required to serve both 
producer and consumer. As a result, "these conflicting functions have made it impossible 
for the grain board to carry out any policies consistently, other than the unstated policy 
of diverting revenues from the grain sub-sector to the industrial and urban economy."s,so 
There is a price support system and a fertilizer distribution system, but the board plays no 
role in marketing which is dominated by the five large multinational grain companies and by 
other private organizations. The multinational companies have a great advantage because 
of the currency instability in Argentina. Indeed, it has been suggested that many Argen-
tinian sales are made with no profit margin because of the opportunities to use changes in 
the Argentinian exchange rate to the companies' advantage.s.s1 The Menem government 
drastically altered traditional Argentinian policies after 1990. For the purposes of this the-
sis, however, the burden of the past is most significant. It prevented Argentina from playing 
their part in the grain trade which its rich soil and talented farmers suggested it could play. 
1I.49 Lacroix et al., "Argentinll.," p.28. 
&.&0 Ibid., p.28. Also, National Grain Policies 1969, pp.112-16. 
11.111 Lacroix et al. make this point based upon interviews with officials of gra.in companies. See" Ar-
gentinll.," p.39. 
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Argentina was disadvantaged because of internal policies and economic conditions which 
make the economic environment for wheat producers much less favourable. A study of pro-
ducer subsidy equivalents carried out by the U.S. Department of Agriculture suggests that 
these equivalents amounted between 1982 and 1986 to 36.5% for the U.S., 30.4% for Canada, 
7.7% for Australia, and an incredible -54% for Argentina.5.52 Argentina, so much poorer 
than its major competitors, cannot compete if those competitors create unfavourable inter-
national markets through their own national policies which subsidise their own producers. 
Thus, like Canada and Australia, Argentina has begun to work with others to create a more 
favourable international environment. 
5.5. European Community 
"The trinity of grain, flour and bread is to be found everywhere in the 
history of Europe. It was the major preoccupation of towns, states, mer-
chants and ordinary people for whom life meant "eating one's daily bread" 
"5.53 
Although this statement was made in reference to the period between the fifteenth and 
eighteenth centuries, it could be equally applicable today. The commitment of European 
governments to support their agricultural ~ector dates back to around 1880. The stimulus 
at that time was the challenge of dealing with cheap grain imports from America. The 
Industrial Revolution was slow to influence European agriculture and it therefore remained 
backward.5•54 Agricultural trade was modest and largely intra-European, and perhaps most 
importantly, the "latent strength of agricultural production in the United States had not 
d .. t E "5.55 yet rna e Its Impac on urope 
The repeal of the British Corn Laws in 1846 was, as we have seen in the case of Canada, 
a milestone in the short period of "free trade" which was given impetus by the teachings of 
•·i2 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, "Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents," Govemment 
Intervention in Agriculture, 198!-1986 (Waahington,D.C.: USDA,1988) 
··"Fernand Braude! (1981), p.143 in Peter W.B. Phillips, Wheat, Europe and the GATT (London, Pinter 
Publishers; 1990, p.1) 
····Michael Tracy, Weltem Europe, 1880-1988 Third Edition (N.Y., Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) p.5. 
The exception to this was England where improved farm methods were adopted to improve production for 
the benefit of urban workers 
•· .. Ibid. p.1S 
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Adam Smith. From 1879-1884 American imports doubled, causing a significant drop in the 
price of European grain. By 1890 this crisis had been exacerbated by imports from Russia, 
Canada, India and Australia, and further price reductions. After the turn of the century, 
conditions in North America and Europe improved and remained strong until World War I. 
Germany spearheaded the revival of protection for agriculture, drawing on Friedrich List's 
school of nationalist economics, with its stress on economic development through protection 
and the desirability of linking politics and economic activity."·"6 The new tariffs, such as 
the Meline Tariff of 1892, increased protection for industry and agriculture and remained in 
effect until the First World War. Public support for these measures rested in the widespread 
belief in the virtues of rural life and the societal disadvantages of industrialisation.u7 This 
argument was reinforced by the obvious risks involved and excessive dependence on imports 
and in areas where protection was adopted it succeeded in restraining the fall in prices _. 
although it did not stop it.u8 
5.5.1. The 1930's 
The 1929 slump in the U.S. quickly spread to other countries. The Hawley-Smoot tariff 
in the U.S. set off a chain of "beggar-thy-neighbour" tariff increases. Wheat production 
was increased in order to achieve greater self-sufficiency and to relieve balance of payments 
pressures. Again, the protected countries in Continental Europe curbed the price decline. 
In 1932 new duties in accordance with the Ottowa Agreement brought wheat and other 
products within its scope, so far as the British Commonwealth was concerned."·59 
The European response was to legislate more regulation. Domestic markets were to 
be organised and imports and exports regulated. The response of European governments 
was typical of the rest of the world. The answer was higher tariffs. Tariff levels on food 
at least doubled in most European countries between 1927 and 1931. These measures, 
however, were not enough to keep domestic levels at prices which would satisfy producers ... ·6o 
li.liIlIbid. p.20, also see Willia.m C. Olsen a.nd A.J.R. Groom, International RelatiofU Then and Now 
(London, Ha.rper Collins publishers, 1991), p.27 
1i·Ii7 Micha.el 'fra.cy, Wedern Europe: 1880-1988, p.23 
l1.li11 Ibid. p.26 
ue Ibid. p.123 
uOMicha.el Atkin, The International Grain Trade (second ed., Ca.mbridge: Woodhea.d, 1995), p.22. 
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In 1936 regulation in France was taken one step further with the creation of the Office 
National Interprofessional ou Ble with a mandate to fix wheat prices and ensure that they 
were observed. In Germany, the National Socialist government clearly set goals for its 
agricultural sector: fair prices for producers and national self-sufficiency. An extensive 
system of regulation of agricultural production and markets was established.s.61 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the maximisation of production was the 
priority. Despite these efforts, when hostilities ceased, supplies were very low and the 
productive capacity of agriculture was inadequate to meet immediate needs. The situation 
in Europe at war's end was dreadful. In his history of Europe after 1945, Walter Laqueur 
writes: 
The specter of famine appeared all over Europe. During the early stages 
of war farming had prospered, but later on, with the loss of manpower and 
the lack of machinery, fertilizers, and seed, harvests were severely reduced 
and there were heavy losses in livestock; the situation deteriorated further 
as the result of a severe drought in 1945. Excluding the Soviet Union, the 
harvest of cereal crops on the continent fell from 59 million in 1939 to 31 
million in 1945. In France the drop was worst, and the memory was sharpest. 
Rationing was in force everywhere, and observers estimated that 10000000 
Europeans were consuming 1500 calories per day or less.5.62 
With the assistance of the Marshall Plan in 1948, recovery was rapid. By 1949 a new 
International Wheat Agreement had been negotiated, and a comprehensive new agricultural 
plan was formulated to achieve the much more ambitious agricultural goals of post-war 
Europe. 
5.5.2. The Common Agricultural Policy 
It has often been said that the Common Agricultural Policy is the glue that holds together 
the European Community. To understand why the glue is so strong one must reflect on the 
history of agriculture in Western Europe since the 1920s. As indicated above, only recently 
has Europe been a net exporter of grains, but European agriculture's importance has been 
a major element of national policies of Western European countries since 1945. The reasons 
Ullbid. p.129 
1i·e2 Walter Laqueur, Eu.rope in Ou.r Time.!: A Hidory 19.5-199! (New York: Viking, 1992), p.6. 
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are not difficult to fathom. In his major study of European reconstruction, Alan S. Milward 
has written "Without discussion or argument there was one matter on which all national 
reconstruction plans were in agreement, the maximization of agricultural production.,,15·63 
The memories of the 1920's and 1930's remained strong in European memory. There was, 
after 1945, a world food shortage and food had to be bought with Bearce dollars. Of 
course, memories of wartime food deprivation were strong. Countries like Britain and 
Switzerland that had adopted liberal policies towards agriculture had Buffered during the 
war and after. Therefore, in Milward's words, "Any sacrifice of agricultural output on 
the altar of international efficiency now appeared as strategically dangerous and politically 
disastrous." There would be no sacrifice; indeed, there would be a conscious attempt to 
obtain more food security than had existed in the 1930s.5 .64 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was designed to achieve the objectives of pro-
ducer income support, promotion of technical efficiency and the efficiency of resource use, 
price stability and food security as established by the Treaty of Rome (1959). The CAP 
thus became the instrument of "modernisation" or "industrialisation" of farming. 15·615 In 
a larger sense, the economic benefits of the CAP only offers a partial explanation for the 
plan. While acknowledging the economic benefits of integration by the founder of the 
E.C., "political unity among the nation states of Western Europe was their larger goal."I5·66 
Given the threat of Communist expansion during the 1950s, political interaction amongst 
the Western European democratic nations was encouraged by the U.S. The Americans had 
doubts about CAP but they had fears about Communism and political disintegration which 
overcame these doubts. 
As production of the more efficient farms continued to rise, supply tended to exceed 
effective demand. The tendency for oversupply to drive prices down was offset by the 
i.53 Alan Milward, The Recon8truction of We8tem Europe 19-45-51 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:University 
of California Press, 1984), p.435. 
UtIbid. 
uiI.R. Bowden, Agriculture under the Common Agricultural Polic!l(Manchester University Prell, U.K., 
1985) p.xi. Industrial farming is characterised by specialisation both on individual farms and whole farming 
regions, a farm structure of fewer and larger units and systems that rapidly apply technological, biological 
and chemical innovations. 
us Ibid 
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implementation of guarantees which provided producers with price supports under a variety 
of schemes.5.67 Producf'rs were thus f'ncouraged to continue inuf'asing production; however, 
as governments became increasingly involved, the cost of support rose.5 .68 Part of the 
problem was success. Laqueur describes what he terms the "surge" of Buropean agriculture 
which transformed country life all over the continent by the 1960's. The statistics are 
impressive: 
The number of tractors in use had been fairly negligible before 1945 except in the Soviet 
Union and Britain; between 1950 and 1962 it increased from 350,000 to 2.6 million in 
the Common Market countries alone. The use of fertilizers grew by over 85% between the 
1930's and 1959, and as a result of these and other improvements, productivity in agriculture 
doubled in France and West Germany between the early fifties and the middle sixties; a 
shrinking labour force produced far more food than in the prewar years. 
In fact, it produced as much as Western Europe could consume by the 1960's, and France 
became the granary of the Common Market. It is small wonder that a political problem 
arose with the traditional suppliers, of grain to Europe. 
By the 1960s the problems in the system had become apparent to all, but, the worst 
effects of the surplus market conditions were absorbed by the stock-holding and pricing 
policies of the Canadian-American duopoly. It is important to emphasise that in the early 
1960's, Europe was still in the second rank among grain traders. 
In 1967, the CAP came into full force. The Americans were troubled, but they did not 
see the CAP as the protectionist policy that it would become. Moreover, the Americans 
hoped that the Kennedy Round of the GATT would lead to a generalliberalisation of trade 
including the problem of the CAP. In fact, during these negotiations, the Europeans did 
propose what became known as the "mont ant de soutien" which would have frozen support 
at current levels. The Americans (and others) hoping for better rejected this offer. As 
Atkin writes, "In retrospect, and particularly in the context of the difficulties posed by 
agricultural trade issues in the GATT Uruguay Round, nearly 30 years later, it is easy to 
'Ul7Michael Tracy, Western Europe 1880-1988, p.237 
5.118 Ibid. 
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see that the E.C.'s offer should have been grabbed with both hands, but the opportunity 
was lost."s.69 
By 1970, the stabilising effects of the duopoly as well a.s the Intenational Wheat Agree-
ment (IWA) had ended. The tight market conditions of the mid-1970s proved to be very 
prosperous for all grain exporters, however, as surplus conditions again began to appear 
in the late 1970s relations with the other exporters, especially the United States, became 
increasingly strained. U.S. determination to pressure the E.C. to alter its policies was mod-
erated by the agricultural shortages of the mid 1970s.s.1o By the end of the decade, relations 
had seriously deteriorated. 
The crisis in global agricultural trading relations of the 1980s was a result, primarily, of 
the decline in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of the E.C., a formidable competitor.5.71 
Although the CAP brought considerable benefits to its member nationss.1l it irritated the 
E.C. 's partners. Australia's extreme antagonism towards Europe reflects, perhaps, the loss 
of its traditional British markets.s.13 The United States responded to Europe's aggressive 
export policies with retaliatory policies such as the Export Enhancement Program (EEP)Ii.74 
and repeated appeals to the GATT to affect changes to CAP. The E.C. responded that CAP 
constituted an internal policy beyond GATT's jurisdiction.us The E.C. capitalised on the 
general downturn in the early 1980s by investing heavily in grain exports. By 1989 the full 
scope of the complete E.C. wheat trade policy was clear; it included targeted marketing 
with flexible commercial and concessionary credit, multi-annual supply agreements and a 
storage system. Ii.16 
Throughout the 1980's it was clear that the United States and Europe had a different 
conception of the relationship among agriculture, trade, and rural life. Although Margaret 
11.1111 Atkin, The International Grain 7hlde, pp.25-6. 
1I.7°Theodore H. Cohn, "The Changing Role of the United States" in William Avery, World Agriculture 
and the GATT, p.27 
11.71 Ibid p.29 
1I.72 Nick Butler, The International Grain 7hlde, p.38 
II.7S Ibid. p.44 
II.HRonald T. Libby, Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and the World Grain 7hlde, p.l 
1I.7II Nick Butler, The International Grain Trade, p,48 
1I.7&Peter W. Phillips, Wheat, Europe and the GATT (London, Pinter Publishers, 1990), p.2 
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Thatcher shared the commitment of the Reagan administration to deregulation, privatisa-
tion, and liberalisation of markets, other Europeans did not. Thus although the Dutch and 
the British in the 1980's tended to share what might be termed the American paradigm, 
they were overruled within the Community by the French and Germans. As new mem-
bers entered the Community, notably Spain, these members derived great benefit from the 
subsidies for agricultural products in the Community. Thus, the disputes over agriculture 
intensified in the 1980's, especially as the heightened value of the American dollar opened 
many markets for European grain traders.5.TT 
The Uruguay round of the GATT was an exercise in frustration for all interested par-
ties. The E.C. recognised that the CAP was an impediment to progress, but national 
governments prevented not only the elimination of CAP but also its serious revision. The 
details of the negotiations are beyond the scope of this chapter, however, the outcome of 
those negotiations will determine the future direction of agricultural relations and national 
policies. 
5.6. Summary, Analysis and Conclusion 
The instability and variability which has plagued the international grain trade throughout 
this century has played a major role in motivating and justifying policy intervention in this 
vital sector of the economy. The capital intensive nature of agricultural production makes 
it particularly sensitive to fluctuations in general economic conditions both nationally and 
internationally. Many of the policies and programs which governments have instituted may 
be viewed as a means of distributing the risks between the farm sector and the rest of the 
economy. The history of the agricultural policies of the major grain exporting countries 
reveals that at times the policies designed to alleviate one risk can often be seen to have 
created new ones.5•T8 The history of the agricultural policies of the major grain trading 
1i.77See Marcelo Raffaelli, The Ri,e and Demi,e of Commodity Agreemenb, (Cambridge: Woodhead, 
1995), pp.28-29. Also Atkin, The International Grain 7\-ade, pp.28-29 
&.78 Beverly Fleisher, Agricultural Rid: Management (Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990) 
p.1 
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nations as described in Chapters 4 and 5 is a history of many such trade-ofrs among interest 
groups within a country, and among countries. 
In the introduction to the discussion of national agricultural policies, two arguments 
were presented. First, the issues which plague agricultural policy makers today arc largely 
rooted in the past. This premise particularly relates to issues involving production control 
and surplus management. The second is that the trade policies of the five major exporters 
have been shaped primarily by domestic political and economic circumstances. A third 
argument which could now be added is that to a large extent, the policies of Canada, 
Australia and Argentina have been formulated in response to policies and pressures of the 
United States. The premise will be examined in more detail later. 
Chapters 4 and 5 have attempted to identify the major domestic, political and economic 
forces which have shaped the export policies of the five major exporters and to explain how 
these circumstances have in turn shaped the international grain trade, as well as the trade 
relations of these actors. For each exporter the domestic forces were different; nevertheless, 
there are some common patterns which can be identified. Because grain is a thinly-traded 
commodity and because the international grain trade is an oligopoly, the policy decisions 
of any major grain seller have profound effects on the other major actors and on the state 
of the market in general.S.79 
This chapter has studied three countries whose relative influences have declined since 
1939 because of the increasing economic and political strength of the United States and 
later, the E.C. Their policy decisions are seen to be increasingly reactive to the influence of 
American policy. The European Community has defied U.S. domination and has become 
a major actor within the last two decades as a result of the "domestic decision" to use 
agriculture as a unifying force in the community. Interestingly, this decision parallels earlier 
"domestic decisions" by Canada and Australia. This decision has had a profound effect 
on the structure of the oligopoly. In the words of one analyst "no government policy 
has caused more change since 1960 in any area of the world economy than the Common 
r.. 78 Brian T. Olsen, Ph.D. Thesis, "Price Determination and Market Share Formulation in the Interna-
tional Wheat Market" (Mineapolis, University of Minnesota, 1979) p.1 
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A~ricultural Policy (CAP) of the E.C."5.80 The resultant subsidy "war" interfered with 
the export objectives of many countries (indudin~ the main opponents) and exposed the 
structural weaknesses of the system as never before.5 .81 
Although it is generally considered that the "food regime" as such was created in the 
aftermath of World War II,5.8l many elements of the modern trading system and the gov-
ernment policies that support it were set in place after the "Great Depression" in the early 
1930's. The depression was a watershed in the development of the international grain 
trade. Regardless of the relative strength of the industry prior to 1930, the global scope 
of the depression devastated grain producers in all the major exporting countries.5 .83 The 
political decisions that were made in the aftermath of the depression to a large extent 
shaped the health of their economies in general, and their grain industry in particular. The 
United States led the way with its comprehensive Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933) while 
Canada and Australia adopted producer support systems that included the establishment 
of marketing boards to regulate supply and provide some price stability. Canada's support 
system was comprehensive, incorporating elements of the U.S. model. Australia's wheat 
industry lacked the political support and financial resources necessary to revive the sec-
tor and restore production levels. In Argentina, budgeting for the reconstruction of the 
economy was directed to the industrial sector at the expense of the grain and livestock 
producers. Argentinian agricultural policy since that time has been marked by short term 
policies of grasping market advantages whenever possible with apparently little regard for 
the long term consequences. Examples of this erratic market behaviour range from breaking 
the marketing and financial provisions of the International Wheat Agreement causing it to 
collapse in 1934 to the selling of grain to the Soviet Union during the 1980 embargo. World 
UORobert E. Hudec, "Dispute Settlement in Agricultural Trade Mattera: The Lessons of the GATT 
Experience" in U.S. Canadian Agriculturul 7'rcJde Challenge,: Developing Common Approache., ~ds. Kristen 
Allen and Katie Macmillan (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1988), p.149 
u1Theodore H. Cohn, The International Politic. 0/ Agriculturul Trade: Canadian-American RelatioRl 
in II Global Agricuiturul Context (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1990) p.4 
r.· II2 Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Anal-
yses" in Stephen D. Krasner, International Regime" (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983) p.85 
u~1n the 1920's, Canada was considered the "bread-basket" of the world, with 42% of world trade 
and Argentina was its closest competition. Between 1923 and 1928 the U.S. moved to second position and 
became the leading exporter after 1930. 
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War II and the immediate post war period also demanded all-out production for the war 
effort and to provide for European reconstruction. 
A major initiative in terms of producer cooperation and market stability was the f:'stab-
lishment of the International Wheat Agreement in 1949. This and subsequent agreements 
will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. The 1950's and 1960's represented a period of 
cooperation among the major grain exporters despite the heightened politicisation of the 
trade.5.s4 The United States was the undisputed leader in the industry in the post World 
War II period, however, in the absence of budgeting pressures, agricultural trade policies 
were restrained in the 1950's and 1960's. Emphasis was given to the political/security value 
of grain exports in terms of both market development and Communist containment. Con-
cessionary policies such as PL480 provided the legislative authority to achieve these goals 
while reducing the surplus stocks which became increasingly troublesome during this pe-
riod. This "dumping" of American surpluses on the market posed a serious problem for the 
other grain traders. Canada responded most decisively by moving into Communist markets 
which, for ideological reasons was rejected by the U.S. This initiative was significant in 
offsetting the expansionary policies of the U.S. and by the late 1960's, these markets were 
Canada's best. 
Despite this success, western Canadian grain agricultural interests began to decline in the 
1960's in favour of powerful manufacturing interests in Central Canada. The interventionist 
orientation of Prime Minister Lester Pearson and later Pierre Trudeau brought a number 
of stabilisation and insurance programs to assist producers who faced chronic surpluses 
and depressed prices. This decline was evident even within the prairies where capacity 
came to represent only 20% of economic activity and priority was given to the oil and 
petrochemical industries in the aftermath of the OPEC crises. It also stemmed from the 
strong influences of the Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whelan, whose bia.<; was in support 
of the agricultural interests of Central Canada, particularly the poultry and dairy sectors.Uti 
1I···Theodore Cohn, The International Politic! oj Agricultuml Trade: Canadian-American Relation. in 
a Global Agricultuml Conte:z:t University of British Colombia Press, Vancouver, 1990), p.99 
II.IIIGrace Skogstaad, The Politic! oj Agriculture and Policy Making in Canada, pp.5-9 In this compre-
hensive study of the regionally concentrated agricultural commodity secton in Canada, Skogstaad builds in 
the thesis put forward by Faith Stevenson that intergovernmental situations and policy-making in Canada 
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Although the regional and indeed federal aspects of policy-making in Canada had long 
fuelled intergovernmental tensions, interests became particularly polarised in the 1970's. 
Internationally, tensions were also rising. The U.S. concessional sales increasingly af-
fected the pattern of commercial grain exports. The U.S. shar(l of exports to LDCs increased 
from 36% in 1950-54 to 68% in 1960-64. During the same period Canada's share of exports 
to LDCs dropped from 23% to 6% while Australia's exports dropped from 17% to 9% and 
Argentina's 14% to 5%.5.86 The outcry of these "victims of U.S. policy" led to the creation 
of FAO's Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal in 1954, but with little effect. 
The tendency for the U.S. to take unilateral action in order to serve its general purposes, 
as in the case of PL480 confirms the findings of Keohane and Nye that the typical approach 
of the United States on socio-economic issues was to take "unilateral action to which the 
smaller partners tended to respond by demanding redress through diplomatic channels."5.87 
Despite the obvious political problems that arose among the grain traders at this time, 
Canada and the United States maintained the "duopoly" which had shielded the market 
from more severe dislocations as a result of surplus accumulation.5.88 This system, in 
conjunction with the economic provisions of the International Wheat Agreement managed to 
keep prices within the accepted price range until the breakdown of the agreement in 1967.5•89 
By 1967 the duopoly model became increasingly unsatisfactory to the U.S. Increased balance 
of payments problems demanded a more aggressive marketing approach and in 1967-68 it 
disposed of 750 m. bushels of wheat, contributing to the break of the floor prices of the 
are affected significantly by the interplay of Canada's regional economies which have historically favoured 
the interests of Central Canada over those of the West. 
U&Robert Band, Food Aid and International Agricultuml Trade, (Lexington, M.A.: Heath, 1972). p.242 
uTRobert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politic8 in 7ran.ition 
(Boston, Little Brown, 1977) p.200 
li.slTheodore Cohn, International Politic. of Agricuitu",. Although Australia and Argentina were some-
times included in the meetings, prices were set by Canada and the U.S. who controlled 60-70% of world 
trade. pp.668-668 
11.1, Jon McLin "Surrogate International Organisations and the Case of World Food Security 1949-1969" 
International Organuation 33-1 (winter 1979) pp.35-55 McLean has described the Canadian - American 
duopoly of the 1950's and 1960's as a "surrogate system" of world food security since it functioned in the 
absence of an international arrangement with explicit multilateral obligations and administr .. tive responsi-
bilities undertaken by an international secretariat." 
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IWA and the collapse of the agreement.S.90 Australia and the f~l1ropl'an Community also 
contrihuted to the breakdown through aggressive market activity.s.91 
The breakdown of the Canadian-American "duopoly" and the Interna.tional Wheat 
Agreement constituted the end of the food regime which had provided a hasic consensus for 
regulating market practices and price levels among major grain exporters in the postwar 
period. The principles and aims whic.h guided the system were not without problems; how-
ever, in retrospect, this period proved to be certainly more stable than the periods which 
preceded and followed it. The end of such a regime is seen by Puchala and Hopkins to reflect 
"two classical political concepts - power and interest." The structure of international power 
had changed and with it the marketing imperatives of the grain traders - particularly the 
United States and the added complication, by the mid-1970's, was the growing presence of 
the E.C. on the export market. 
Fundamental economic changes took place in the late 1970's which have led to serious 
problems in agricultural trade relations. Increased pressures from U.S. balance of payments 
deficits contributed to more aggressive American trade policy including the U.S. targeting 
of Canada's Communist markets. The ever growing impact of the European Community 
agricultural exports set the stage for the full-blown conflicts and subsidy wars that have 
paralysed the system throughout the 1980's. 
The marginalisation of the lesser grain exporters by the policies of the U.S. and E.C. led 
to the establishment in 1986 of the "Cairns Group"S.9:l In their important work, Relocating 
Middle Powers, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue that at their "boldest" the Cairns Group 
was a "major force in the early phase of the Uruguay Round" and that it "helped set the 
agenda and provided an important middle way for progress when negotiations hetween the 
U.S. and E.C. appeared to be heading for a deadlock."s.93 
6. IIO Theodore Cohn, International Politic I of Agricultural 7rade pp.70-72. In contrast, Canada took 
wheat off the market during this time in an attempt to strengthen prices. 
1i.II1ibid 
6.II'The members of the "Cairns Group" are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, The Philipines, Thailand and Uruguay. 
6.113 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powerl (Van-
couver, pniversity of British Colombia: 1991) p.82 
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Their argument has much strength, hut. it. should he recalkd t.hat differences among this 
very diverse group soon surfaced. Some, particularly Brazil, found themselves torn between 
their membership in Cairns and their membership of the Food Importers Group. Canada 
was, however, the major problem for two major reasons. First, Canada was also prot(>ction-
ist in several areas of agriculture, and second Canada in the mid 1980s was engaged ill the 
negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States, and seemed to be driven by a 
need to support American initiatives.5.94 The significance of the Cairns Group was perhaps 
its very creation. 
As all nations, both exporting and importing, struggled to break through the impasse 
of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the words of Leslie Wheeler, Director of the Office of 
Foreign Agricultural Relations, USDA, come to mind. In reflecting on the post-depression 
situation, he stated that "since agricultural price support programs and their accompanying 
trade restrictions appeared to be a permanent fact of life around the world, the road back 
to free trade could only be taken through international cooperation.,,5.95 The impulse to 
seek international cooperation through international organisations and agreements in times 
of crisis is a pattern which has been established throughout this century. The international 
agreements which were established at those moments will be the subject of Chapter 6. 
&·'·For a fuller explanation of this argument, see John English and hene Knell, "Canadian Agricul-
ture and World Politics" International Per6pective6 (November/December 1987), also Andrew Cooper, 
"Like-Minded Nations/Contrasting Diplomatic Styles: Australian and Canadian Approaches to Agricul-
tural Trade" Canadian Journal of Politicnl Sciena! (June 1992), pp.349-79 
&'''Berton Edmond Henningson, "United States Agricultural Trade and Development Policy During 
World War II: The Role of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations", unpublished thesis (University of 
Arkansas, 1981), p.38 
Chapter 6 
International Wheat Agreements: 
Origins and Fates 
6.1. Introduction 
International interest in the stabilisation of primary commodity prices is an age old phe-
nomenon. Because of the nature of wheat as an internationally traded commodity and 
because of the nature of the market as it has evolved in the twentieth century, there have 
been numerous attempts to "manage" the wheat trade. The agriculture led "Great Depres-
sion" of the 1930's, and the economic planning which followed, gave rise to the concept of 
government intervention in the regulation of commodity markets and the recognition that a 
fundamental lack of symmetry existed in the way agricultural markets operated, particularly 
in contrast to those of manufactured goods. The difficulties in adjusting supply to variation 
in effective demand, revealed the limitations of self-correction in the international grain 
market.6 .1 Chapters 4 and 5 dealing with the national politics of the major grain exporters 
have detailed the numerous national adjustment programs designed to reduce the state's 
exposure to the negative effects of external price fluctuations. These efforts have, under 
certain political and economic climates and external market conditions been supplemented 
by attempts among the major exporters to manage the trade internationally, particularly 
with respect to market share and pricing arrangements. From the first wheat agreement in 
1931 to the present much looser arrangement, such cooperation was perceived as a means of 
providing a certain degree of regulation in order to improve the functioning of the market 
- not to replace it.6•2 
The unique character of agricultural production has demanded a much higher degree of 
government regulation than other sectors of the economy. Economic forces such as general 
6.1 Gamani Corea, "Creating a Framework to Strengthen and Stabilise International Commodity Mar-
kets." in Alan K. Henrikson ed. Negotiating World Order: The Artilanlhip and Architecture of Global 
Diplomacy. (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986) pp.167-8 
11.2 Ibid. p.169 
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macroeconomic conditions, exchange rate variatiolls and 1Il0lH'tary and fiscal policies have 
the effect of enhancing or restraining all international trade flows. Agricultural trade is 
further complicated by the vagaries of seasonal and weather influences. Second only to the 
unexpected changes in the economic environment caused hy policy changes, weather is a 
major source of uncertainty in agricultural output.6 . 3 The national and global impact of 
weather on the quality of output can be dramatic, which, taken in conjunction with the 
inelastic nature of aggregate demand, magnifies the variation.5 ... 
Income variability of producers as a function of weather-induced changes in yields can 
also be extreme. This variability (and the resultant political pressure) has remained a 
dominant feature of the grain trade since prior to World War II when grain prices moved 
freely in response to supply and demand with little direct government intervention. Prices 
received by producers in the United States varied from $.36 in 1932 to $2.25 in 1947 in 1932 
prices. The social and political unacceptability of such extreme price and income variations 
and the ineffectiveness of national programmes to resolve adequately the problems led to 
demands for some form of international cooperation or coordination of the wheat trade.6.IS 
It was, however, the nature of the market that made collaboration possible. 
Several features of the international grain market contributed towards cooperation. 
First, there are relatively few significant exporters, and, in the early part of the century, 
relatively few significant importers. Secondly, the impact of reserve stocks on pricing is 
immense, leading to great market dislocations in times of significant surplus or shortages. 
The ability of one or two exporters to maintain sufficient stocks to influence the market in 
such a significant way has provided the impetus for all major exporters and importers to 
seek an agreement which could provide market stability. Thirdly, the major exporters were 
countries which had close political and economic relations with each other. Canada and 
the United States were neighbours, and Canada was linked with another major exporter, 
URobert D. Reinsil, "Government Grain Storage: Food Security and Price Stability" in Robert D. 
Reinsil ed. Managing Food Security in Unregulated Market.. (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Pre •• , 1993). 
p.106. See also "The World Wheat Situation and the International Wheat Agreement" (IWC, London, 
1954). p.5 
ulbid. p.107 
e.IiMaiden "International Wheat Agreements" in International Journal of Agrarian ADair., Vol. 1, No. 
3, (Oxford University Preas, Sept. 1949) p.ll 
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Australia, through the Commonwealth. Moreover, wheat was a component of broader po-
litical and economic relations among these countries. As national interests of the major 
participants came to be defined differently over time, the introduction of international or-
ganisations and agreements provided the catalysts necessary for coalition formation and the 
continuation of the regime.6 .6 
From the early attempts to reach agreement in the 1930's, to the more stable and 
lasting agreement of 1949, particular political and economic conditions existed within and 
among the major exporting and importing nations which have made such international 
agreements possible. The changing patterns of these interrelationships has largely been in 
response to changing international market conditions, political and economic strategies, and 
increasingly, domestic political pressures.6.T The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
formulation, functioning and eventual demise of the International Wheat Agreements. This 
review will identify the political and economic environment that resulted in the creation 
and continuance of the successive agreements, the mechanisms of operation, the socioeco-
nomic factors that kept them viable, and the change in the political objectives and market 
conditions that led to their breakdown. This examination will be conducted within the 
context of the effect these agreements had on the function of the market in terms of price 
stability, general trade relations among the main actors and food security. Emphasis will 
be given to the more substantive agreements which operated from 1949-1969. 
This study will revisit the ongoing debate regarding the desirability of government in-
terference with "market forces". It will, in fact, go beyond the national debate to the 
international arena where the collaboration of governments in the regulation of global eco-
nomic enterprises such as in the case of International Commodity Agreements (ICA 's) not 
only expands the breadth of the debate, but raises new questions relating to the viability 
of a system which advocates the coexistence of co-operation and competition. 
A central feature of the post-war food regime, the International Wheat Agreements 
exemplify the central tension which exists in international commodity trade issues: that 
Upeter Urin, The International Organi.sation of Hunger (London, Keegan Paul International, 1994) p.8 
e.7Yamani Corea, "Creating a Framework to strengthen and Stabilise International Commodity Market" 
p.168 
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is, the conflict that arises from the seemingly incompatible objectives of free trade and 
the (at least partial) regulation of the commodity in ord('r to promote price stability and 
availability of supply.6.s The history of International Wheat Agreements (IWA) traces the 
evolution as well as the resolution of this conflict over time, and reveals the interface of 
exporter and importer interests. 
6.2. The Evolution of International Cooperation in Wheat 
Throughout recorded history the problems of production management, distribution, mar-
keting and pricing of wheat have concerned political leaders, from the Roman focus on 
bread and circuses to the modern Western leaders and their fear of agrarian and consumer 
protests. For our purposes the first moves toward the creation of an international regime 
in the area of wheat occurred at the International Economic Conference in Geneva in 1927. 
an impulse which reflected the desire of agricultural producers to gain a greater slice of the 
prosperity then prevailing.6.9 The general economic boom of the mid to late 1920's was 
accompanied by a boom in agricultural production with food production increasing by 15% 
between 1921 and 1929. By 1929, however, it Was evident that the economic boom had 
passed its peak. Surplus capacity was evident in manufacturing as well as in raw materials 
and grain. The increased interest in commodity control schemes was an indication of the 
growing difficulties of primary producers.6 •10 
When the depression struck, the situation worsened with the dramatic collapse in world 
wheat prices due to over-abundant supply and the significantly reduced purchasing power 
of the major importers. Informal meetings led to the first International Wheat conference 
in London in May 1931 at which eleven wheat exporting nations participated. The con-
ference convened to address what was considered the abnormal market phenomenon that 
UStephen D. Krasner, ed. International Regime. (Ithaca, Cornell University Preas, 1983) pp.75-77 and 
Mark W. Zacher "International Commodity Trade regime" in International Organilation(Vo1.41, Number 2, 
Spring 1989) pp.174 - 176. A recent study which largely ignores wheat but reflects generally on international 
commodity agreements is Marcelo Qaffaelli, The Rile and Demile of International Commodit!l Agreement. 
(Cambridge: Woodhead, 1995). 
U A,G. Kenward and A.L. Longhead The Growth of the International Econom!l1920 - 1980 (London, 
George Allen Unwin, 1983) pp.200-201. 
II.l°International Wheat Council, File Ex(74/75) 2/2, Second Meeting of the Executive Committee 10 
Sept. 1974 
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was "facing farms all over the world, that is to sell below the cost of production, limiting 
the purchasing power of wheat growing countries and demoralising world trade."6.u The 
conference explored various proposals in order to facilitate orderly marketing, including the 
implementation of export quotas. In the end, the Canadian Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett, 
refused to sell Canadian wheat on an export quota basis.6.1~ The following day, the United 
States also announced its opposition to export quotas proposing acreage reduction as an 
alternative. Despite objections from the Soviet Delegation that it was struggling to recover 
its pre-war production capacity, the motion was carried6.13 and acreage was reduced by 15% 
in the first year and 10% in the second. Although the general terms of the conference were 
not maintained, perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of the 1931 conference was the 
establishment of a Clearing House of Information to assist the wheat exporting countries in 
exploring possibilities of expanding wheat usage.6.U 
6.3. The International Wheat Agreement. 1933 
Two years later in the deliberations of the Monetary and Economic Summit in London, 
on August 3, 1933, pressure to secure a more comprehensive agreement among the wheat 
exporters came from the United States. In what was described as a "stiffening of the United 
States attitude" in 1933, Canadian ambivalence toward an agreement was challenged. Under 
the threat of the U.S. abandonment of domestic acreage reduction and the possible dumping 
of surpluses on world markets (which would have been disastrous for Canada) full Canadian 
support for an agreement was won. Argentina and Australia also agreed to reconvene at 
Canada House, London, on August 21 to investigate more fully the possible options. From 
the onset of the depression, the global character of the grain trade and the "domino effect" 
of problems in the agricultural sector had become increasingly evident. Writing in 1932, 
5.11 "Multilateral Arrangements Part 3 Wheat Trade" telegram 51 Secretary of State for External Affairs 
to High Commissioner, Ottawa, May 14, 1931 also A.G. Kenward. p.201 and IWO File Ex (74/75) 2/2/ pp. 
9 - 15 
s.12Telegram Prime Minister to High Commissioner (Ottawa, May 20, 1931) (ibid.) 
s,uTelegram 58 High Commission to Secretary of State for External Affairs, ibid. 
s.14 IWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2 p.3 and Telegram 142 Advisory Office and Secretary of State for external 
Affairs, Geneva, May 13, 1933. 
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M. Giuseppe de Michels, president of the Int,('rnational Institute of Agriculture made this 
point. 
In recognising the international character of the present crisis in agricul-
ture, it should also be recognised that the only way to its solution is that of 
coordinating national requirements with the requirements of the whole mod-
ern economic system which is essentially international, and that coordination 
of this kind is only possible on the basis of international agreements.6.lII 
Under the strong direction of the United States, and with the cooperation of wheat 
importing countries, who were also committed to the establishment of a balance between 
production and consumption through orderly marketing, an agreement was reached by 
August 25. All major exporters and importers were signatories to the agreement includ-
ing: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Greece, Hungary, the Irish Free State, Italy, Poland, Rumania, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia, Australia, Canada and the United States. Argentina's signature was delayed 
but finally arrived.6.16 
The stated objectives of the 1933 International Wheat Agreement were "to adjust the 
supply of wheat to effective world demand and eliminate the abnormal surpluses which have 
been depressing the wheat market, and to bring about a rise and stabilisation of prices at 
a level remuneration of the farmers and fair to the consumers of breadstuffs" .6.11 
To this end, three features were adopted by the conference. The first was the acceptance 
of an export quota scheme by the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia for the 
1933/34 crop years which was based on a projected world import demand of 560M bushels 
or 15.2M tons. Secondly, the four major exporters accepted a 15% reduction in exports 
for that year, and a corresponding reduction in production acreage. Thirdly, an agreement 
was reached to fix the price of wheat for a period of 16 weeks, at which time importing 
countries would be obliged to lower their customs tariffs. In addition to these provisions, the 
lI.liM. Giuseppe de Michels, President, International Institute of Agriculture. World Agriculture (Lon-
don, Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1932) 
lI.ll1Telegram 86 office of High Commission to Secretary of State for External Affairs, London, Aug. 25, 
1933 (p.569) 
1I.17IWC, File Ex (74/75) 2/2. p.3 
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United States and Canada agreed to share proportionally the burden of carry-over stocks 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed to limit their exports for the crop year 
1933--:34. Of lasting significance was the creation of the Wheat Advisory Committee, which 
was to continue to assess market conditions and oversee the working and application of the 
Agreement.6.lS 
However comprehensive and ambitious this agreement may have been for its time, it 
proved to be inadequate in correcting market imbalances. Far from attaining and holding the 
agreed basic level, the price of wheat actually fell as a result of several factors. The upward 
movement of tariffs which had characterised the early years of the depression continued well 
into the mid 1930's, inhibiting trade internationally.6.l9 Paul de Hevesy, a leading analyst at 
the time, critiques what he saw as "the paradox of many of the industrial states in Europe 
attempting to maintain and even expand their agricultural production through protective 
tariffs. Thus, as the price fell, less instead of more wheat was allowed to enter importing 
countries.,,6.2o Therefore, although all major producers were under pressure to find markets 
for their wheat, Argentina was the first to break the agreement by overshipping its quota 
by one million tons due to bumper crops and inadequate storage facilities.6 .2l 
In hindsight, the IWA 1933 appears to have been doomed to failure given the macroeco-
nomic conditions of the day. It was, however, a surprisingly comprehensive undertaking for 
its time, adopting as it did the three essential elements of a commodity agreement, supply 
regulations, export controls and price provisions - however elementary.6.22 This agreement 
was also significant in that it was the first one which sought to establish an effective balance 
of production and consumption levels by incorporating the interests of both exporters and 
importers. This interdependence between the consuming nations and the producing and 
11.18 Description of the 1933 Wheat Agrement is taken from: Telegram 86 Office of High Commislioner 
to Secretary of State for External Affairs, l-ondon, Aug. 2S, 1993 allO lee, IWC File E1 (74/75) 2/2 and 
The Stabili.ation of International Trade in Grain,: An aueument of problem' and pouible .olutionl FAD 
Commodity Policy Study #20 (FAD, Rome, 1970), p.16-17, and Tom Sewell, The World Grain Trade 
(London, Woodhead-Faulkner (Publishers) Ltd., 1992), p.99 
8.111 A.G. Kenward and A.L. Longhead, p.21S 
e.2°Paul de Hevesy, World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning in General, (London, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1940), p.3 
8.21 IWC File Ex(74/7S) 2/2, p.3. see also Telegram 214 Secretary of State for External Affairs to 
Minister in France, Ottowa, Oct.8, 1933 
6.22IWC Files Ex(74/75) 2/2, p.4 
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exporting nations was reflected in the words of the French Ministry of Commerce in 1936: 
" .,. Recovery is not possible while the buying power of the farmer remains so low, since 
the disposal of manufactured goods depends chiefly on the wealth of the rural masses.,,6.23 
In addition to the inability of this agreement to be sustained given depressed market 
conditions, it was also flawed in that it was almost completely lacking in the "infrastruc-
ture" necessary in order to carry out the scope of its provisions.6 .24 The Wheat Advisory 
Committee, the institutional base, had little power, but was nonetheless maintained from 
1935-1938 when a succession of droughts reduced the massive surpluses and interest in 
the negotiation of a new agreement was renewed.6 .25 The sudden rise in wheat prices in 
1936-1937 was the result of an astonishing array of factors, which were political, economic 
and atmospheric in nature. They included the initial failure of the 1935/36 Argentina crop; 
four consecutive small crops in the United States and Canada, poor crops in France, GN-
many, Italy and S.W. Europe in general, heightened international political tension and the 
consequent build-up of stocks for military purposes, civil war in Spain, and the mandatory 
devaluation in France, Holland and Switzerland. 
The suddenness of the market reversal prompted the United States to put forward a pro-
posal to stabilise the export quantities for all major exporters. A Preparatory Committee 
met in London in early 1939; however, efforts to establish a workable basis for a new agree-
ment was interrupted by the outbreak of war in September 1939.6 .26 Although the meeting 
of the Wheat Advisory Committee and the negotiation meetings were held in secrecy,6.2T 
agreement appears to have been reached with regard to setting a world minimum price for 
selected reference wheat (Manitoba No.3) and on the provision of specific export quotas 
for Canada (40%), Argentina (25%), the United States (18%) and Australia (17% ).6.28 
e.23 Paul de Heveay, p.9 
e.2·IWC File Ex(74/75), p.4 
e.2li Paul de Heveay, p.29 
8.28 International Journal of Agrarian Affairl, Vol. 1 No.3, 1949, The basis of an agreement was reached 
just before Hitler's troops invaded Poland in Sept. 1939. 
e.27 Paul de Hevesy, pp.21-25. Hevesy severely criticises the committee for the secrecy of its meetings 
and blamed it, at least in part, for the failure of the agreement. 
e.28 IWC File Ex(74/74) 2/2, p.6 and the Stabilisation of International Trade in Grains, FAO, 1970, p.16. 
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6.4. The War Years 
Despite the suspension of the negotiations due to the war, informal preparations for a new 
wheat agreement continued, and in 1942 the Wheat Advisory Committee met in Wa.shing-
ton with representatives of the four major exporters, the United States, Canada, Australia 
and Argentina, and one importer, the United Kingdom. This meeting concluded a Mem-
orandum of Agreement and Draft Convention which called for the establishment of an 
International Wheat Council to supersede the Advisory Committee. The Agreement itself 
essentially provided for a future international conference to negotiate a new international 
wheat agreement, and initiated plans for the post-war recovery and relief programs. The 
Washington deliberations also expanded the scope of possible market stabilisation mecha-
nisms to include reserve stocks, production control, export quotas and price regulation.s.29 
The provisions accepted by this conference reflected the findings of comprehensive re-
search conducted by the U.S. Offices of Foreign Agricultural Relations. In studying the 
history of commodity surpluses and the various responses which had been implemented, 
several conclusions were drawn: 
1. As surpluses had been problematic prior to the war, they would likely persist after 
the war. 
2. In the absence of some agreed method to absorb the surpluses, cut-throat competi-
tion would likely be resorted to which would be disastrous for all exporters. 
3. Attempts to resolve these problems through national programs are unlikely to be 
effective. 
International commodity agreements which provide for orderly marketing, were seen to 
be the best solution to the problem.s.lO Having reached these conclusions, considerable 
attention was given to the specifics in the establishment of such an agreement. The U.S. 
position at the discussion was clear. In order to be effective and beneficial to all concerned, 
an agreement should: 
e.2I1IWC File Ex(74/75) 2/2, also Berton Edmond, Hennmgson, "United States Agricultural Trade and 
Development Policy During World War II: The Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations" (Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of ArbnsaB, 1981, pp.245-255) 
uOLeslie A. Wheeler, "International Agreements for the Control of Farm Surpluses", Foreign Agricul. 
ture, 6 Sept., 1942, p.324 
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in managing these essential commodities. At war's end, government control in the food 
sectors was maintained in order to deal with the (lnormous physical and financial challenges 
of feeding the populations devastated by war, particularly in J<=urope and Asia.6 .33 
Planning for a post war agri-food system or regime represented just one component of 
the comprehensive world economic restructuring which was undertaken at this time. The 
emergent political, economic and military pre-eminence of the United States was reflected 
in the leadership role which it assumed in the establishment of a new global economic 
system. The essence of the plan was, in the long term, to achieve a substantial multi-
lateral liberalisation of world trade and the elimination of all forms of international trade 
discrimination.6.34 Given the magnitude of distress and dislocation at the time and given 
the strength of the U.S. administration and the clarity of the objectives of U.S. Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull, planners were able to construct the framework necessary to implement 
the plan. The widespread belief that prospects for world peace would be enhanced through 
non-discriminatory trade practices also facilitated the institutional reconceptualisation of 
the post-war period.6•36 
Cordell Hull's liberal vision was articulated in the Havana Charter, the set of provi-
sions which were to form the basis of the proposed International Trade Organisation (ITO). 
Within the terms of the Charter, the sole exception to the general trade liberalisation ob-
jective was in the area of primary commodities. Interest in the stabilisation of primary 
commodities in the aftermath of the war was considerable. The special treatment of pri-
mary commodities including agriculture can, at least in part, be traced to the influence of 
e.33Robert G. Lewis, Deputy Administrator, Agricultural Stabilisation and Conservation Service, USDA. 
"Competitors and Cooperators in the Pricing of U.S. Wheats in Export Markets", paper given to the Third 
National Wheat Utilisation Research Conference, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Nov.5, 1964, 
p.4 
U4Robert E. Baldwin and David A. Kay, "International Trade and International Relations" in C. Fred 
Bengsten and Lawrence B. Krause eds. World Politic. and International Economic. (Washington D.C., The 
Brookings Institute, 1975), p.13 
e.uIbid, p.1l2. Alao see Robert D. Isaak, International Politicol Economy: Managing World Eco-
nomic Change, (Prentice-Hall International Inc., New Jersey, 1991), p.82-83, see also Berton E. HenninglOn, 
"United States Agricultural Trade and DeVelopment Policy During World War Two: The Role of the Office 
of Foreign Agricultural Relations", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Arkansas, 1981, pp.245-246. 
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.John Maynard Keynes who, in the early 1940's, urged the creation of a common fund to "fi-
nance buffer-stock price stabilisation for a range of primary commodities,,6.36. This special 
treatment of primary commodities is particularly significant given the large percentage of 
world trade it represented. In the years 1948, 1953 and 1958, trade in primary commodities 
as a percentage of world trade represented 55.5%, 51.0% and 48.2% respectively.6.37 Thus, 
although the ITO failed to come into force, the exceptionality of primary commodity prod-
ucts and particularly agricultural products had been formalised. Again, when the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) took over much of the international trade function 
intended for the ITO, agriculture was excluded.6.38 
6.6. Types of Agreements 
Before proceeding in the discussion of International Wheat Agreements, it would be useful 
to differentiate the various types of commodity arrangements that emerged in the immediate 
post-Havana Charter period. First, the 'export quota' type of agreement used as a basis for 
the International Sugar Agreement involves the establishment of a negotiated price range 
in combination with export quotas and production controls for major exporters in order 
to keep prices within agreed limits. Second, the 'buffer stock' type of agreement employed 
in the International Tin Agreement involves absorbing supplies in times of abundance, and 
releasing them in times of scarcity in order to moderate price fluctuations within an agreed 
range. Finally, the 'multilateral contract' type of agreement, which was employed in the 
post-war Wheat Agreements was distinctive in several respects. It involved the negotiation 
of a minimum and a maximum price, a commitment on the part of importing countries to 
purchase 'guaranteed' quantities of their imports from member exporters within the agreed 
US Christopher P. Brown, The PolitiaJl and Social Economy oj Commodity Control pp.2-3 
u7lnternational Financial Statistica, Dec. 1951 and Feb. 1960 in Joseph D. Coppoch, International 
Economic Inltability: The E:I:JH!rience after World War Two (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1962), 
p.37 
uSThis section taken from Corea, p.168. See also Christopher Brown, pp.2-4, Isaak, p.90 and Mark W. 
Zacher, "Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps, Regime Analysis and International Commodity Trade Regulation" 
in International Organilation, Spring 1987, Vol.U, No.2, p.179; also A.S. Friedberg, The United Nation. 
Conference on Trade and Development of 1964· The Theory of the Periphery Economy of the Centre oj 
International Political Dilcuuiom (Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1969) p.73 
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price range, and an undertaking was also made on the part of exporters to provide agreed 
quantities of the commodity at 'range' prices.6.39 
The commodity agreements that evolved during this time were each subject to a number 
of different political influences. The majority of the agreements involved the interests of 
producers (largely in developing nations) and consumers (largely in developed nations) 
and as such, were largely considered to be part of a development strategy.6.40 The wheat 
agreement, on the other hand, was biased in favour of the interests of producers in wealthy 
developed nations, which have long enjoyed special weight in the IWO and FAO forums.6.41 
The post-war wheat agreements allowed the United States in particular, to pursue its trade 
liberalisation policies without sacrificing the economic interests of its producers.6.4l 
6.7. The International Wheat Agreement (IWA) 1949 
As the first agreement to be successfully negotiated under the principles of the Havana 
Charter, the wheat agreements have remained one of the most enduring commodity ar-
rangements despite substantial changes to its formal aspects, and despite having many of 
its 'teeth' extracted along the way.6.43 In his comprehensive study, The Political and Social 
Economy of Commodity Control, Christopher P. Brown describes the wheat agreements as 
being the only global multilateral contract, and, as such, the one which served as a proto-
type for the multilateral contracts which were later proposed under UNCTAD's Integrated 
Program for Commodities.6.44 
The contractual nature of the early wheat agreements in part reflected the interface 
of interests and influences of the major exporters and importers, particularly the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The obligations of the importers and exporters 
UIIChristopher Brown, p.3, see also !WC File Ex (74/75) 2/2. p.4 
e.tOCorea p.168 Corea regards the marginalisation of commodity agreements (other than wheatO as a 
function of the dichotomy of producer venus consumer interests which emerged in the post-colonial era. 
u1Puchala and Hopkins in Krasner. p.76 
u2Henningson. p.245 
e.uChristopher Brown. p.6 
e.uIbid. p.6, see also Isaak. pp.91-95 
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were symmetrical in that aggregate contract quantity was equal for both groupS.6.45 Alan 
Henrikson describes the structure of the first IWA as having 'distrihuted' majorities, or COI\-
curring separate majorities of exporters and importers, thus balancing conflicting interests. 
This symmetry was first evident in 1948 when a special session of the International Wheat 
Council in Washington tabled the proposed terms of agreement for a post-war International 
Wheat Agreement. The proposal included maximum and minimum price provisions (based 
on No.1 Northern Manitoba), export quotas for the United States, Canada and Australia 
totalling 500m. bu. (13.6 m. tons) per year. This commitment was to apply only at the 
maximum price. The export commitment was to be met hy a corresponding commitment 
of thirty-five importing countries to purchase 500 m. bu. (13.6 m. tons), with a specific 
quantity allocated to each country. Minimum carry-over stocks were to be maintained at a 
level of 25 m. tons by Australia, 70 m. tons by Canada and 170 m. bu. by the United States. 
In addition, in the event that prices fell below the minimum, exporters and importers were 
to undertake building up additional reserves until prices rose above the minimum.6.46 Al-
though this agreement never came into being, it formed the basis of the 1949 agreement 
which, due to a renewed commitment by the United States was ratified by 38 countries 
in April 1949. Significant omissions to the signatories were Argentina and the USSR, the 
former disagreeing on maximum prices, the latter on its market share.6.47 
The objective of the agreement, as stated, was "to assure supplies of wheat in importing 
countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices" 
and, except for a lowering of the minimum price from $2.00 to $1.80 per bu., the pricing 
provisions were maintained. A more substantive change was applied to the reserve stock 
formulation. Specific quantities were replaced with a more generalised requirement by 
exporters to "endeavour to maintain stocks of old crop wheat at the end of its crop year at 
e.u Alan K. Henrikson, "The Global Foundations for a Diplomacy of Consensus" in Alan K. Henrikson 
ed., Negotiating World Order. The Arti,an,hip and Architecture oj Global Diplomacy (Delaware, Wilming-
ton, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986) p.241 
ue International Wheat Agreement, Washington 6 March 1948, Articles I - XXII 
e.uS.C. Herdson, "International Cooperation in Wheat" Paper presented to Seminar on Wheat, Uni-
versity of Manitoba, Feb.25, 1970; see also, International Journal oj Agrarian Affair" VoU, No.3 (London, 
Oxford University Press, Sept. 1949), pp.6-7. Although delegates were disappointed at the Argentinian 
refusal to join the Agreement, considerably more effort was taken in attempting to bring the USSR into the 
agreement. The USSR refused to compromise on its demands. 
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levels adequate to ensure that it will fulfil its guaranteed sales UlI<iN the Agreement in each 
subsequent crop year" .6.48 The reformulation of the reserve provisions of the IWA reflected 
the unwillingness of certain exporters, particularly A ustralia to commit to certain stock 
levels. 
The sustained willingness of Canada and the United States to share the burden of carry-
ing surplus stocks in the interest of market stabilisation compensated for this compromise,6.49 
In fact, the degree of Canadian-American cooperation in the wheat sector at this time 
was quite remarkable. The Canadian Wheat board (CWB) had established an office in 
Washington during the war at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, enabling the American 
government and the CWB to consult daily on issues relating to the Combined Food Board, 
the International Emergency Food Council as well as the International Wheat Agreement 
negotiations.6.5o With such strong support, the IWA of 1949 got off to a good start and 
successfully fulfilled its mandate. Figure 6.1 indicates the effectiveness of the IWA in main-
. . k t h 6.51 tammg mar e s ares. 
The fact that wheat was in short supply and that the maximum price throughout the 
term of the agreement was lower than the open market price certainly contributed to its 
success.6.52 Of greater significance, however, was the willingness and ability of the two 
major exporters to accept a loss of income in order to protect thE' politically influential 
producers from extreme price fluctuations. The memory of war and the depression deeply 
affected commitment to the Agreement and both countries had sufficient storage to maintain 
reserves adequate to ensure price stability. At this time "classical free trade models" clearly 
us International Wheat Agreement, Washington, April, 1949, Article I-VII 
u8D.J. Puchala and R.F. Hopkins, in Krasner p.77j see also Alex F. McCalla, "A Duopoly Model of 
World Wheat Pricing" in Journal 0/ Farm Economic, 48 (3)0 August 1966 p.719j and Theodore Cohn, The 
International Politic. of Agricultural 7rade: Canadian-American relation, in A global Agricultural conte:z:t 
(Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1990) p.69 
e.r.°Theodore Cohn. pp.58-67. The complexities of Canadian - American agricultural trade relations are 
explored in exhaustive detail in this study. 
u1IWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2. p.10 
e.r.2 IWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2/ p.10. During this time the average export price of the reference wheat in 
the open market exceeded the maximum price by amounts ranging from 19 to 51 centR. 
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Figure 6.1. The guaranteed and actual sales under the IWA for the first two 
crop years subsequent to the agreement indicate why the agreement, unlike 
earlier ones, held. 
August 1, 1949 - July 31, 1950 
























Source: FAO, Reconsidemtion of the Economics of the International Wheat Agrement, 
Sept. 1952, p.35 
did not apply.6.53 In fact, economic factors were not paramount as strategists attempted to 
encompass domestic realities as well as international economic and political goalS.6.114 
Ultimately, the high priority that the U.S. administration placed on the regulation of 
the grain market can be attributed to the dual objectives of security of supply and price 
stability, and by that standard the IWA must be judged a success. For the importers, the 
operation of the IWA was viewed differently, and strains on the Agreement were evident by 
the early 1950's. The IWA 1949 remained in effect until 1953; then with modifications it 
was renewed for another three year interval. 
The terms and structure of the agreement remained largely unchanged, but membership 
was less static. Total membership expanded from 43 in 1949 to 46 in 1952; however, the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom in 1953 proved to be very disruptive. As the world's 
largest commercial importer, the absence of the U.K. from the agreement from 1953 - 1959 
significantly demoralised the other participants and thus weakened the Agreement. The 
U.K.'s decision to withdraw from the Agreement was due to the rapidly changing market 
6,53 Alex McCalla, "Strategies in International Agricultural Marketing: Public vs Private Sectors", (Tus-
con, Arillona, Paper prepared for Symposium on International Trade and Agriculture, 17-29 April 1977), see 
also Alex McCalla "A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing" p.759 
e.uHenning80n. p.245 
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which in 195:J was characterised by rapidly growing surpluses and plummeting prices. Wheat 
was available more cheaply outside the Agreement and given the volume of the U .K.'s import 
. . h b' l' h' 6 55 reqUIrement, It was teo VIOUS po ICY C olce .. 
Given these market conditions, the U.K. sought greater food imports at stabilised prices 
through the use of long term contracts as an alternative approach to trade policy, and in 
1952, the U.K. had such contracts with 31 countries covering 22 food commodities.u6 The 
British failure to join the IWA of 1953 was the result of a minimal difference in purchase 
price of 5 cents per ton. However, the implications of this decision were substantial in terms 
of general confidence in the agreement and in terms of relations among member states. The 
very stability and security objectives of the Agreement were undermined as other members, 
including Brazil, Italy and Mexico, perceiving a two-tiered market ill wheat, wavered in their 
own ratification, thereby threatening the continuance of the agreement.6.1i7 The withdrawal 
of the U.K. also resulted in a sharp reduction of the guaranteed quantities pledged under the 
Agreement, further weakening its influence on the market. Perhaps even more disturbing 
was the trend to "fail to report transactions," and in 1953 only 53% of the actual trade 
between exporting and importing members was reported.6.li8 
Australia took the rather cynical view that "The United States and Canada can take 
care of the rest,,6.59 The perception that Canada and the United States should "take care of 
the rest" as expressed by the Australian delegate attested to the central role of the United 
States and Canada in the market, and, given their stock-holding policies and given their 
commitment to an agreement, it could be argued that they might well have performed 
U6This section was taken from Eric England, Agricultural Attache, London to State Department. June 
11, 1953 RG59 State Department 398. 2311/6 - 1153 (National Archives); also further explanation of U.K. 
position in FAD Commodity policy Study no. 3, The Long Term Contract (Rome; FAD, April 1953) and the 
Discussion in American Embassy, London to State Department. "Proposed Meeting on Wheat Agreement 
exporters; Background ILnd Further PlLIticulars" Feb. 15, 1954, RG 59 State DeplLrtment 398 - 22311.2 -
1554, National Archives. 
UIIFAD Commodity Policy Studies No.3 The Long Term Contract p.1; see also J.D. Gibson, Canada 
Economy in a Changing World (Toronto, Macmillan, 1948) pp. 168-169. The U.K. voiced ita reservations 
about the proposed IWA and its purposes for long term contracts as early as 1947. 
1I.57 Foreign Service Dispatch, American Embassy, London to the Department of State, Washington, Dec. 
14, 1953, 398-2311/12 - 1453 "Wheat Council Chairman, Informal Report to Exporter Members of Executive 
Committee 
uaIWC File Ex (74/75) 2.2. p.12. GUlLranteed quantities were reduced from 15.3 m. tons in 1949 to 
10.7 m. tons in 1954 
uliForeign Services Dispatch 398 - 2311/12 - 1483 
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a stabilising role - even in the absence of the Agreement. Primary documents suggest, 
however, that the importance ofthe Agreement in setting and maintaining norms cannot be 
overestimated, particularly pertaining to relations between the United States and Canada. 
A memorandum by a senior U.S. official indicates how influential the agreement was in 
determining policy. 
"In the negotiations with the Canadians concerning sharing of the re-
duction in the Wheat Agreement pool resulting from non-participation of 
the United Kingdom [in the 1953 renewal of the agreement], the United 
States sought to get the Canadians to take the greater part of the reduction, 
inasmuch as Canada, both under the old Agreement and previously, had 
held most of the U.K. market and would probably continue to hold it. The 
Canadians, while prepared to depart somewhat from a pro-rata reduction, 
would not meet the U.S. position. The Department of Agriculture finally 
accepted the Canadian proposition but in doing so indicated that it might 
have to take steps to make the United States competitive with Canada in the 
British market, which now was outside of the Agreement. The Canadians, 
however, doubtlessly felt they were doing all that could be expected of them 
in making a concession from the pro-rata principle in sharing reductions.,,6.60 
Having made the technical adjustments resulting from the U.K. withdrawal, producers 
again were forced to deal with problems of surpluses. 
6.B. Surpluses, Power and Foreign Policy 
With the immediate post-war food shortage crisis having been resolved, problems of surplus 
production were again being felt particularly in North America. The outbreak of the Korean 
war in June 1950 brought temporary relief, but an exaggerated response to this demand 
through production incentives resulted in burgeoning surpluses as early as 1952 and by 19.54 
the situation had reached critical proportions, particularly in the United States.IS•1S1 The 
maintenance of high acreage through the 1953 harvest, and a corresponding fall in export 
demand due to bumper crops in Europe exerted tremendous downward pressure on wheat 
prices and tested the holding capacity of both Canada and the U .S.6.1S2 
e.eoMemorandum, Mr. Highby to Mr. Alexandra, Dec. 2, 1953 RG 59 State Department Records, 398 
_ 2311/6 - 115 (National Archives), Washington. 
l1.li1 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada Sin~ 1945 (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1981, Revised Edition 1989) pp. 122-125 
l1.li2 The World Wheat Situation and the International Wheat Agreement (London, IWe, 1954) p.3 
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The strained relations between the two were exacerbat(ld in 1954 when the U.S. passed 
the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act (PL 480) as a means of disposing of 
surpluses on both a concessional and commercial basis. Canada and the other exporters, un-
able to even contemplate adopting such costly price support and surplus disposal measures 
were consequently displaced from a number of their traditional markets.6 •63 
Although the U.S. did demonstrate at least some degree of restraint to limit the back-
lash, the impact on the functioning of the IWA was considerable. It not only intensified 
the strained relations among exporters, but its also established a concessional basis for 
a considerable proportion of its exports, thus circumventing the quota limitations of the 
Agreement. In doing so, the United States undermined the ability of the Agreement to 
fulfil its objectives.6 .64 The degree to which PL 480, rather than more stringent produc-
tion control; was used to resolve the surplus problem distorted the balance which had been 
established between exporters and importers, and possibly more importantly among the ex-
porters. Growing international concern over surplus grain stock accumulation was addressed 
in various FAO conferences. These discussions led to the adoption of the FAO Principle of 
Surplus Disposal (1954) and later the establishment of the FAO Grains Group.6.65 While 
acknowledging the "delicate" nature of the world market equilibria which could be dispro-
portionately upset by marginal surpluses, the conferences made recommendations relating 
to national production policies, grain reserves and food aid to alleviate the problem.6 .66 
With regard to the IWA, the report stressed that the agreement provided an inter-
national institutional basis "through which national programs could be coordinated". It 
concluded, however, that the greatest weakness of the agreement was that it covered less 
than one half of the world trade in 1954, and "although it had succeeded in providing a good 
measure of stability to the market, this stability would be much enhanced if the proportion 
1I.IIITheodore Cohn. pp.34-38 
l1.li. A recon.idenation of the Economic. of the International Wheat Agreement FAO Commodity Policy 
Studies No. 1. Rome, September 1952) p.1 This study concludes that the efficacy of the agreement in 
attaining its objectives is dependent on the degree to which participating countries succeeded in bringing a 
reasonably high proportion of their normal transactions within the scope of the Agreement. 
l1.li11 The Stabili.ation of International Trade in Grain.: An Aueument of Problem. and Pouible Solu-
tion, FAO Commodity Policy Studies QO (Rome, 1910) 
l1.li11 Gerda Blau, Di.po.al of Agricultural Surplu,e., FAO Commodity Policy Studies, No.5, (FAO, Rome, 
June 1954) 
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of trade covered by the agreement was increased and reported."6.67 The proportion of trade 
covered by the Agreement in fact continued to decrease as trade under concessional terms 
increased. 
6.9. The International Wheat Agreement 1956 
The renewal of the IWA in 1956 was marked by the return of Argentina and the addition of 
Sweden. The provisions of this Agreement were unchanged from the preceding agreement 
except that the maximum and minimum prices were set slightly lower at $2.00 and $1.50 
respectively.6.68 Conditions both within the agreement and the market generally deterio-
rated during the life of this agreement. Although price levels were maintained, guaranteed 
quantities fell further to 8m tons in each of the three years despite the fact that the actual 
trade among members remained at roughly 16.4m tons annually. Recorded transactions 
also declined to 5.4m tons or approximately 16% of world trade.6.69 
This progressive internal weakening of the Agreement reflected the growing dissatis-
faction among members with the rigidity of the system as variations in crop yields made 
restrictive import quantities impractical. 
6.10. The International Wheat Agreement 1959 
The rigidity inherent in the IWA was addressed in the 1959 negotiations and a somewhat 
modified form of the multilateral contract agreement was adopted thus allowing the United 
Kingdom to rejoin the Agreement.6.70 Problems of quantity guarantees and the reporting 
of transactions which had restricted IWA trade in the early agreements were dealt with in 
the broadened objectives of the IWA 1959, which was designed: 
(i) to promote the expansion of the international trade in wheat and wheat-flour and 
to secure the freest possible flow of this trade in the interests of both exporting and 
importing countries; 
tUll "Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses" Extract from the Report of the 23rd Session of the FAO Com-
mittee on Commodity Problems, Rome, 3-11 June, 1954, pp.26-32 
u'IWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2, p.l3 
uiIWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2, p.13, chart. 
8. 7°FAO Commodity Policy Studies #20, p.l8. See also Theodore Cohn, p.68 and IWO File Ex (74/75) 
2/2, p.lS 
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(ii) to overcome the serious hardship caused to producers and consulllcrs by burdensome 
surpluses and critical shortages of wheat; 
(iii) to encourage the use and consumption of wheat and wheat-flour, and in particular, 
so as to improv(' health and nut.rition, ill countries wlJ{'re the possibility of increased 
consumption exists; and 
(iv) in general to further international cooperation in connection with world wheat prob-
lems, recognising the relationship of the trade in wheat to the economic stability of 
markets for other agricultural products.6.11 
The multilateral wheat contracts as they existed after 1959 abandoned the concept of 
guaranteed quantities in favour of having importing countries undertake to purchase from 
exporting members a specified percentage of its total commercial requirements at prices 
within the range. This undertaking was to apply throughout the price range, not only at 
the minimum price level. Exporters undertook to satisfy the commercial requirements of 
the importer and in the event that the maximum price level is reached, the percentage 
obligations were lifted, leaving importers free to obtain commercial requirements from any 
exporter.6.n 
This dramatic departure in the modus operandi of previous agreements was specifically 
designed to include various categories of non-commercial transactions, that is the conces-
sional transactions largely promoted through PL 480.6.13 The extensive use of government 
assisted programs, long-term credit arrangements, barter and gifts, enabled the U.S. to alle-
viate the pressure of massive surplus accumulation while furthering foreign policy objectives 
relating to communist "containment" and generally expanding its sphere of influence.6.14 
Figure 6.2 details the changing structure of wheat exports. 
This new factor, the dramatic increase in the use of special transactions, was addressed 
in Article 3 of the 1959 and 1962 IWA and the scope of IWA transactions was expanded to 
include: 
(a) sales on credit or non-commercial terms through government intervention; 
e.7l As quotation in paragraph 30, IWA, 1959 
e.72 International Wheat Agreement, 1959 
e.73 "Trade Agreements Involving Wheat 1962/63 to 1965/66" International Wheat Council Secretariat 
Paper #7 (London, IWC, 1969), p.9 
e.HDan Morgan, Merchanb of Grain, (New York, Penguin Books, 1986) p.146-147 
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Figure 6.2. Wheat: Structure of Exports 
49/50- 53/54- 56/57- 59/60- 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69" 
52/53 55/56 58/59 61/62 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69" 
percentage 
Commercial exports 
Argentina 12 15 12 9 7 7 12 18 8 4 8 
Australia 7 11 11 20 18 19 19 13 17 19 15 
Canada 32 35 35 36 35 37 34 33 33 23 23 
France 2 9 6 7 12 7 13 11 7 12 17 
United States 39 10 20 21 12 22 12 18 24 23 18 
Others 8 20 16 7 16 8 10 7 11 19 19 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total ('000 tons) 25820 22236 21600 24100 25900 4100 34600 4300 40800 36300 33735 "Preliminary 
Total Exports 
Argentina 12 13 8 6 4 5 8 13 6 3 6 
Australia 7 9 8 13 12 14 13 10 14 14 12 
Canada 32 29 26 23 22 27 24 25 28 18 20 
France 2 8 4 5 8 5 9 88 6 9 14 
United States 39 29 41 45 43 42 39 39 38 42 33 
Others 8 12 13 8 11 7 7 5 8 14 15 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total ('000 tons) 25820 25853 31043 38097 40240 55170 50275 59460 52820 49165 43690 
Source: International Wheat Council, War'" Wheat Stati6t1c6 (IWC, London) p.23 
(b) sales financed by bans by the government of the exporting country and tied to the 
purchase of wheat; 
(c) sales for the currency of the importing country, neither freely transferable nor con-
vertible; 
(d) sales under trade agreements with special payments arrangements which include 
clearing accounts for settling credit balances bilaterally through the exchange of 
goods, except where the exporting country and the importing country concerned 
agree that the sale shall be regarded as commercial; 
(e) barter transactions other than at world prices and other than "open-end" barter, 
the latter being those in which the country of final destination was not named in 
the original barter contract; 
(f) gifts of wheat or grants for the purchase of wheat; and 
(g) other categories of transactions that include features introduced by the government 
of a country concerned which do not conform with usual commercial practices, as 
the International Wheat Council may prescribe. 
In addition to this categorisation of special transactions, commercial transactions were 
also classified to include: 
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(a) barter at world prices and also "open-end" barter; 
(b) U.S. sales under the C.C.C. credit terms; 
(c) arrangements on commercial terms of credit wheth('1' und<'f formal agreem('nt or 
not; and 
(d) arrangements providing for access to markets including commitments to purchase a 
specified quantity of wheat or flour or to maintain trade in these commodities at a 
stabilised level, but where trade is on normal commercial terms. 
Through these amendments to the IWA 1959, the propensity to conduct transactions 
outside the Agreement was effectively curtailed. In fact, as Figure G.2 indicates the volume 
of "special transactions" exports (as defined by the IWA) by the six major exporters rose 
from 14.3 m. tons in 1957/58 - 1960/61 to 19.7 m. tons in 1962/63 - 1965/66. However, as 
a percentage of total exports, these transactions declined from 78.9% to 70.1% in the same 
. . d 6.76 time peno . 
6.11. The Changing Market 
In addition to policy-induced changes in the international grain trade as in the emergence 
of concessional sales, the market experienced fundamental changes throughout this period. 
Exports of grain rose from an average of 40 Ill. tons in 1949/50 - 1953/54 to 106 m. tons 
in 1965/66, primarily as a result of improved farm techniques and production stimulation 
in North America. Markets changed as well. Europe, after recovery, receded as a major 
market area while Japan's requirements grew to account for 10% of world grain imports by 
1966. Communist countries, once major exporters, accounted for 20% of world imports by 
1966. Developing countries, perhaps influenced by PL - 480 turned increasingly to grain and 
by 1966 also accounted for 20% of imports.6 .T6 The major exporters remained the United 
States, Canada, Australia and Argentina, lending stability to the market. 
In redefining the terms of the IWA in 1959 to meet the altered world market, member 
states, but particularly the exporters, demonstrated their commitment to the continued 
e·TI>IWO File ex (74/75) 2/2 p.9. The six leading exporters Argentina, Australia, Canada, France and 
the U.S .. collectively accounted for over 94% of world wheat exports in 1962/63 - 1965/66 average. 
e.7e The .tabili.!cation of International Trade in Grain.!: An Aueument 0/ Problem.! and Po .. ible Solu-
tioRl. (FAO, Rome, 1970). pp.2-4 
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viability of the IWA. Again, despite significant market turbulence, the price range was 
maintained although a rise in the last year brought prices to within 2~ cents of the maximum. 
Poor harvests in 1961/62 drew surplus stocks down from an average of 59 m. tons to 9.2 
m. tons.6.11 The ability of the exporters to adapt to even substantial production variation 
without breaking the price limits again demonstrates the strong commitment particularly of 
Canada and the United States in maintaining the Agreement. In assessing the effectiveness 
of the IWA 1959, the Council in 1962, acknowledged this producer cooperation. 
"These exporting countries have thus exercised a measure of export con-
trol and in effect have operated voluntary buffer stocks .,. if it can be 
assumed that the major exporting countries ... will continue to incur the 
financial costs of such policies, it would seem unnecessary to make formal 
provisions for stock-holding or the control of exports through quotas."6.18 
6.12. The International Wheat Agreement 1962 
The success of the 1959 IWA and tightened market conditions were evident in the adoption 
of the 1962 Agreement which was essentially a continuation of the previous agreement but 
included an increase in the maximum price of 12.5 cents bringing it to $2.02l.6.19 the 
U.S.S.R. also joined the Agreement in 1962 as an exporting member. The 1960's, however, 
were to bring new challenges to the Agreement. Continued growth in world trade brought 
the many dislocations so often associated with rapid trade expansion. More problematic was 
the significant divergence in trade patterns which was developing between the two major 
exporters, the United States and Canada. As Table 6.1 reveals, the bulk of U.S. exports 
were being traded on a concessional basis while the bulk of Canadian exports were traded 
on a commercial basis.6.80 In response to the U.S. surplus disposal program, Canada, as we 
have seen, moved to take advantage of markets which for ideological reasons, were closed 
to the U.S., notably the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, especially in 1962/63.6.81 
e.77World Wheat Statistics - see also IWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2 p.17 
e.7l International Wheat Council Executive Committee Report, 1962 
e.1l1The Stabilisation of International Trade in Grains, FAO, 1970, p.19 
e.aoInternational Wheat Council, Sectional Paper no.7. pp. 9-10 
e·I1International Wheat Council, World Wheat Stati.tic. In 1962/63 Canada sold 2.9 m. tons to the 
U.S.S.R. and 1.8 m. tons to China. Australia also conducted sizeable transactions with China. 
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The U.S. responded in May 1963 by suspending the Ministerial Trade Committee's quar-
terly Meeting on Wheat and Related Matters.6.8l Although Canadian and American officials 
met in April and June 1964 to review bilateral consultation procedures, and consulted again 
during the Kennedy Round negotiations, the communist sales in 1962-63 marked a turn-
ing point in the successful operation of the duopoly, and by implication, the IWA. The 
United States, increasingly preoccupied with expanding its commercial transactions, was 
both less sympathetic to Canadian complaints,6.83 and more aware of the growing problem 
of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) in international cereal markets.6 .B4 The 
ratification of the Common Agriculture Policy in January 1962, was viewed by the U.S. as 
having profound implications for their market position in terms of lost sales. More gener-
ally, the antagonism between the U.S. and E.E.C. carne to dominate the Kennedy Round 
negotiations of the GATT.6.85 
The simultaneous weakening of the Canada-U.S. duopoly and the emergence of the 
E.E.C. as a power in the international grain market confirmed the divergence of interests 
which had developed among the exporters and the adoption of a more unilateral and ag-
gressive approach to trade policy.6.B6 Yet, despite the growing tensions among the major 
exporters, the sudden tightening of the market as a result of the communist sales brought 
them to work together again in the interest of market stability. Through daily consulta-
tions between the United States and Canada, the IWA price range was maintained, although 
prices came within 10 cents of the maximum.6.87 In assessing the capability of the IWA 
to deal with such unusual market activity, the Agreement was credited with providing "a 
U2Theodore Cohn. p.65. The Ministerial Trade Committee was established in Jan. 1959 to conduct 
quarterly meetings of wheat experts from both countries to discuss questions relating to U.S. surplus disposal 
program and other trade expansion issues, and was valued as a forum in which adverse effects of national 
policies could be aired. p.60 
US Ibid. p.65 
6,UFrans A.M. Alting von Geusau ed. Economic relatiofU After the Kennedy Round (Tilburg, The 
Netherlands, A.W.S. Hoff-Leyden, 1969). p.36 
UliIbid. p.16 
u6lbid. p.175. Discusaion held at the International Colloquium on KAtlantic Relations after The 
Kennedy Round" Dec. 1967, concluded that the increased tension in agricultural trade rdations and the 
actual suspension of the general committee meetings on agriculture during the round were a function of 
domestic policies which were distorting international trade. 
u1IWC File Ex (74/75) 2/2 p.18 and (Confidential Source) Letter to The Hon. Orville Freeman 
Secretary of Agriculture from Mitchell Sharp Minister of Finance, Jan. 8, 1964 
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framework within which appropriate action could be taken to deal with these problems, and 
it is open to doubt whether without it such orderly conditions would have prevailed."e.aa 
Although consultations among the major exporters were essential to the maintenance of 
market stability under such conditions,6.89 the underlying reason for the astonishing re-
siliency of the market was the existence of carryover blocks of 55 m tons, an amount 
sufficient to absorb the shock without disrupting commercial trade.6.90 The market did 
tighten sufficiently that both governments felt "heavy" pressure from overseas buyers lead-
ing them to establish a committee to study the underlying problems in the wheat market. 
The U.S. proposed that the IWA 1962 set to expire July 31, 1965 be extended by protocol 
for one to two years pending the conclusion of the Kennedy Round. 6.91 Given the failure 
of the agricultural talks of the Kennedy Round, relations among exporters continued to de-
teriorate through the duration of the Agreement. Sluggish markets heightened competition 
as was evident in the battle for the new Chinese market as France pushed for increased 
subsidies in order to compete with Australia and Canada.6.92 
French complaints received little sympathy, and generally, the B.B.C. was increasingly 
ostracised by the other exporters. At a meeting in Washington in Dec. 1964, Canada, 
Argentina and Australia met with U.S. representatives to discuss the problems of E.E.C. 
import levies, IWA exports to Communist countries and other issues relating to commer-
cial sales. The U.S. admitted to having considered inviting France, but did not.6.93 The 
Washington discussions, while not reaching any agreement, exposed the extent of the dis-
tress on the market.6 .94 The meetings also revealed the U.S. resolve to increase its volume 
e·&8International Wheat Council, Annual Report, 1963/64, London. 
e.slITheodore Cohn, p.68 
8.II°IWC File (74/75) 2/2 p.18, 
e.1I1(confidential source) Letter to the Hon. Orville Freeman Secretary of Agriculture, Washington from 
Mitchell Sharp "The Canadian - United States Wheat controversy, Jan 8, 1964, File 37-15-Wheat-Vol.l. 
Reply: To Hon. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Dept. of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa From: Orville L. 
Freeman Jan 31, 1964. (confidential source) Telegram, Washington D.C. May 25, 1965 To external 1980 
priority "International Wheat Agreement" 
8.112(confidential BOurce) File 37-15-Wheat-l 35/6 Telegram To: External 543 purity from: Emb. Paria 
"French Wheat Exports China" 
e.1I3(Confidential Source) File 37-15 Wheat 35/6 To External 545 Priority From Tand C OR Oct. 29, 
1964, see also Transcript of Pre88 conference given by Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce, 
Canadian Embassy, Washington D.C., Dec. 18, 1964. 
8.11. Ibid, Transcript 
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of commercial sales - regardless of price. The U.S. was no longE'r content with its rolE' 
as residual supplier in the commercial wheat markE't, and given its surprisingly low sharE' 
of the commercial market, their position was certainly defensible (See table 6.1). Given 
the concurrent rise in the balance of payments problem, this resentment became illtE'nse.6.95 
The following chart (Table 6.2) indicates how the U.S. could perceive that Canada benefited 
most from the IWA. 
Figure 6.3. U.S. and Canadian Shares of World Wheat Exports 
1953/4 1959/60 bf 1962/3 1964/5 
Commercial 
Canada 35 36 3.5 34 
U.S. 10 21 12 12 
Total Exports 
Canada 29 23 22 24 
U.S. 29 45 43 39 
Source: Theodore Cohn, p.70. 
Canada recognised that the continuation of the agreement was very much in its interest 
and private Canadian documents reveal clearly that Canada hoped to maintain the essential 
qualities of the agreement.6.96 Canada appealed for the maintenance of market stability to 
the U .S.;6.97 however, Canadian-American relations had become increasingly strained by 
the Vietnam War.6.9B Another relevant by-product of the Vietnam War was the increased 
pressure on the U.S. balance of payments, which in turn was reflected in a decreased commit-
ment to multilateral initiatives and the increased disposition to adopt unilateral approaches 
to trade policy formulation. Aggressiveness in the pursuit of commercial objectives of U.S. 
grain export policy thus increased, as the balance of payments problems which began in til(' 
early 1960's became chronic by the late 1960'S.6.99 
1I.IIiTheodore Cohn. pp. 65-70 
11.1111 Jon McLin, "Surrogate International Organisation and the Cue of World Food Security, 1948-1969" 
1I.IIT(confidential source File 37-15-Wheat-l Vol. Sharp to Pearson, Jan 8,1964, (This theme wu further 
developed in a private interview with the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, January 1994, Ottawa) 
8.111 John English, The Worldly Yearl; The Biography of uder Pear.on, Vol. II, 1949-1971, (Toronto, 
Knopf Canada, 1992) 
(1.1111 J. Edelmae Spero, The Politic. of International Economic Relatiom, 3rd ed. (New York, Maitins, 
1985) pp. 42-53; see also David H. Blake and Robert S. Walkers, The Politic. of Global Economic Relation., 
3rd ed. (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., 1987) pp. 65-67 in Theodore Cohn, p.21. In addition to 
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The future of the IWA was dealt a decisive blow in ,January 19()5, when USDA's chief 
economist John Schnitlken publicly questioned the value of the IWA to the U .S.6.1oo AI-
though the IWA continued until March 1969, commitment to the terms and spirit of the 
Agreement dwindled after this period. Despite the now open dissatisfaction with the Agree-
ment and the continued fall in prices, the U.S. ratified the agreement for one more year 
stating that ~it was in the best interests of the U.S. to support the international price 
stability that the Agreement promotes ... , and that it would be good for foreign rela-
tions generally.,,6.101 Although the problems with the Agreement were particularly acute 
in sluggish markets, the need for cooperation, particularly when the alternatives were con-
templated, continued to be accepted by some analysts. One trade specialist argued that: 
"Cooperation among wheat growers, therefore, to achieve stable and sat-
isfactory prices and a satisfactory balance between production and market 
demand is broader than domestic programs. If satisfactory solutions are to 
be found to the problems facing wheat growers, domestic programs must 
mesh with the pattern of international cooperation among growers in other 
countries as well.,,6.102 
Despite the deplorable market conditions and despite the fact that the major exporters 
routinely broke the IWA minimum price after 1966, farmers remained extremely anxious at 
the prospect of a possible withdrawal from the IWA. In a very strongly worded letter from 
the President of the National Farmers Union to President Lyndon Johnson, the point was 
made: 
"International trade in wheat must not he allowed to revert to a form of 
economic warfare. American wheat farmers must not again be abandoned 
to all of the international trade problems which led to the negotiation of the 
present International Wheat Agreement."6.103 
export promotion the U.S. alao restricted foreign investment and tied foreign aid in order to improve the 
balance of payments problems. , 
11.100 Journal of Commerce Jan 7, 1965. These remarks were prepared for the annual convention of the 
National Association of Wheat Growers. 
II.I0l(confidential source) File 37-15-Wheat. Vol. 2 6.2.65 - 31.8.66, Telegram from Washington D.C. 
Feb. 25/65, To External 612 "Speech by Secretary Freeman" 
11.102 Address made by Irwin R. Hedges, Agricultural Trade Specialist at the Annual Conventions of the 
National Association of Wheat Growers, Dec.15, 1968, Lincoln, Nebrsska. 
II.I03Letter To: The Honourable Lyndon B. Johnson, The President of the United States, The White 
House, Washington D.C., Dec.22, 1966, From: Tony T. Deckart, President, National Farmers Union. 
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In the end, a compromise was reached. The administrative provisions of the IWA were 
extended for one year to July 31, 1968, while the substantive issues were left - pending 
the conclusion of the Kennedy Round. As no agreement was reached during the Round, 
an International Grains Conference was convened in Rome, 12 July 1967, which negotiated 
the International Grains Agreement, 1967 (IGA). 
6.13. The International Grains Agreement (IGA) 1967 
The negotiations for the IGA were difficult in that there was little consensus on the form the 
new arrangement should take, and in fact, commitment to the process was questionable.6. 104 
The IGA ultimately took the form of two separate instruments linked by a common pream-
ble. The Wheat Trade Convention, 1967 was the 'successor' to the previous agreements, and 
the Aid convention, 1967 which, for the first tinw, formally addressed the issue of food aid. 
A Food Aid Committee was struck composed of six contributing states and six recipient 
states, for the purpose of developing guidelines for and exercising supervision of the opera-
tions of the food aid programme, and more generally all non-commercial transactions.S•1011 
The Wheat Trade Convention maintained the multilateral contract format, but important 
changes were introduced. The reference wheat in price setting was changed from No. 1 
Manitoba Northern to U.S. Hard Red Winter No.2 due to its longer growing season. A 
Price Review Committee was also established with power to adjust temporarily minimum 
and maximum prices should market conditions warrant it. Import and export commitments 
were maintained and guidelines for concessional transactions were introduced.s.106 Despite 
the additional flexibility offered in these amendments, the spirit of cooperation among the 
producers was lost. The U.S.S.R. and Brazil withdrew from the IGA.6. 107 
Depressed market conditions and aggressive export policies by all major producers un-
dermined the Arrangement from the beginning. The U.S. pressed for new, lower minimum 
e.l°'(confidential source) File 37-1S-Wheat/Vol. 6, Jan I, 1968 - 8.3;68. Exporters were contemplating 
a separate meeting for exporters only. 
e.lo·Commentary of International Wheat Agreement 1962 as it is affected by the Memorandum of 
Agreement, 19th May, 1967. This commentary served as a guideline during the 1967 negotiation. p.5 and 
Annex J. 
e.1oe Ibid. 
e.l07IWC File Ex (74/7S) 2/2. p.20 
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prices almost immediately and by January J 968 the five major exporters were selling below 
the IGA minimums scheduled to corne into effect July 1, 1968.6.108 Mounting surpluses 
continued to depress the market throughout the year, forcing exporters to continue selling 
below minimum prices and to resort increasingly to concessional sales to help absorb the 
surplus.6 .109 
Despite the problems experienced under the IGA there was "no doubt that it resulted 
III a very considerable degree of restraint in pricing policies and that it had provided a 
good deal of stability to the wheat market which would otherwise have been absent.6.110 
Although price limits were undermined after 1966, it was never by more than 10 cents, and 
given the external or domestic producer, and budgeting pressures, the influence of the IGA 
. I I' d' bl 6.111 pnce eve s IS un ema e. 
By 1968 the unique circumstances that had held the International Wheat Agreements 
together had ended. The effects of World War II, the rise of the Cold War and even memories 
of the Depression had led producers - and consumers - to believe that their common 
interests would be served by regulation of the international grain trade. By the late 1960's, 
the perception of common interests had disappeared. Exporters aggressively competed for 
markets, as levels of production ran well beyond effective demand, and importers used the 
sluggish markets to their advantage, further undermining the spirit of cooperation. 
American commitment to the IGA and cooperation generally was further reduced with 
the election of Richard M. Nixon in November 1968. This administration was marked by 
aggressive unilateral trade policies and an increased willingness to link wheat sales to foreign 
policy objectives.6.11~ The U.S. was not alone. Increased aggressiveness in the grain trade 
e.108(confidential source) File 37.15, Wheat-1, Vol.6 "Implementation of the International Grains Ar-
rangement - Canada, U.S.A. Meeting of Officials, Washington, Jan. 12, 1968,. This meeting presented 
a very pessimistic market outlook by the U.S. and revealed the extent of domestic pressure to relieve the 
surplus problem. 
!I.108(Confidentialsource) File 37.15, Wheat-I, VoLll, 1/2/69-15/3/69, Memorandum for the Minister, 
March 6, 1969, "International Wheat Developments". 
e.11o(Confidential source) File 37.15, Wheat-1, Vo1.12, 16/3/69-30/4/69 Fmi ITANDC London to 
Schwartzman, March 18/69, Restricted Ref: MYTEL TC/243 
e.111(confidentialsource) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.13, 1/5/69-30/6/69, Canada-U.S.A. Joint Ministerial 
meeting, June 20/69 "Agricultural Matters - Grain" 
e.112 John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1982), 
p.163-164 
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was characteristic of all major exporters of this time. Australia justified its breaking of 
the price minimum by citing its high freight charges and demanded concessions on its IGA 
minimum to offset these changes.6 . ll3 Canada also pursued wheat sales to the United Arab 
Republic on the basis of concessionary credit arrangements and continued to conduct other 
sales at below minimum prices. The E.E.C. publicly supported the IGA price minimum, but 
when coupled with its export subsidy system, the E.E.C. was able to price competitively 
in all markets and expanded its sales significantly at this time.s,u • Thus, while publicly 
supporting cooperation in principle, each of the major exporters pursued aggressive export 
policies while blaming the others for undercutting prices. Industry leaders also exerted 
pressure on producers to eliminate the minimum price.6 . u5 
In an attempt to head off an all out price war, the producers met in April 1969 in 
Washington to discuss possible adjustments to national policies, particularly production 
controls, expanded credit facilities and the lowering of price minima. In the absence of 
effective action following the producers' meeting, Robert McNamara, addressing the V.S. 
House Agricultural Committee, suggested that "pricing arrangements should never have 
been part of the Agreement and to meet the present situation fundamental changes in 
these provisions were now needed. He added that there seemed to be no way to persuade 
Australia to alter their procedures. France continued to undercut prices in sales to Taiwan 
and Canada has also been selling on concessionary terms.6 . llS Given these circumstances 
the V.S. suggested in June 1969 that "the best course of action was to suspend pricing 
provisions of IGA under Article 111."6.117 The E.E.C. and Australia strongly opposed the 
e.1l3 (confidential source) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.12, 16/3/69-30/4/69, telegram to: External: Ottawa 
From Canberra; Action copy, Our tel. 355 March 14, Your tel. 374 March 18, "IGA Wheat Pricing". Claiming 
that an arrangement operated inequitably Australia stated that "unless this is resolved it will be difficult to 
work toward resolution of IGA minimum price levels." 
fI.llt(confidential BOurce) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.12, 16/3/69-30/4/69, Memorandum - Wheat Pricing 
_ International Grains Arrangement. March 28/69, Confidential "Meeting of Exporters", Washington, 3-4 
April, 1969. 
o·11Ii(confidential BOurce) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.12, 16/3/69-30/4/69, Washington DC, April 17/69, 
Confidential to External 1358 IGA Exporter Meeting. The U.S. was perceived to be under strong pressure 
from wheat industry leaders to lower minimum prices. 
e·l1fI(confidential BOurce) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.13, 1/5/69-30/6/69, From Washington May 30/69, 
Confidential to: External 1888 Immed. "IGA Wheat Pricing" 
e.1l7(confidential source) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.13, 1/5/69-30/6/69 From: Industry Trade and Com-
merce to External 2768,·June 23/69 "Meeting of Wheat Exporters Concluded Today" 
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suspension and Australia offered to step aside to allow t.ht, U.S. market to f('cover. The 
U.S. did not consider that this offer altered conditions sufficiently 1.0 reconsider .6.118 
In the aftermath of the U.S. declaration, all-out competition was the order of the day. 
Traditional markets were no longer respected and trade pa.tterns changed.6.119 A warning 
was sounded by Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, in a letter 
to U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, in which he stated that the situation had become 
acute "and I fear that we are now on the brink of a chain reaction which we will live to 
regret," .6.1~O Mr. Sharp's words were more prophetic than was realised at the time. Despite 
such concerns, surplus disposal remained the imperative of all producers and the importing 
states continued to reap the benefits of the sluggish market even to the point of playing one 
exporter off against another.6.131 By December 1969 the U.S. ended any formal commitment 
to regulate the IGA,6.13~ adopting instead a fully unilateral approach to its wheat policy. 
In anticipation of the formal expiration of the IGA in July 1971, the exporters con-
ducted an assessment of the deficiencies of the IGA and concluded that three factors were 
paramount. 
(1) The inadequacy of pricing provisions relating to new members wheat (import('rs 
ignore IGA price range). 
(2) The absence of a mechanism to ensure exporters participate equitably. 
(3) The absence of any provision relating to production management. 
This meeting also introduced the E.E.C. proposal that coarse grains be included in any 
future agreement.6.1~3 
6. llS Ibid. 
e.llll(confidential source) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vo1.l4, Meeting with Mr. J. McEwen, Deputy Prime 
Minister Australia and Canadian Minister for Trade and Industry. Argentinian protests over Canadian sales 
to Peru was just one example. 
6.120 (confidential source) From Ottawa to Washington, July 25,1969. telegram #G-216 Ourtel G-217. 
In a private interview Jan. 1994, Mr. Sharp reflected that having lived through the depression, the proposal 
of unregulated markets was very disturbing. The underlying problem was the inability of producers to 
effectively manage production. 
S.121 (confidential Bource) File 37-15-Wheat-l VoU7 memorandum Sept. 25/69 'Wheat Policy Meeting, 
Brussels, Oct. 2-3" (confidential source) File 27-15-Wheat-l VoU7. 
e.122Fm: Washington D.C. Dec., 12/69 To: Externai4036 "IGA Renegotiation and U.S.A. Farm Policy" 
8·12~(confidentiai source) File 37-15-Wheat-l Vol. 19 To: External April 4, 1970 To Washington and 
others Tel. # ECL-624 
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Although the IGA remained in existence and a negotiating conference was convened by 
UNCTAD in Geneva in early 1971, the IGA had dearly been unsuccessful in maintaining 
orderly marketing and any stabilisation that did exist had been brought about through bilat-
eral consultations rather than the yet unused mechanisms embodied in the Convention,6.124 
The conference ultimately agreed on a three year extension of the administrative provisions 
of the IGA. The impasse between Canada and the U.S. on references wheat, and the more 
general impasse between the U.S. and other exporters rendered an agreement with pricing 
provisions an impossibility at the time.6 .125 
Consequently the International Wheat Agreement, 1971 which came into being in July, 
1971 was very different from its predecessors. Composed of two conventions, the Wheat 
Trade Convention and The Food Aid Conventions, the IWA 1971 assumed a role that was 
largely advisory. New features included the establishment of an Advisory Sub-Committee 
on Market conditions whose function was to keep market conditions under constant review, 
and the provision for members to proceed to a more substantive agreement if desirable. The 
dramatic and unprecedented events of 1972/73 and 1973/74 precluded any such possibility. 
A disastrous crop shortfall in the U.S.S.R. in 1972 resulted in the unexpected purchase 
of 17 m. tons bringing world trade levels to 67 m. tons. Total carryover stocks for the 
five leading exporters were drawn down to 28.8 m. tons - the lowest level in 21 years. 
"Prices, far from repeating their stability in the rather similar events of the mid-sixties, 
nearly doubled during the crop year." The following year, 1973/74, prices climbed even 
faster despite reduced Soviet demand and increased wheat production, and by February 
1974 the export price of wheat was over $6 per bu. 
External factors such as the world energy crisis, the uncertain international monetary 
situation and "explosive" growth in the cost of most commodities all contributed to the 
tI.12t(confidential source) File 37-Wheat-l-Vo1.22 "Conference Summary" see also IWC File Ex (74/15) 
2/2. p.22 
8.12r.Ibid. Conference Summary 
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world-wide economic crisis.6 •126 These events, while proving disastrous for developing coun-
tries were very beneficial to grain exporters. Given the opportunity to finally he able to 
command prices well beyond their expectations, there was little interest in any form of 
regulation. Any questions relating to the IWA were deferred to the Tokyo Round of the 
GATT which was convened in 1973, but did not in fact begin negotiations until 1977.6 . 127 
Mounting concern for world food security, however, led to the convening of the World Food 
Conference in November 1974. The IWA was extended by protocol for one year until 1st 
July 1975. 
The World Food Conference and the work of the IWC from 1974 - 1978 in examining 
options for the replacement of the lapsed economic provision of the IWA, and particularly 
the provision for buffer stocks, will be the subject of Chapter 7, therefore it will not be 
detailed here. The subsequent negotiations held under the auspices of the UNCTAD 1978-
79 were ultimately suspended over differences relating to price and stock levels, and the 
"unwavering stand taken by the E.C. on the inclusion of coarse grains used for animal 
feed" .6.U8 As the market softened again in the late 1970's conflict and competition among 
the major exporters again emerged. The growing influence of the E.C., Japan and some 
LDC's also greatly complicated the issues. In addition, the unwillingness of the United 
States and Canada to hold substantial reserves in order to stabilise prices, again made the 
successful completion of an agreement with price ranges an almost impossible challenge at 
this time.6 . n9 
Following the suspension of the IWA negotiations in February 1979, Canadian offi-
cials invited representatives of the other exporters, except the E.C., to Canada to discuss 
the possibility of concluding an exporters' agreement. The United States was unwilling 
1I.1211This section was taken from I.M. Desder "United States Foreign Policy" in Raymond Hopkins and 
Donald Puchala Global Political Economy of Food, p.44, IWC file Ex (74/75) 2/2. p.20 and A.G. Kenwood 
and A.L. Lougheed. p.265. World Inflation rose from 5.9% in 1971 to 9.6% in 1973 and exceeded 15% in 
1974. 
11.127 A.G. Kenwood and A.I. Lougheed. pp.294-295 
1I.128 Theodore Cohn. p.76 
11.1211 Ibid. p.76. The emergence of new competitions led to Canadian and American demands that others 
contribute more substantially to stock holding. 
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to participate ill what would essentially be considered a cartel, and the meetings were 
1 d 6.130 suspen< e . 
6.14. The International Wheat Agreement 1986 
The next major meeting of ministers from the grain exporting count.ries was lwld in Whistler. 
British Columbia in 1986, followed by another in San Diego. "The major issue through the 
1980's had become the United States-European Community subsidy war rath<'f than an 
exporter's agreement.6.131 Regardless, the International \Vheat Council did conclude the 
International Wheat Agreement 1986, which consisted of two separate legal instrum('nts. 
the Wheat Trade Convention 1986, and the Food Aid Convention, 1986. This agre('mE'nt 
was essentially an updated version of the 1971 IWA.6.13l It was decided that the "Council 
should concentrate on what it was best at - namely, market analysis, long-term forecasting 
and most importantly, serving as a center of information and a meeting place where those 
leaders whose task it is to seek to influence grain policy could do so in knowledge of each 
other's views and in possession of comprehensive and up-to-date information, in the hope 
of avoiding calamity of the kind which had occurred in the past."6.133 
6.15. Summary, Analysis and Conclusion 
An analysis of the International Wheat Agreements conducted by th(' FAO in 1970 con-
cluded that finding "a solution to the difficulties facing the world grain economy - t h(' 
persistent tendency towards disequilibrium between supplies and demand, the accumula-
tion of surplus stocks and the spread of special government aids to exports -- does not depend 
solely on the ability to design a workable commodity stabilisation scheme, important as thi:; 
is. Equally, it depends on the political willingness of governments to coop<'fate in making 
a particular scheme effective."6.134 
e·13°Theodore Cohn. p.81 
8.131 Adrian Ewins "1979 Grain Meeting Had Similar views". We.stem Producer 5 June 1986. p.30. 
Maggie McNeil "Wheat Meet Finds No Solution". Wedem Producer. 26 Feb. 1987. sec. A. p.4. 
8.132 International Wheat Agreement 1986 and Rules of Procedure (London. International Wheat Council. 
1986) 
uUTom Sewell. The World Grain Trade (London. Woodhead. 1992) p.l03 
uu The Stabilillltion of Intemational Trade in Grainl. FAO. 1970 p.16 
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is. Equally, it depends on the political willingness of governments to cooperate in making 
a particular scheme effective."6.134 
This statement very succinctly encapsulates both the scope of the problems in the in-
ternational grain market but also the necessary ingredients for the effective management 
of the market; an effective plan and the political will. The volatility of the grain market 
in the 1930's led to the first attempts to formulate an effective plan. An increasingly com-
prehensive succession of proposals for an International Wheat Agreement in the 1930's and 
early 1940-'s, met with limited success due to the sluggish market, and the yet inadequate 
provisions to manage market extremes. Nearly 18 years of discussions and negotiations 
culminated in the International Wheat Agreement 1949, which was, apparently, a model 
commodity agreement that could withstand even substantial market fluctuations. The terms 
of this agreement successfully provided stability to the international grain trade in terms of 
price stability, and security of supply for a period of nearly twenty years. The stabilisation 
of price within an agreed, acceptable range was perhaps the primary function of the IWA. 
The agreement which originally balanced producer and consumer interests reverted to a 
producer dominated mechanism once the World War II crisis had abated, and as such the 
maintenance of acceptable price levels was of primary concern. Despite the considerable 
variability in production levels and import demand throughout this time, the IWA price 
range was maintained. This was largely due to the willingness of Canada and the United 
States to make the necessary adjustments to their stock levels and sacrifice short term 
market advantages in order to maintain market stability and the terms of the Agreement. 
Central to the stabilisation as well as the security function of the Agreement was the 
role played by reserve stocks. Although unmanaged surpluses can have a depressing effect 
on the market, the availability of reserve stocks averted a crisis in 1962/63 when the Soviet 
Union unexpectedly made· massive purchases following a crop failure. In light of very similar 
market activity in the unregulated market of 1972-1973 and its aftermath, it is clear that 
"the underlying reason for the astonishing resilience of market stability in 1963-1964 lay in 
the existence of carryover stocks amounting to some 55 m. tons, sllffici('nt to absorb the shock 
e.1U The Stabili,ation of International Trade in Grain •. FAO. 1970 p.16 
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of a very large unexpected demand without there being any real danger that the regular 
importing countries would not be able to obtain their full normal requirements" .6.135 Thus, 
both the flow of commercial sales and concessional transactions were maintained. In terms 
of food security, defined as, "the stabilisation of prices of basic food stuffs, the provisions 
of reserves against the threat of occasional shortages and programs for maintaining or 
improving the per capita food consumption on poor countries", the IWA 1949-69 was also 
judged a success.6 .136 Price ranges were maintained, and carryover stocks were held at well 
over the 20% minimum safe requirement throughout this period. Large scale famines in 
India in 1965-1966 were also dealt with with minimal impact on price.6•137 By contrast, 
the Soviet sales in 1972-1973 resulted in the world food crisis of 1973-1974, essentially a 
period of wildly escalating prices and scarcity of supplies - particularly for the low income 
developing countries. Not only was grain less available to developing countries through 
commercial channels, but the tight market conditions resulted in a significant drop in food 
aid. World totals of food aid by principal donors fell from 12,563 thousand tons in 1971/72 
to 10,109 tons in 1972/73 and down to 5,651 thousand tons in 1973/74.6. 138 
The breakdown of the substantive International Wheat Agreements 1949-1969 is at-
tributable to a number of national and international factors. The more aggressive V.S. 
export policy, which proved to be very damaging to trade relations and to the maintenance 
of the agreement, reflected the growing pressure on the V.S. federal reserves in the late 
1960's, which culminated in the suspension of the U.S. dollar's official convertibility to gold 
or other currencies in August 1971. The V.S. was no longer willing, or able, to carry the 
burden of market stability largely on its own. The changing market structure as seen in the 
breakdown of the Canadian-American duopoly and the simultaneous rise in the presence 
of the E.E.C. also contributed to the breakdown. Perhaps the fundamental weakness in 
the IWA was its inability to maintain market buoyancy through the collective and effective 
8.Ulilnternational Wheat Council, File Ex(74/75) 2/2 p.18 
8.138 John McLin, "Surrogate International Organisation and the Case of World Food Security, 1949-
1969" International Organi,ation, 33-1 (Winter 1979) pp. 33-35 
8.1Hlbid. 
8.138 Food Outlook (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation, No. 1979) in Raymond F. Hopkins 
and Donald J. Puchala, Global Food Interdependence: Challenge to American Foreign Policy (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1980) p.76 
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management of reserve stocks. The recognition of the importance of the establishment of an 
international grain reserve as an integral part of any future agreement led to the proposal at 
the World Food Conference 1974 for the establishment of such a reserve. The grain reserve 
proposal and the subsequent negotiations will be the subject of Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7 
Case Study: Proposal for the 
Establishment of An International 
Grain Reserve, 1974-1979 
7.1. Introduction 
Earlier chapters have described how the production, consumption and trade patterns of 
the international grain market have evolved during the past century. The character of the 
commodity and the resultant difficulties in balancing production levels with effective de-
mand has, over time, provoked numerous national and international initiatives designed to 
stabilize grain supplies and prices. The most successful period in terms of stabilization was 
1949-1968 when a combination of the comprehensive International Wheat Agreement and 
the stockholding policies of the major grain exporters kept grain prices within acceptable 
levels. The degree of stability which had been achieved in the grain sector was remark-
able when compared with other commodities. Prices for the major grains traded on the 
international market fluctuated only a few percentage points per month during the 1950's 
and early to mid-1960's.7.1 By 1972, however, the situation changed completely as prices 
of major grains traded on the international market nearly tripled, outstripping many other 
commodities in the general economic turbulences of the early to mid 1970's. 
The sudden rise in the price of grain and the tight market conditions culminated in the 
world food crisis of 1972-74. The world food crisis engaged politicians, diplomats, research 
institutions, task forces, commissioners and charitable foundations and within a period of 
three years at least a dozen new institutions were set up worldwide to analyse the problem 
of food security and agricultural development.7.2 
7.1 Alexander H. Suvis, Philip C. Abbot and Lance Taylor, Grain Re6erve" Emergency Relief and Food 
Aid Second Draft, (Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute, Much, 1977) 
7.2Niclt Butler, The International Grain Trade: Problem, and Pro'pt!cb (London, The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1986), p.1 
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In response to the World Food Crisis, a World Food Conference was convened in Rome 
in November 1974. In the Conference keynote address, Dr. Henry Kissinger, who headed 
the U.S. delegation, committed the U.S. to support policies which would ensure that "no 
child would go to bed hungry" .7.3 He called for the establishment of an international grain 
reserve scheme which would serve the dual purpose of stabilizing grain prices and ensuring 
supply in tight market conditions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the factors which contributed to the World Food 
Crisis, the response of the international community at the World Food Conference and the 
food security and market stabilization schemes developed in the aftermath of Rome. This 
chapter will specifically examine the U.S. proposal for the creation of international grain 
reserves in the context of a new International Wheat Agreement. This examination will 
follow the proposal from its inception, through the examination and development of the 
proposal within the International Wheat Council, and through the formal negotiations for 
the implementation of the proposal which were held under the auspices of UNCTAD in 
1978-1979. 
This case study has been chosen, as it graphically illustrates the volatility inherent in a 
biological commodity as well as the structural weaknesses in the international grain market, 
especially as it has evolved since the collapse of the International Wheat Agreement (IWA) 
in 1967. This case study also illustrates the highly politicized nature of the international 
grain trade, particularly after 1971, and the implications of all of these factors on world 
food security. 
This study has been built upon a rich documentary base and numerous interviews with 
individuals who participated in the negotiations. The International Wheat Council, (IWC) 
documents relating to the Internal and Preparatory Committees and the documents relating 
to the UNCTAD negotiations which have. been closed since 1979 have been released for 
the purpose of this study. In addition, the closed documents relating to developments 
in the commercial market from 1963-1980 were released for this study by the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs. 
7.3 ibid. 
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The IWC/UNCTAD grain reserve proposal will be presented and analysed with cogni-
sance of the numerous and varied stabilisation schemes introduced in the aftermath of the 
Rome conference. The material will be presented chronologically and analytically within 
issue areas, in the period 1974-1979. Questions that arise within this analysis will include: 
1. What characteristics of grain as an internationally traded commodity and what 
characteristics of the grain market make stabilisation schemes desirable? 
2. What political and economic obstacles to a grain reserve scheme precluded the 
successful conclusion of the negotiations? 
3. Who would benefit from a stabilization scheme and who would pay the costs? 
4. What is the relationship of reserves to the commercial and concessional markets? 
The world food crisis and the attempt to stabilize the market through grain reserve 
proposals not only reflect the unique combination of interests and circumstances of the 
1970's, but also illustrate the pervasive effects of sudden reversals in the grain market and 
the effectiveness of policy responses as adopted. 
7.2. Background 
Of the factors which contributed to the sudden market reversal in the early 1970's, the 
breakdown and suspension of the economic provisions of the International Wheat Agreement 
(IWA) in 1967 and the reformulation of foreign political and economic policy in the United 
States were as we have seen, the most salient. The breakdown of the IWA represented 
the end of an era of cooperation among major exporters and importers and the removal of 
international restrictions on trade. As the domestic and foreign economic policies of the 
U.S. have been one of the most significant factors in the evaluation of the international 
grain trade, the heightened politicization of the trade by the Nixon Administration after 
1971 and its use as an instrument of foreign policy goals vis-a.-vis the Soviet Union again 
significantly altered the market. The decision by President Nixon in June 1971 to terminate 
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the national barrier to the sale or transport of grain to the Soviet Union, China or Eastern 
Europe further opened and destabilised the market.7•4 
The removal of national and international trade restrictions 1ll combination with the 
series of shocks that rocked the grain trade between 1972 and 1979 reduced confidence in 
the ability of exporters to meet import requirements, and the ensuing panic buying and 
speculation drove world food prices to record levels. See figure 7.1. 











Figure 7.2. From Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, Global Food 
Interdependence: Challenge to American Food Policy (Colombia University 
Press, N.Y., 1980), p.55. 
7.4Truck Husbmp Pederson, "Sales, Surpluses and the Soviets: A Study in Political Economy" in 
Richard M. Fraenkel, Ron F. Hadwinger and William P. Browne, eds. The Role oj Agriculture in Foreign 
Policy (N.J., Praeger Publishers, 1919) pp.56-51. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, the more explicit 
Export Control Act of 1949 and the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 dramatically restricted trade 
including agriculture with communist countries. 
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The main factors contributing to instability in the international grain trade included: 
(i) Stock reduction by the United States and other major exporters had reduced world 
insurance against a major downturn in world food production.7.s 
(ii) World grain production declined in 1972-1973 as a result of unfavourable weather 
and average limitations in major producing countries. 
(iii) The reduction in the Peruvian anchovy catch in 1972 led to increased demand for 
soybean meal and alternative feedgrains. 
(iv) The devaluation of the U.S. dollar profoundly affected the stability of exchange rates 
further undermining the international economic security. 
(v) Large grain purchases by the Soviet Union due to substantial crop shortfalls.7.6 
These shocks taken together resulted in the sudden reversal of the international grain 
market and the ensuing world food crisis. During the period 1972-1974, grain markets 
experienced price and supply fluctuations unparalleled since the Great Depression. Had 
policy adjustments been made quickly, the damaging effects of the Soviet wheat sales could 
have been minimised. The Nixon Administration reacted very slowly. Not only were export 
subsidies maintained despite the rapidly rising prices, but acreage reductions were also 
maintained despite the tightening of the market.7.7 Through the grain sales and lack of 
policy response, the U.S. had succeeded in stabilising the Russian food economy whilst 
destabilising its own.7.8 
7.5I.M. Destler, "United States Food Policy, 1972-1976: Reconciling Domestic and International Objec-
tives" in Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, eds. The Global Political Economy of Food (Madison, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p.45. See also, Sanderson, "The Great Food Fumble", Brookings, 
Reprint No. 303 (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institute, 1975), pp.505-506 and Philip H. Tresize, Rebuild-
ing Groin Resources: Towards and International Sy,tem (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1976) 
p.l. "Wheat stocks held by the U.S. and Canada had been 100 percent of average annual domestic and 
export demand in 1963, before the last world food crisis. In 1972, they stood at 70 percent." 
1.5 Alexander Sarris, Phillip Abbott and Lance Taylor, pp.3-1, 3-2 and I.M. Destler, p.53. Soviet Ex-
porthleb representatives quietly contracted the purchase of 433 million bushels of wheat, roughly half of the 
United States carryover stock in 1972, as well as substantial purchases from Canada. Poor crops in Australia 
and Argentina further reduced world stock levels. 
T.7Dan Morgan, pp.214-215. 
7.8I.M. Destler, p.49 
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The contradictions in agricultural policy formulation during the 1972-1974 crisis were 
perhaps in part a function of "intellectual lag" given the speed with which the international 
grain market and the domestic economy was reversed. It was, however, certainly also a 
function of the competing interests within the administration. Producer interests, champi-
oned by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, had achieved their objectives - unprecedented 
price levels as well as high levels of export expansion.7•9 • The foreign policy objectives had 
also been realised through the linkage of grain sales to the Soviet Union in the building 
of a new U.S.-Soviet relationship, and despite the ensuing food price inflation and other 
"dislocations". Earl Butz and Henry Kissinger considered the grain sales a major policy 
achievement.7.1o 
The successes of the farm and foreign policy communities were largely at the cost of 
domestic consumers, developing countries and food aid recipients. Food price inflation 
which had largely been ignored in the summer of 1972, exploded by December 1972, and 
continued throughout 1973. The U.S. wholesale price index for farm products rose from 
132.5 in December 1972 to 184.5 the following August before dropping to 168.0 in December 
1973. 
World food prices rose from 126.3 in December 1972 to 151.5 in December 1973.7.11 In 
June 1973, amid the general chaos of the economic crisis, now exacerbated by the OPEC 
crisis and the larger political crisis precipitated by the Watergate break-ins, the U.S. gov-
ernment attempted to curtail inflation with the imposition of a total embargo on soybean 
exports. While short-lived, this action had very serious consequences in terms of U.S. trade 
relations and represented a major setback in U.S.-Japanese relations,7.12 and U.S. relations 
with Western Europe were also severely damaged. 
The knowledge that North America could no longer fulfil its historic role as a reliable 
residual supplier resulted in panic buying by almost every importer. Fears of impending food 
7.eDestler, p,49 
7.10ibid 
7.11 Economic Report of the Pruident, February 1974, pp.300-305 in Destler, p.5 
7.12Richard Filmore, A Poor Harved. The CltUh of Policie6 and interub in the Grain Trade (New York, 
Longman,), pp.147-150. Japan relies on the United States for 92% of its considerable soybean imports. 
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shortages persisted through the 1973-74 crop years despite production increases. Develop-
ing countries, particularly vulnerable to a supply shortage, given their habitual minimal 
nutritional levels, were prone to panic buying of cereals in 1973 and 1974.1.13 In order to 
sustain grain imports at highly inflated prices, developing countries incurred price increases 
of approximately $12 billion in 1973-1975 over 1972 levels.1.B Among the hardest hit de-
veloping countries were those most reliant on food aid. Food aid in cereals by all principal 
donors fell from a total of 1O.l1mmt in 1972/73 to 5.651mmt in 1973-74.1.15 
In addition to the radical reduction in the volume of food aid, the allocation of available 
supplies which were largely held in the U.S. reflected heightened politicization of grain. In 
1972, allocations that had previously been granted to the hungriest countries were divided 
to serve U.S. foreign policy objectives. "In 1973, South Vietnam and South Korea also 
received almost half of all Title I food aid. In 1974, South Vietnam and Cambodia also 
received 69 percent.,,1.16 
By 1974, the "crisis management" approach to economic policy pursued by most nations 
clearly proved inadequate. The volatility of the international grain market in 1972-74 
when considered in combination with the concurrent oil crisis of 1973 placed economic 
issues at the top of both domestic and foreign policy agendas for political leaders world 
wide. In addressing a NATO summit meeting in June 1974, West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt stated that "The most serious risks facing NATO were not military. The 
growing economic difficulties of its members," he said, "include dangers that cannot be 
exaggerated. Inflation and the necessarily following recession pose the greatest threat to 
the foundations of Western Society."1.11 Writing in October 1974, U.S. Democrat Walter 
7.13 Alexander Sarna, Philip Abbott and Lance Taylor, pp.3.3-3.4. Total imports for deVeloping countries 
rose from 34.5(mmt) in 1972, to 47.0(mmt) in 1973 and 48.0(mmt) in 1974. (Source, FAO Production and 
Trade) 
7.U ibid.p.3-4 
7.U Alexander Sarna, Philip Abbott and Lance Taylor, p.3.4. Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. 
Hopkins "International Regimes: lessons from inductive analysis" in Stephen Krasner ed. International 
Regimes (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983). 
7.15FATUS, December 1975, pp.40-43j Daniel J. Bats, "Agricultural Report: Politics of Food Aid 
Presents U.S. with Policy Dilemma", National Journal (November 23, 1974) p.1764 and Destler p.57. Also 
Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1974. 
7·17Walter F. Mondale, "Beyond Detente: Toward International Economic Security" Foreign Affair. 
(October 1974) p.13. 
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Mondale noted that as industrialised nations assessed the international economic scene 
their "apprehension is fuelled by frustration because the problems are beyond the span of 
control of individual nations. With the growth in economic interdependence, the problems 
are inextricably linked, and only a comprehensive and systematic international effort could 
deal with them.,,7.18 
7.3. World Food Conference 1974 
It was against this political and economic backdrop that Henry Kissinger attempted to pick 
up the pieces of the administration's shattered domestic and foreign policies by convening 
a World Food Conference to be held in Rome in November 1974.7.19 
The World Food Conference perhaps served the short term goal of focusing world atten-
tion on the food security issue, however, little substantial progress was made in furthering 
the expressed goals.1.20 The conference identified the three major defects in the world food 
system: 
(i) Inadequate food reserves to assure reasonable stability in markets and security for 
consumers. 
(ii) Use of food aid that reflected low priority for the food problems of less developed 
countries. 
(iii) Inadequate and inappropriate investment with respect to food production capacity 
in food-deficit areas.7.21 
The World Food Conference did, however, lead to the creation of the World Food Council 
as well as several proposals for the creation of grain reserves. Henry Kissinger's keynote 
7.18 ibid., p.14 
7.18 Henry Kissinger, Year. of Upheaval, especially Chapters XXI and XXV. Also private interviews with 
Charles Weits, FAO Representative of the FAO to the United Nations. The decision to convene the World 
Food Conference was taken unilaterally by Henry Kissinger. Earl Buts alone was "notified" prior to the 
official announcement. 
7.20 Alexander Sarris, Philip Abbott and Lance Taylor, p. 7.2 
7.21 Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., pp.82-83, see also Alexander 
Sarris, Philip Abbott and Lance Taylor, p.7.2 
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speech to the Conference had the dramatic title "The Global Community and the Struggle 
against Famine". The drama was in the title, not the content, as it offered little to alleviate 
famine. It did, however, offer a rather general proposal for an international grain reserve, 
and thus gained some acclaim as a humanitarian gesture.7•22 
The U.S. proposal had five major features in its final form, which was first presented 
in May 1975 at the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and later referred to the International Wheat Counci1.7•23 
The proposal called for: 
1. An initial reserve target of 30 million metric tonnes (mmt), which would be over 
and above working stocks. According to U.S. officials this amount would offset 90% 
of potential deviations from trend in world production of food grain. 
2. The accumulation and the drawing of reserves would be based upon deviations from 
long-term production trends or changes in stock levels. Price would not be an 
indicator. 
3. Shares of the reserve would be based upon trade volume, Gross National Product 
and variability ill production. 
4. The reserve system would be available only to participants. A country could not 
stand outside the agreement and seek to benefit from it under tight market condi-
tiOllS. 
5. Provision would be made for appropriate exchanges of information on crop prospects 
and other relevant questions.7.24 
This proposal represented a response to the demands of the Word Food crisis and also 
acknowledged that some form of grain reserve scheme would be central to a solution to the 
problem of world food security. Its weakness was that it lacked specifics; however, it served 
7.22I.M. Destler, p.66 
7.2J U.S. Information Service, Wireless Bulletin from WashingtoD, September 30, 1975. 
7.24Philip Tresize, pp.53-55. 
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as a starting point as member countries agreed to continue to study the proposal and work 
out the technical details. 
7.4. International Grain Reserves: Creating the Framework 
With the adjournment of the World Food Conference, the International Wheat Council 
secretariat set about the task of exploring and developing possible elements of a new in-
ternational agreement. The "world food crisis" had renewed interest in the systematic 
rebuilding and coordination of cereal stock for the purpose of assuring world food security 
and grain price stability.7.25 
A preliminary review of the possible alternative forms of a new agreement - or more 
precisely, "the major elements which either alone or in some combinations might form the 
basis of such an agreement", revealed four basic assumptions. 
(1) The agreement must contain some provision relating to stocks. 
(2) An agreement in order to be negotiable, or even credible, must contain price provi-
sions, although they may be regarded as indicators (targets) rather than regulatory 
in the sense of the old agreements. 
(3) Emergency aid must be taken into consideration but this does not necessarily assume 
that the agreement will assign executive responsibility to the Council. 
(4) Effective consultation and management procedures must be carefully considered for 
all aspects of the agreement.7.26 
Problems relating to each of these issue areas were evident from the first discussions. The 
committee considered that voluntary stock undertakings would only appear credible if they 
7.2li Committee for Agriculture. Review of Varioul Propolall for World Cereal Stocle Levell (Note by 
the Secretariat (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Restricted, Paris, 24 
February, 1977, AGR (77) 6 Scale 4) p.5. For the purposes of this paper, the FAO definition of reserve 
stocks will be used. They !Lre considered to be all stocks that are in exceBB of (a) minimum working stocks, 
(b) stocks which are retained for strict strate~es or military purposes. "Reserve stocks include stocks which 
can be drawn on to meet unexpected defects m current supplies due to crop shortfalls, other contingencies, 
emergency food shortages in forward international commitments in case of a short crop." 
7.28 Pouible Forml of a New IWA International Wheat Council (IWA (Prep.) 1,18 December 1974. 
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were allied with other measures to form a balanced and convincing package. Regulatory 
price pressures would be difficult to sell to members unless supported by other substantive 
economic mechanisms, yet the potentially more attractive option of establishing "trigger" 
formulae applied to target prices may be less effective in promoting the objective of market 
stability.7.l7 
These components, stock provisions, price provisions and consultations or management 
procedures did, however, ultimately come together in 1978 as the framework for the nego-
tiations which were held under the auspices of UNCTAD. In order to understand how this 
framework was erected, these elements will be presented individually as they were examined 
and developed within the Preparatory Committee of the International Wheat Council. In 
that reserve stocks would constitute a novel feature of international wheat agreements, some 
discussion of their main features would be useful. 
7.4.1. Stock Provisions 
The issue of stock provisions was the most difficult of the trinity of major components 
which formed the basis of the discussions. The successful negotiation of an internationally 
controlled buffer stock was seen to be the most desirable stock option in terms of the 
effectiveness and credibility of the proposed agreement. Centrally-controlled world reserves 
would provide greater insulation from market forces and political influence. A secondary 
advantage of a centrally-controlled scheme was that given the unlikelihood of simultaneous 
shortfalls in a number of regions a smaller reserve would be adequate to provide global 
security than the sum of the security needs of individual countries.7.l8 
Despite the desirability of such a scheme particularly in terms of market stabilisation, 
it was generally agreed within the committee that a co-ordinated system of national stock-
holdings would be more readily accepted by members. The question of the sovereignty. 
of exporting countries own stocks, stored by them but owned and controlled by a buffer 
stock authority, would be overcome through a nationally owned stock scheme. Such a 
7.27 ibid., p.2 
7.2lOutline of a New IWA International Wheat Council (IWA (prep.) 3, 4th February 1975) p.8. See 
also "Food Raising Policies for World Food Security", FAO consultants report (Misc. (74/75)13,19 February 
1975) 
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scheme would still require the harmonisation of national policies into some form of quasi-
international plan which would require agreement on desirable stock levels, a willingness 
to report stocks, and a commitment to a consultative process in the event of significant 
changes. A nationally-held scheme would however fail to carry the powerful influence on 
the market of a full international buffer stock scheme.7.:l9 In addition to the questions of 
what form a reserve stock should take, preliminary discussions of the preparatory committee 
considered questions surmounting the location of stocks, size and management of reserve 
stocks, costs and cost sharing, trigger mechanisms, and the special provisions necessary for 
emergency relief. 
7.4.2. Location of Stocks 
From the outset a strong case was made for the reserve stocks to be held in exporting 
countries, particularly the U.S.,7.30 whose considerable surplus capacity, transportation and 
storage facilities would facilitate the maintenance of either international or nationally held 
stocks. Despite fears of possible domestic competition for inland transportation and loading 
facilities and the possibility of stock movement being hindered due to political considera-
tions, the economic benefits of storing at least a major portion of reserve stocks in the 
U.S. were sufficiently compelling that the firm assurances on these points were considered 
necessary. 
7.4.3. Ileserve Size 
In the determination of the optimal size of reserve stocks the Committee drew from various 
studies to determine the quantity of stocks that would be necessary to achieve various policy 
objectives.7.31 As a starting point, in 1975 there was wide, in not universal agreement that 
7.21lThis discussion is drawn from the earliest IWC position papers: "Possible forms of a New IWA" 
(IWA prep.); IWC, (Misc. (74/75) 12, 22 November 1974); "Food Rescue Policies for World Food Security" 
(Misc. 74/75) 13, 19 February 1975); Questions on a "Voluntary" Grain Rescue System, IWe, (IWA (prep.) 
6, 4 April 1975) and "Rescue Stocks", IWC, (IWA (Prep.) 5, 4 April 1975) 
7.3°"Final reserve policies for World Food Security" (Misc. (74/75) 13, 19 February 1975. Canada and 
Australia were also considered desirable locations. 
7·31The five papers whose suggested methods were pre-eminently considered in the preliminary discus-
sions included: 
(i) "Grain Stocks Issues and Alternatives: A Progress Report" (Economic Research Service, United 
States Department of Agriculture, February 1974). 
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a system of reserve stocks should be examined as a major element of a new agreement. Its 
objective, in its broadest terms would be to act as a buffer against market disequilibrium 
which might arise from supply shortages and rising prices, or the converse.1 .3l Ideally, a 
reserve scheme would protect normal commercial trade flows, yet have cognisance of the 
needs of developing countries. Reserve stocks therefore should provide stability to the 
commercial market, without disrupting trade flows, and provide security of supply under 
tight market conditions. Based on historical experiences, and on the findings of most major 
studies consulted, a reserve stock of 30 mmt to deal with commercial contingencies, with 
an additional and separate 10-15 mmt reserve to provide international famine relief was 
considered optima1.1.33 The exception to these findings came from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture who concluded that a 10% contingency reserve programme (amounting to 
reserves of 20mmt) would have met all but 17mmt of world production shortfalls over a 20 
year period from 1950-1969.1•34 
7.4.4. Stock Management 
Fundamental to the efficient performance of a reserve scheme are the rules and obligations 
of governments which undertake to hold stocks under the scheme and the arrangements for 
the storage of wheat held as the reserve. The primary areas of concern and discussion were: 
(i) The nature of the control exercised by governments (or private interests) over the 
reserves. 
(ii) "World Food Security: Draft Evaluation of World Cereals Stock Situation" (Preliminary Draft); 
(FAO Committee on Commodity Problems, document GR74/11. July 1974). 
(iii) "Food Security - An International Approach" (Draft Report by Carroll G. Brumthauer, Brookings 
Institute, 1974). 
(iv) "Food Resource Policies for World Food Security: A Consultant Study on Alternative Approaches" 
(FAO Expert Consultation on Cereal Stock Policies relating to World Food Security, document 
ESC: CSP/75/2, January 1975). 
(v) "Implications ofstockholding policies for international wheat track", (International Wheat Council, 
Seventy-first Session, documents CL71/9 and CL71/9 Add, November 1974). 
7.32uAgenda for the Preparatory Group', IWC, 13 March 1975 
7.33 ibid.. See also "Reserve Stocks - Annex : Methods for determining the necessary size of reserve 
stocks" IWC, (IWA Prep.) 4, 3 April 1975 and (IWA Prep.) 4, App.l, 7 April, 1975 
UtIWC, (IWA Prep.) 4, p.7 
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(ii) The reporting of relevant information. 
(iii) The guarantee that stocks will he utilised solely under the provisions of the scheme. 
(iv) Regulations regarding the location, types of wheat stored and the condition of the 
wheat being held. 
(v) Methods of disposal and replenishment of stocks. 
The operation of stocks held for emerging relief purposes would be managed by a different 
set of guidelines.7•35 
7.4.5. Costs and Cost Sharing 
Given the uncertainties during the preliminary discussions, costing a reserve scheme was 
difficult, however, throughout the period of analysis both within the IWO and in the context 
of numerous independent studies, consumers were consistently regarded as being the main 
beneficiaries of stable market conditions.7•36 It was generally understood, therefore, that 
consumers would share the costs proportionately. 
7.4.6. Preparatory Meetings: Opening Positions 
The initial tabling of the components considered necessary in the negotiation of a new 
International Wheat Agreement revealed the issue areas that required additional study and 
development. It also revealed the degree to which the actors, primarily the major exporters, 
were at odds on the major issues. Despite their differences, the meetings continued, and 
numerous studies and proposals were taken into consideration to advance the deliberation of 
these complex issues toward resolution. The European Economic Community (EEC) tabled 
a position paper in May 1975, reiterating its commitment to national subsidy programs. 
The main points of the very general paper included three elements: 
(a) Strengthening of machinery for the exchange of information on market prospects 
and production policies; 
7.3'"Guidelines for the Management of Reserve Stocks", (IWA Prep.) 7,23 April 1975, ppl-14. 
7.38 ibid. See also Alexander Sarris, Philip Abbott and Lance Taylor, pp.2-5 and "Food Reserve Policies 
for World Food Security" (Misc. (74/75) 13) p.2 
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(b) Setting up stabilisation mechanisms calculated bot h to stabilise the international 
grains market in terms of price and supply levels in a manner acceptable to importers 
and exporters alike, and to insulate that market from any destabilising factors that 
might emerge in domestic markets; and 
(c) Improvement of the situation of developing countries, in particular by the reorgani-
sation of the food aid structure.7•37 
Perhaps most significantly, the EEC identified the grain sector as "being sufficiently 
important as to warrant a solution implying a high degree of international co-operation 
bearing on all the elements of the problem.7.38 In conclusion, the Community affirmed its 
commitment to the successful negotiations of a new International Grains Agreement.7.39 
The following September, a new U.S. proposal was tabled that provided more detailed 
guidelines on all aspects of the agreement under consideration. The U.S. position remained 
steadfast that reserves were to be nationally held; however, the size of the reserve was 
brought in line with other estimates to 25 mmt of wheat and 5 mmt of rice. The question 
of reserves for course grains was raised, and the criteria for holding reserves would include 
world trade in food chains, GDP, and variations in production. The U.S. proposal also 
introduced the notion of a quantitative (as opposed to price) trigger mechanism.7•40 Re-
serve holdings would be increased when production would exceed trend levels by an agreed 
percentage, and triggers based on stock levels and production shortfalls would signal the 
need for stock withdrawals. The system was to be based on a two-tier action programme. 
At the "warning stages" consultations would be initiated with regard to working stocks, 
limitations of livestock feeding, limitation on abandonment of export restraints and a fuller 
7.37 "Statement Made by the Representative of the EEC, 26 May 1975", Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Group "Agriculture" IWO, (IWA (Prep.» 13,16 June 1975. 
u8ibid. p.6 
u8ibid. p.7 
7 .• 0 
(1) "Proposal for a Two-Tier Price System" IWC, (IWA (Prep.) 8,5 May 1995, See also "Australian 
Paper on Price Triggers", IWC, (IWA (Prep.) 9, 7 May 1995. 
(2) "Skdeton Outline of a New Agreement", IWC (IWA (Prep.) 16, 14 August 1975. 
(3) Discuuions of the Preparatory Committee conducted between 20 March 1975 and September 1975 
were based on the use of price triggers. 
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reporting on future sales and purchases. The "shortage stage" would involve decisions on 
the run-down of reserve stocks.T•n Quantitative trigger mechanisms were perceived by the 
U.S. as providing greater flexibility in responding to market changes than the more rigid 
.' h' f tl t T.42 pnce trIgger mec amsms 0 le pas . 
An analysis of the proposed quantitative trigger mechanisms where applied to produc-
tionfstockftrade data as given in Appendix Table 1, suggests that an inappropriate response 
would have been made in all but one year over the period 1964 - 1974,7.43 The U.S. proposal 
continued to be examined by all major exporters at the third meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee in October 1975. The exporters worked together to develop the criteria that 
could be applied to action formats that could be applied to the system of indications whether 
it be quantitative or price.7.44 
Following the Third Meeting of the Preparatory Group on 29 - 30 September 1975, and 
with the endorsement of member states, study regarding key elements of an international 
reserve system continued. The task included the framing of a comprehensive definition of 
"working stocks" which could be applied to future discussions regarding grain reserves as 
well as a determination of working stock estimates in selected countries, on the basis of 
historical data.7.45 The definition of working stocks in global terms may be a measure with 
which world food security might be measured. A second definition would view a country's 
total reserves to comprise a number of distinguishable elements, of which working stocks is 
one.7.46 The other elements would include: 
(i) stocks held on farms - available for sale. 
T.U "International Grain Reserve: U.S. Proposals' IWC, (IWA (Sec.)21, 26 September 1975. See also 
"U.S. Proposal for an International Grain Reserves System (Prep. (75) WP.13) (IWA )Prep.)19, 25 Septem-
ber 1975. 
u2"The Role of Prices in A New Agreement", IWC, IWA (Prep.)14, 18 June 1975. See also "Dr. 
Kissinger's Address to the Special Session ofthe United Nations" IWC, (IWA (Prep)17, 5 September 1975. 
uhThe Operation of a Production Trigger Mechanism" (Comments on the U.S. proposal in document 
PREP (75) WP.13) lWC, (IWA (Sec.)20, 26 September 1975 pp.l - 7. The exception was 1965 when the 
world wheat economy was about to enter a period of shortages and connective measures would have been 
useful. 
uhlnternational Grain Reserve: Trigger Action", lWC, (lWA (Sec.)22, 13 October 1975. The EEC 
made the suggestion that it would be useful to detail actions and procedures that would facilitate speedy 
response at both the "warning" and "shortage" levels. 
UhWorking Stocks", IWC, (IWA (Sec.)23, 23 October 1975. See also IWC (Prep.(75) 7, and "Working 
Stocks', IWC (IWA (Sec.)23 (Rev.l), 30 October 1975. 
T.4hWorking Stocks" lWe, (IWA (Sec.)23, 23 October 1975. 
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(ii) (exporters) stocks held by marketing agencies and by government agencies and con-
sidered necessary to maintain the uninterrupted flow of domestic and export com-
mitments. 
(iii) (exporters) stocks held by traders for domestic or export trade including supplies 
held internally or afloat but remaining the property of the exporter. 
(iv) (importers) stocks held by government agencies, importers, merchants and proces-
sors in mill or other storage points.7.47 
In concluding this study, the Committee raised the question of the relevance of focusing 
unnecessarily on working stocks given that the stocks held under an international agreement 
would be in addition to any other holdings. 7 .48 
The second major area of continued examination in late 1975 was concerned with eco-
nomic provisions. This complex and controversial field included discussions on: a proposed 
two-tier price system particularly with reference to the effects of such a system on developing 
countries; methods of modifying the IWA if market conditions warranted it; considerations 
of minimum and maximum prices in the context of a new agreement; and quantitative trig-
ger mechanism:; based on projected wheat consumption.7•49 These consultations produced 
a set of options which would afford varying degrees of stringency in the economic provision 
of a new International Wheat Agreement. These options included: 
(i) Action points for consultative remedial action to contain prices within a certain 
range. 
7.47 "WorJring Stocks" IWC, (IWA (Sec) 23 (Rev.l) 30 October 1975 
7.48 ibid. p.6 
7.4hproposal for a Two-Tier Price System: Possible Effects on the Position of Developing Exporting 
Countries" IWC, (IWA (Sec.)24, 24 October 1975; "Methods of Modifying the Cause of an International 
Wheat Agreement During the Period of its Validity" IWC, (IWA (Sec.)27, 11 November 1975; "Minimum 
and Maximum prices in a new agreement" IWC, (IWA (Sec.)28, 12 November 1975; "A Quantitative Trigger 
Based on Projected Wheat Consumption" IWe, (IWA (Sec) 29) 21 November 1975; "Methods of Modifying 
the Economic Provisions of an International Wheat Agreement During the Period of its Validity" IWe, 
(IWA (Sec)30, 21 November 1975; "Minimum and Maximum Prices in a World Wheat Agreement", IWe, 
{IWA (Sec.)31, 21 November 1975; "Second Lines of Defence in a Reserve Stocks Agreement", IWe, (IWA 
(Sec.)32, 21 November 1975. 
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(ii) Action points for remedial action, consultative and/or combined with reserve stock 
management to restrict prices within defined minimum and maximum limits. 
(iii) Each participating exporting country would state minimum and maximum price 
limits they were prepared to accept within absolute limits regardless of class. 
(iv) Each participating exporting country states minimum and maximum price levels for 
each group of wheat which they were prepared to accept as absolute limits. 
(v) Fixed minimum and maximum prices, with quality differentials for most widely 
traded wheats, similar to the International Grains Arrangements, 1967.7 .50 
By mid December the economic provisions were presented in a "Skeleton Outline" of a 
new agreement which incorporated all aspects of a new agreement. The outline which was 
based on the documents which had been submitted to the Preparatory Group the outline 
attempted to clarify the possible scope of a new agreement. 
The reaction of major exporters and importers to the range of options presented in the 
"Outline" was mixed. A tabular summary (Figure 7.2) of these reactions indicates that the 
position of the main actors, although somewhat modified, had not fundamentally changed. 
In particular, the U.S. continued to press for market stabilization through stock provision 
rather than price controls. Conversely, the EEC favoured an agreement based on negotiated 
maximum and minimum prices rather than stock or production management. Despite the 
expressed differences and concerns, Figure 7.2 reveals that there remained a willingness to 
continue the search for common ground on the substantive issues.7•51 
7.60"Skeleton Outline ofa New Agreement", lWC, (Iwa (Sec.)36, 11 December 1975, Appendix Table I 
"Options Relating to Price Provisions in a New International Agreement". 
7.lil"Summary of Comments Made by Members of the Preparatory Group on Different Aspects ofa New 
IWA", IWC. December, 1975. 
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7.4.7. 1976 
Drawing on the lessons of the economIC provIsIons of previous wheat agreements, the 
Preparatory Committee continued its examination of trigger mechanisms contrasting the 
behaviour of those based on price movements with those based on production estimates 
when applied to market data from the 1960's and early 1970's.7.52 The differences in the 
behaviour of these two mechanisms, initially thought to reflect inadequacies in either, or 
both, came to be more fully appreciated as indicators that were measuring different forms 
of instability. The choice of trigger mechanisms would therefore largely depend on the ob-
jective of the agreement. If the agreement was to address both price and supply instability, 
the provisions for both types of trigger mechanisms would be desirable.7.53 
A summary of the deliberations on price provisions and all aspects of a new agreement 
was presented to the Seventy Sixth (Special) Session of the full Council. The broad lines of 
the work of the Preparatory Group were conveyed to the full membership without attribu-
tion and with the provision that this work had been undertaken on a non-committal basis 
on the part of participating governments.7.54 The Group unanimously supported the objec-
tive of bringing a new agreement with substantive economic provisions into effect as soon as 
possible and to move on to the stage of actual negotiations as soon as it appeared likely that 
the basis for a successful outcome to such negotiations existed. One group member was of 
the opinion that a draft text of an agreement could be forwarded to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations in time for an International Wheat Conference to be convened as 
early as the end of 1976 or the beginning of 1977. This view was perhaps overly optimist.ic 
given the task at hand, however, despite the differing views regarding the structure of a 
new agreement, participants consistently emphasised the need for continuing and indeed 
strengthening of cooperation in international wheat matters until a new agreement had 
been reached.7.s5 
7.62 "Price Equivalent computations Under the International Wheat Agreement, 1962", lWC, (UWA 
(Sec.) 41, 11 March 1976; "The Course of Prices 1973/74 and 1975/76", IWC, (lWA (Sec.) 37, 5 January 
1976; "Trigger Mechanisms - Some Further Observations", IWC, (IWA (Sec.) 38, 13 January 1976. 
uhTrigger Mechanisms - Some Further Observations" IWC, (IWA (Sec.) 38, 13 January 1976. 
7.64 ibid. 
7.uibid., pp.2-3. 
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Cooperation and study did continue through the spring of 1976, particularly on the 
very complex question of pricing provisions. Detailed studies tested various hypotheses 
against previous and projected market behaviour. As a result, a new approach to prices 
was developed. The term "indicative prices" was coined as a means of describing the 
philosophy of the new approach. In assuming an "indicative" role, prices would signal "the 
need for remedial action at various stages - as indicators of a changing market situation 
rather than objectives.". 7.56 
The re-examination of the nature and purpose of price provisions in a new agreement 
reflected the general dissatisfaction among major exporters with price provisions as they 
had been applied in previous agreements. 7.57 In particular, a more flexible pricing arrange-
ment would allow price levels to be reached, and breached without confidence in the whole 
agreement being shaken - as was the case with previous agreements.7.5S 
A system of flexible remedial response would also reduce the internal preoccupation 
with minimum and maximum prices during negotiation.7. 59• The other main points under 
consideration with regard to price provisions included the more technical areas of: refer-
ence wheat; basing points; quality differentials; ocean freight rates; and currency exchange 
rates. 7.60 
As the technical details of price and stock provisions were being developed, the more 
general objectives of a new agreement, and the rights and obligation of participants were 
also receiving clarification. The objectives of a new agreement, as presented in June 1976 
were as follows: 
7.56 "The Indicative Price Approach" 
7.57(confidential source) File 37.15, Wheat-I, Vol. 13, 1/5/69-30/6/69. From: Industry Trade and 
Commerce to Extoll 2768, June 23/69 "Meeting of Wheat Exporters Concluded Today". Pricing provisions 
of the IWA were suspended at this meeting. See also "The Indicative Price Approach," IWC, (IWA (Sec.) 
42) 9 April 1976. 
7.&8 See also "Price Equivalent Comput!1tions: Technical Issues Requiring Further Considerations in a 
Regulatory Price System", IWC, (IWA (Sec.» 50, 12 July, 1976 and Prep. (75) WP.9 Paragraph 3 and 6. 
7.lii ibid. 
7.60 "Price Equivalent Computations: Technical issues requiring further consideration in a regulatory 
price system". lWC, (IWA (Sec.» 50, 12 July 1976 
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(a) To follow international cooperation in connection with world wheat problems, recog-
nising the relationship of the trade in wheat to the economic stability of markets for 
other agricultural products; 
(b) To promote the expansion of the international trade in wheat and wheat flour and 
to secure the finest possible flow of this trade in the interests of both exporting and 
importing members; 
(c) To contribute to a greater security in world food supplies by arrangements to main-
tain reserve stocks of wheat; and 
(d) To contribute to the fullest extent possible to the stability of the international wheat 
market, in relation both to prices and the assurance of supplies, in the interests of 
exporting and importing members.7•61 
The pursuit of these objectives through the establishment of a grain reserve with price 
provisions inevitably led both importers and exporters to seek assurance within the context 
of their rights and obligations as participants to the agreement. Importers were looking 
for assurances of supplies of maximum price levels. Exporters were concerned that the 
price span would provide an adequate return to efficient producers through a satisfactory 
minimum price level. 7.6~ The reconciliation of these objectives would clearly be a formidable 
task. The Preparatory Committee, in July 1976, outlined the complexity of the issue: 
These price aims would in theory be best satisfied under a regulatory 
system, and this explains the reluctance to abandon the traditional concept 
despite the acknowledged technical difficulties it would present in current 
circumstances. Ideally, these aims require the determination of maximum 
and minimum prices for all wheat international traded by a formula that 
is clearly understood, whose essential elements can be accurately identified, 
without dispute or controversy, and which confers no competitive advantage 
on any supplier."7.63 
7.51 "Draft Revised 'Options' Paper: Section 1", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 43, 23 June 1976; "Draft Revised 
'Options' Paper: Section II", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 47, 21 June 1976; "Draft Revised 'Options' Paper: Section 
III", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 46, 18 June 1976. 
7.82 "Standstill" Paper: Suggested outline of Part III", IWe, IWA (Sec.) 49, 8 July 1976. 
7.83 ibid. 
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While acknowledging that no formula would fully satisfy all of these conditions, they would 
seek some combination of compromises which would stand some chance of being successfully 
negotiated.7.64 
In seeking such a solution the Preparatory Group moved to the next logical stage of the 
discussion, which was to consider the possible effects of the interaction of reserve stocks 
and prices on each other. Questions raised included whether the elements be included in a 
single convention or whether they appear as separate conventions within a comprehensive 
agreement. The legal and administrative implications of the various options would also 
require further study.7.6s 
In assessing the economic implications of integration, some difficulties arose from the 
fact that there were two types of provisions being applied to participants. In general the 
rights and obligations under the price provisions of an agreement would apply to the whole 
membership; however, additional provisions relating to reserves would have direct appli-
cation only to the small proportion of members who undertake reserve commitments.7.66 
Despite the complications arising from these structural complexities, the integration of re-
serve stocks and price provisions was generally considered to be beneficial to the effective 
functioning of an agreement. In general, the agreement would gain in stature by being seen 
to be concerned with a much broader sector of the international wheat situation and its 
problems. 
"In particular, the major economic provisions would interact and would 
tend to reinforce each other. Thus, the existence of a reserve of stocks and the 
power to regulate the flow of supplies to the world market would represent 
a powerful stabilizing factor when available to supplement other measures 
designed to curb excessive price fluctuations. Consequently, price provisions 
which represented the desirable limits of price fluctuations with intermediate 
alerts or action points would provide and objective set of price criteria to 
be taken into account, inter alia, in reaching decisions affecting disposals or 
replenishment of the reserve. Furthermore, those provisions would supply 
7.84 ibid. 
7.86 "Revue of Possible Elements in a New International Wheat Agreement, Draft of Part B (Integration 
of Reserve Stocks and Proce Provisions", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 57, 4 August 1976. 
7.88 "The Economic Implications of Integrating Reserve and Price Provisions", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 55, 30 
July, 1976, p.1 
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the mechanisms for a trigger system whose formula relied wholly or in part 
on price movements.,,1.61 
Thlls, although there were clearly advantages to a fully-integrated reserve and price 
scheme, safeguards were brought forward that would minimise the risk of inappropriate re-
medial action being taken. Price movements alone would be insufficient to activate a trigger 
mechanism; however, a formula relating to both prices as well as overall stock movements 
would provide a more balanced trigger point. Consultations would also be invariably held 
before any stock actions would be activated.1.68 The final point of deliberation regarding 
integration concerned the structure of the agreement. The question was whether the reserve 
and stock provisions should be combined within a single convention or set up in separate 
conventions forming part of a master agreement.7.69 
Given the reciprocal relationship of these instruments, the adoption of the separate 
convention option would require a precise coordinating arrangement and a formalised role 
for liaison and consultation procedures. These and other technical questions were presented 
to the full Council membership following the third meeting of the Preparatory Group, 22-23 
September, 1976.1.70 This report revived development in all major issue areas, identified the 
remaining problem areas and set the timetables through to the completion of the negotiating 
conference. 
The major problems remaining in the development of the agreement as outlined include: 
1. Some experts viewed the determination of the precise nature of the rights and obliga-
tions to be undertaken by member governments as key to the negotiation of a new 
international wheat agreement, whatever it content. Special needs of developing 
member countries should be taken into account. 
7.117 "The Economic Implications of Integrating Reserve and Price Provisions", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 55, 30 
July 1976; "Review of Possible Elements in a New International Wheat Agreement - Draft of Part B, (The 
Integration of Reserve Stock and Price Provisions) IWC, IWA (Sec.) 57, 4 August 1976. 
7.118 ibid., p.5 
7.lIe ibid. 
7.70 "Revised Draft: Report by the Executive Secretary on the Third Meeting of the Preparatory Group 
(Technical)" IWC, IWC (Sec.) 64 (Rev.l) 12 November 1976. Countries represented included: Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Egypt (Arab Republic Of), European Economic Community, Finland, India, Japan, 
Malta, Norway, pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the United States of America. 
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2. The distinction hitherto made between "indicative" and "regulatory" price systems 
was considered misleading. They should not be considered mutually exclusive since 
an "agreement could be constructed including both a price range with rights and 
obligations, and an indicator to give the alert in determining market conditions and 
to provide a first line of defence of the maximum and minimum price." 
3. The determination of wheat quality differentials and the computations of price equiv-
alents proved to be one of the most intractable problems. One school of thought 
maintained that the old concept of fixed differentials was still workable and that the 
problems arising in 1967 were a function of abnormal market conditions. "Other 
experts questioned whether the 'normality' of any given period could be established, 
and suggested that the technical difficulties alone of establishing differentials might 
be insurmountable."7.71 
4. Due to the complexities involved in prIce provisions, the secretariat and expert 
groups had devoted considerable attention to developing a comprehensive pricing 
system. The development of the "standstill" proposal provided a means of avoiding 
the need to calculate quality differentials and price equivalents in an agreement with 
maximum and minimum prices.7.72 The setting of maximum and minimum prices 
was considered beyond the scope of the preparatory group, however, the "standstill" 
proposal appeared to be technically feasible and was therefore retained as an option. 
5. The relationship among the major elements of a new wheat agreement was also 
a point of discussion. Reserve and price provisions could be considered an or-
ganic unity with a common membership. Participants that did not actually hold 
stocks would contribute to the carrying charges. Alternatively, building on the two-
Convention approach of previous agreements, a three-Convention agreement might 
also function well. A Wheat Trade Convention (with or without price provisions) 
would have a broadly based membership as in the 1971 Wheat Trade Convention as 
7.71 ibid., p.3 
7.72 ibid., p.4 
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would the Reserve Conventions. The Food Aid Conventions would be confined to a 
smaller membership. 
6. To this point, Food Aid was considered beyond the terms ofreference of the Prepara-
tory Group. The question of its future inclusion remained unresolved. 
7. Problems involving trade with non-member countries would be reduced if the few sig-
nificant wheat trading nations currently outside of the agreement could be brought 
in.1 .13 
Having presented the problem areas as outlined, the Council concluded that the limits 
of profitable technical work conducted by the Preparatory Group had been reached and a 
summary of options and their ramifications could be finalised for submission to the negoti-
ating conference. As the third Protocol of extension of the International Wheat Agreement 
1971 was due to expire 30 June 1978, it would be necessary to conclude the negotiating 
conference not later than January/February 1978.1.14 
To this end, the secretariat resumed the development of the main remaining problem 
areas - indication mechanisms and reserve stock provisions. Development of indicator 
mechanisms and their application began with the clarification that indicated that it is es-
senti ally the means of monitoring the market in numerical terms. A rise or fall in indicator 
value would therefore correspond with a respective tightening or easing of the market situa-
tion. The role which indicator mechanisms could play in a new International Wheat Agree-
ment was also expanded beyond the trigger-action conceptualisation of the Preparatory 
7.13 ibid., p.7 
T.T'This section has provided an overview of the discussions conducted between July and October 1976. 
For detailed discussions involving those issues, see "Working Relations Between Reserve Stocks and Wheat 
Trade Schemes", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 60, 12 August 1976; "Hypothetical operation of various trigger mecha-
nisms," IWC, IWA (Sec.) 59, 13 August 1976; "Problems Associate~ With the Initial Build Up of Reserve 
Stocks", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 61, 19 August 1976; "Comparison of Rights and Obligations set out in Prep.(T) 
10 and 11", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 60, 19 August 1976, "Problems Associated With the Initial Build-up of 
Reserve Stocks, Draft", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 63, 26 August 1976; "Draft Revised 'Options' Paper Section VI 
Consultation Provisions", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 54, 28 July 1976; "Draft Revised 'Options' Paper: Section V: 
Reporting Provisions, Miscellaneous Provisions, Administration, Final Provision", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 63, 28 
July 1976; "A Review of Possible Elements in a New International Wheat Agreement: Redraft of Chapter 
on Reserve Provisions", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 65, 21 October 1976; "A Review of Possible Elements in a New 
International Wheat Agreement: Redraft of Part B of Prep.(T) 11 (The Integration of Stock and Price 
Provisions)", IWC, IWA (Sec.) 66,22 October 1976. 
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Group,7.75 to provide useful reinforcement of subjective analysis regardless of the possible 
relationship to a reserve stock scheme. As the eventual content of a new agreement could 
not be predicted, various eventualities were explored. 
Detailed studies served to advance both the theoretical and statistical application of 
quantitative and price indicators in the context of a new International Wheat Agreement. 
The reports of these studies, in combination with a detailed review of reserve stock provisions 
formed the basis of the negotiation document submitted by the International Wheat Council 
to the United Nations Wheat Conference, February, 1978.7.76 
A significant political development in 1977 vis-a-vis the negotiations was the election 
in the United States of Democrat Jimmy Carter. The Carter Administration took a more 
favourable view of the negotiations than their predecessors. President Carter was a farmer 
prior to entering politics, and Robert Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture, had considerable 
experience in the development of agricultural stabilisation programmes. 
7.5. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
"U nited Nations Conference to Negotiate an Interna-
tional Agreement to Replace the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1971, as Extended": Part I 
7.5.1. Introduction 
The United Nations Wheat Conference, which convened in Geneva under the auspices of 
UNCTAD in February 1978, would merge many varied constituencies to negotiate a new 
1.15 "Indicative Mechanisms in Practice: Part One, Introduction: Quantitative Indicators", IWe, IWA 
(Sec.) 68, 13 January 1977. See also, "Reserve Stock Provisions in a New Agrement", Prep.(75) WP.8; 
"International Grain Reserves - Trigger Action", Prep.(75) WP 14; "International Grain Reserves - Price 
and Quantitative Trigger Mechanisms" Prep.(7S) WP.lS. 
1.1hIndicator Mechanisms in Practice: Part I. Introduction and Quantitative indicators" IWA Secre-
tariat, IWA (Sec.) 68, 13 January 1977; "Indicator Price Mechanisms in Practice: Part II. Price Indicators 
and Conclusions," IWA Secretariat, IWA (Sec.) 72, 16 May 1977; "A Revue of Possible Elements in a New 
International Wheat Agreement: Reserve Stock Provisions", IWA Secretariat, IWA (Sec.) 68 (Rev.) 21 
January 1977; "A Review of Possible Elements in a New International Wheat Agreement: Reserve Stock 
Provisions", IWA Secretariat, IWA (Sec.) 69,2 February 1977; "A Review of Possible Elements in a New 
International Wheat Agreement Third Redraft of Part A III of Prep.(T) 11 (Price Provisions)", IWA Sec-
retariat, IWA (Sec.) 71, 9 February 1977. 
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International Wheat Agreement. The conference was open to all parties to the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extended, which through the IWO provided background 
documents as a basis for the negotiations, as well as all member states of UNCTAD.7.77 
In addition, the newly-formed FAO based World Food Security Committee (WFSC) 
provided technical and statistical input to the conference,7.78 and representatives of non-
member governments and specialised agencies were present as observers. 
The formal and unanimous adoption of the rules and agenda for the conference masked 
the undercurrents of differences within the representative groups. The U.S. expressed sup-
port for an agreement based on a reserve stock of 30mmt; full participation in cost sharing 
and some trigger mechanism formula encompassing both qualitative and price indicators. 7. 79 
Such an arrangement would serve its need for surplus stock regulations. 
Canada, having instituted a comprehensive national program of marketing controls was 
reluctant to enter an agreement with firm minimum/maximum prices on the grounds that 
such an agreement was too easily broken.7.8O Given variable production levels, Australia 
was reluctant to commit to a stock holding arrangement. It was, however, the EEC that 
most clearly defined what the lines of negotiation would be. In the words of Canadian 
delegates, "The EEC adopted a tactic of isolating the four exporters and pursuing a price 
type of arrangement with supplementary provisions that was strongly supported by the 
importers."7.81 The EEC also declared that it was "not prepared to work on an international 
agreement on wheat alone ~ something had to be achieved for coarse grains.,,7.81 The 
agreement was also weakened before the discussions even began, when on January 25 1978, 
7·T7 Significant differences existed in the memberships of these two bodies. As detailed in Chapter 2, 
the IWC is a producer-consumer focus dominated by the major exporters with a predominantly commer-
cial orientation. UNCTAD, which addresses trade and economic relations of developing countries, became 
increasingly unified with the emergence of the Group of 77 in 1965. 
7.7I The WFSC, which was established at the Rome 1974 World Food Conference, was dependent of the 
outcome ofthe UN Wheat Conference in the pursuit of its objectives of (a) supporting the establishment of 
national stock policies and (b) maintaining the supply/demand market situation. Alexander Sarvis, Philip 
Abbot and Lance Taylor, p.79. 
7.711Confidential Source: From Geneva - To Extoll Feb. 28/78 "UN Wheat Conference Summary 
Report" 
7.IO ibid., See also Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, Canada "ince 19-45: Power, Politic" 
and Provincialum (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1989), pp.342-44. 
7.11 Fm. Geneva To Extoll Feb. 28, 1978, "UN Wheat Conference Summary Report" 
7.82 Confidential Source Fm. Was. D.C. UNTD 0985 March 10, 1978 
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China, a major importer, declared its intention not to participate ill the discussions. 7 .83 
Despite the inevitable prejudices and problems, work on the substantive issues proceeded. 
7.5.2. Overview 
Following the first round of meetings on substantive issues, an evaluation was prepared 
which included an examination of the draft text prepared by the Executive Secretary of 
the IWC (TD/WHEAT.6/R.l) and the "summing up" of preparatory work by the con-
ference Chairman. acknowledging the work of the Preparatory Group and the Conference 
committee, with particular reference to the work of the Economic Committee and the Sub-
Commitee on Wheat, the chairman summarised the objectives of the Convention as follows. 
(a) to assure supplies of wheat and wheat flour to importing members and markets for 
wheat and wheat flour to exporting members, especially to developing members; 
(b) to contribute to the fullest extent possible to the stability of the international wheat 
market in the interests of both importing and exporting members, especially of 
developing members; 
(c) to contribute to world food security, especially safeguarding the interests of de vel-
oping members; 
(d) to moderate extreme price fluctuations of wheat; 
(e) to promote the expansion of international trade in wheat; and 
(f) to encourage greater international cooperation in all aspects of the trade in wheat. 7.84 
It was generally agreed that the implementation of these objectives, particularly the 
objectives of greater stability in the world market and world food security, would be fur-
thered by the establishment of an international stock policy resulting from the coordinated 
management of national reserve stocks which would be adequate to rescue excessive price 
7·13 Confidential source: Memo to file - John Dingwell, "Wheat Conference - Food Aid Conventions, 
Interdepartmental Meeting" Feb. 9, 1978 
7.14 "Preparation of an International Arra.ngement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, 
as Extended: Summing up by the Chairman" UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/EX.R.5, 22 March 1978, pp.1-2. 
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fluctuations. A major problem remained in determining the nature and definition of the 
range within which these fluctuation should be contained or moderated.T.s5 Despite the 
differences, there appeared to be agreement as to the need for members to undertake joint 
reserve stock actions at specified price action points and in extreme price or market situa-
tions to take corrective actions.T•86 
In order to implement a reserve stock undertaking, members were requested to convey 
to the Conference the existing arrangements within their systems which would enable them 
to fulfil their reserve stock obligations under a new agreement. In order to fulfil the market 
stabilisation function, and based on past production variations, 30mmt was considered to 
be an optimal total size for a reserve. A range of 12-15mmt was also tabled; however, 
based on previous studies, such a reserve would have questionable value in terms of market 
stabilisation.T.8T 
With regard to reserve stock action, agreement appeared achievable if the reserve stock 
action based on price indicator movements followed certain lines: 
(a) At the first falling, or rising, price action points, consultations within the Market 
Review Committee would assess the current and prospective market situation. 
(b) At the second falling price action point, the question remains as to whether the 
accumulation of reserve stocks should be automatic of subject to agreement. 
(c) At the second rising price action point, the release of stocks should give prior-
ity to the requirements of developing members, however, the question of whether 
stock release should be exclusively for the benefit of importing members remained 
unresolved.T•s8 
Measures to be taken in extreme price situations remained a contentious issue with import-
ing countries attaching as much importance to assurances of supply as exporting countries 
did to the question of assurances of markets. 
7.86 ibid., p.2. The U.S. maintained that "the objectives should be met through reserve stock actions and 
other measures affecting availability of supplies". The EEC wanted price triggers. 
7.ae ibid. 
7.87 ibid .. See also Alexander Sarris, Philip Abbott and Lance Taylor, p.7.7 
7 .aa ibid., p.3 
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On the recommendation of the Economic Committee on Wheat, the members agreed 
that developing countries should receive assistance from reserve stocks enabling them to 
fulfil their obligations under a new agreement. 7.89 Conference reports regarding the Food 
Aid Convention, Economic Committee on Coarse Grains and the Administrative Committee 
would be reviewed separately. 
7.5.3. Food Aid Committee 
The Food Aid Committee was established by the Executive Committee on 16 February with 
the objective of carrying out an international food aid programme "ensuring the availability 
of not less than 10mmt of wheat and other grains suitable for human consumption annually 
to developing countries.,,7.9o The work of the Food Aid Committee proved to be the least 
contentious of all the committees, and by late March the Draft Food Aid Convention, 1978 
was in place. The Convention to a large extent followed the structure and provisions of 
previous food aid conventions, and differed mainly in the size of the undertaking. The 
newly elected Carter Administration in the United States supported an increase in the 
total food aid commitment from 4mmt to lOmmt 7.91 During the final sessions of the Food 
Aid Committee in March, the U.S. announced its intention to double its commitment to 
4.47mmt under the new FAC and also called for additional provisions for emergency relieU·9:l 
The provisions of the Draft Food Aid Convention were formalised and with the exception 
of the allocation of the minimum annual contributions of members it proceeded without 
difficulties to the final draft. 7.93 The outstanding issue regarding contribution allocation 
was also largely resolved in the final draft Food Aid Convention as transmitted by the Food 
Aid Committee for its consideratioll. The formula agreed on was as follows: 
7 .Ie ibid., p.3 
1.80 "Preparation of an International Agreement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, 
as Extended: report of the Food Aid Committee", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/EX/R.2, 21 March 1978, p.2 
1.81Confidential Source, "Record of Technical Meeting of Wheat Exporting Countries", Washington, 
February 1, 1978. 
u2Confidential Source, Fm. Geneva to ExtOtt, March 3, 1978, YTA G0805. 
7.1l~ "Preparation of an International Arrangement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement, 1971 
as Extended: Draft Food Aid Convention" UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/R.4, 26 October, 1978. p.8 
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• Austria reserved its 
commitment until the Austrian Government had taken a final decision.7.94 
The convention also provided for the establishment of a Food Aid Committee which was 
to meet at least twice a year in conjunction with the statutory sessions of the IWC in order 
to: 
(a) receive regular reports from members on the amount, content, channelling and terms 
of their contribution under the Convention; 
(b) keep under review the purchase of grains financed by cash contributions with partic-
ular reference to the obligation in paragraph [(8)] of Article III concerning purchases 
of grain from developing [member] countries; 
(c) examine the way in which the obligations undertaken under this conventions have 
been fulfilled; 
(d) exchange information on a regular basis on the functioning of the food aid arrange-
ment under this Convention, in particular where information is available, on its 
effects on food production in recipient countries.7.95 
The Food Aid Committee was also to evaluate situations in which low income developing 
countries experience substantial feedgrain production shortfalls and make recommendations 
to members for increased food aid allotments. 
7.e4 ibid., p.ll 
7.Q6 ibid. 
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7.5.4. Coarse Grains 
The inclusion of a separate convention on coarse grains within a new International Wheat 
Agreement was unforeseen during the preparatory stage of the deliberations. Although 
coarse grains were always considered to be an integral part of a new agreement, the issue 
received a new prominence at the insistence of the EEC. Meeting in Washington, the U.S. 
and EEC aired their differences on a bilateral basis. The EEC minister laid out his terms 
to United States Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland. Given the interdependence of 
wheat and coarse grains in the EEC domestic market and given the relationship of domestic 
prices with international prices, a separate but similar convention on coarse grains would 
be the only technique available for dealing with the market as a whole. A comprehensive 
agreement on coarse grains was to be the precondition of the participation of the EEC in a 
w heat arrangement. 7.96 
The EEC was, however, willing to consider a stocking arrangement as a price stabilisation 
technique. As the EEC was clearly resolute in its determination to institute a convention 
for coarse grains, the U.S. pushed strongly for improved access to the EEC coarse grains 
market. U.S. officials insisted that the U.S. Senate would never agree to an agreement on 
coarse grains in the absence of improved access to the EEC market.7.97 Carroll Gunderlach 
reiterated that the EEC had "a political need for coarse grains to be included in an interna-
tional stabilisation arrangement and an inability, again for political reasons, to contemplate 
improved access for coarse grains."7.98 
The options open at the conclusions of this meeting included: the Fourth Extension 
of the Wheat Trade Convention and Food Aid Conventions which were set to expire on 
June 30th, 1978; to schedule additional bilateral meetings; and to reconvene the Conference 
as a whole. The IWA Conference chair chose the third option and established an Interim 
Committee to draft the text of a new international arrangement before the Conference 
7.IIO Confidential Source, "Bergland/Gunderlach Discussions: IWC" Fm. Wash. DC, To Extoll ECW, 
UNTD0999, March 13, 1978. 
7.117 ibid. 
7.8a ibid. 
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would reconvene in September 1978. 7.99 Thus, although meetings regarding coarse grains 
were held within the context of the Conference, little substantial progress was made pending 
the outcome of the bilateral meetings. 7.100 
7.6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
"United Nations Conference to Negotiate an Interna-
tional Agreement to Replace the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1971, as Extended: Part II 
The International Wheat Conference was reconvened in Geneva on 6th November 1978 in 
light of changing market conditions and changing negotiating positions on the part of the 
major actors. The Interim Committee initiated examinations relating to the production, 
utilisation and stocking of feedgrains as members moved slowly toward the acceptance of 
an agreement that would include coarse grains. Bilateral meetings also continued, as the 
priorities and problems of the Conference moved away from the question of reserves to 
the inclusion of a Coarse Grain Trade Convention. The most difficult point relating to 
grain reserves was the Australian insistence that it be allowed to use reserve stocks for 
commercial purposes. As the Australian position hardened, the U.S. Undersecretary who 
responded in exasperation that "perhaps there was the need for another period of low prices, 
and later shortages to convince some LDC's and Australia that an agreement would be in 
their interests.,,7.101 By late September, the important remaining difficulties were price 
indicator levels and the question of Australian reserve utilisation. 
Perhaps more potentially damaging to the negotiations was the shifting in the political 
will of the major exporters to conclude a successful agreement.7.10l In this regard, the 
7.88 "Preparation of an InterIlational Arrangement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, 
as Extended: Draft Resolution Submitted by the Chairman", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/L.3, 22 March 
1978. The Interim Committee consisted of: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, EEC, Finland, 
India, Japan, Kenya, U.S.S.R. and U.S. 
7.100 "Preparation of an International Arrangement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, 
as Extended: Report of the Economic Committee of Coarse Grains", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/R.4, 22 
March 1978. 
7.101Confidential Source, "IWA Interim Committee", Fm. GVMTN To Extott, YTGR4411, July 13, 
1978. 
7.102 Confidential source: "Wheat Discussions - Meeting between Canadian and American Senators", 
To Hon. Otto Lang, Minister Responsible for Canadian Wheat Board, from W. Miner, Coordinator, Grain 
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Canadian Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whelan, expressed interest in pursuing the idea 
of a "wheat cartel" as raised in a meeting with U.S. Senators McGovern, Dole and Bellman. 
In response, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau "wrote to Mr. Whelan instructing him not to 
pursue this idea since it was not in accord with government policy."1.103 
The official statement regarding the cartel proposal was that the "Senators' proposals 
are intended to provide an impetus to the slow moving IWA negotiations by showing a 
willingness to act outside of the agreement. '1.104 In addition to the political obstacles to an 
agreement, the softening of the international grain market in late 1978 also inhibited the 
negotiations. 
Nonetheless, the conference committees and delegates continued to search for common 
ground to bring about a new agreement. To this end, a Draft Coarse Grain Trade Conven-
tion, and a Draft Wheat Trade Convention were tabled at the November 6 meeting.1.105 The 
Draft Coarse Grain Trade Convention was very nearly a mirror image of the Draft Wheat 
Trade Convention and, having established the necessity of including a comprehensive plan 
for the treatment of coarse grains within the agreement, progress was swift. 
During the course of the November meetings, agreement was reached on many of the 
outstanding issues relating primarily to the Economic Provisions of both the Draft Wheat 
Trade Convention and the Draft Coarse Grain Trade Convention. Revised documents re-
lating to: Draft Wheat Trade Convention: Economic Provisions; a Draft Wheat Trade 
Convention: Administrative and Final Provisions and a Draft International Wheat Trade 
Convention: Chapter Three - Special Provisions Relating to Developing Members were 
forwarded to the Executive Committee for consideration.1.106 
Group. In discussing the workability of a. "whea.t cutel" the Sena.tors a.greed tha.t the 'four' exporters should 
"coopera.te and ma.nage their supplies to ensure tha.t the market returns were at least the cost of production" . 
T.103Confidential source: "Whea.t Cartel Proposal" To Under Secretuy, From Commodity and Energy 
Policy Division, ECW-2306, October 5, 1978. 
7.10t ibid. 
7.1011 "Preparation of a.n International Agreement: Draft Coarse Grain Trade Convention", UNCTAD, 
TD/WHEAT.6/R.3, 26 October 1978 and "Preparation of an International Agreement: Draft Wheat Tra.de 
Convention", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/R.2.Add.l, 26 October 1978. 
T.l011 "Preparation of an International Arrangement: Draft Wheat Trade Convention: Economic 
Provisions", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/EX/R.7, 22 November 1978j "Prepara.tion of a.n Interna.tional 
Arra.ngement: Dra.ft Whea.t Trade Convention: Administra.tion and Final Provisions", UNCTAD, 
TD/WHEAT.6/EX/R.8/ Add.l, 29 November 1978j a.nd "Preparation of a.n Interna.tional Arra.ngement: 
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Despite the considerable progress in the development of the various conventions, four 
problem areas remained: the price indicator level for stock accumulation; the Australian 
stock obligation relief; reserve stock levels and food aid donation levels.7. 107 On 24 November 
1978, the Conference Chairman, while acknowledging the important progress that had been 
made, noted that further consultations were needed to reach a definitive agreement. The 
work of the Conference was therefore suspended and the Interim Committee recommended 
to consider the relevant factors with a view to the resumption of the Conference.7. 108 
The suspension of the Conference received mixed reactions. The emerging conditions of 
surplus world stocks had taken the urgency out of the negotiations, however, talks between 
Tomas Saylor, head of the U.S. negotiating team and Claude Villain, head of the EEC 
delegation continued. The Canadian Department of External Affairs records show that 
such an informal meeting took place between Mr. Saylor and Mr. Villain on December 
8th 1978 at which price levels were agreed upon. On December 12th, U.S. Undersecretary 
Hathaway called William Miner, head of the Canadian delegation "to see if Canada could 
live with the informal outcome of the talks" .7.109 
7.7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
"U nited Nations Conference to Negotiate an Interna-
tional Agreement to Replace the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1971, as Extended: Part III 
However positive the outcome of the informal discussions, they were both fleeting and very 
private. When the Conference reconvened on 22nd January, the differences remained. A 
significant change in the u.s. position was evident, as one Canadian delegate noted: "For 
the first time in more than a decade, the u.s. is strongly supporting [as opposed to simply 
supporting] a new wheat agreement" .7.110 The meetings progressed, and by the final week, 
Draft International Wheat Trade Convention: Chapter Three - Special Provisions Relating to Developing 
Countries", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/EX/R.10, 28 December 1978. 
7.107Fm. Wash. DC To Extott, ECB, UNT04859 November 10, 1978 
7.101 "Preparation of an International Agreement: Draft Resolution submitted by the Chairman", UNC-
TAD, TD/WHEAT.6/L.4, 24 November 1978. 
7.10llConfidential Source: File 37-15-Wheat-Vo1.31, 78-09. 01-31.1-79 
7·11°Confidential Source: "Resumed Wheat Conference: Canadian Position", January 11, 1979, File 
31-15-Wheat Vol.31 
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a number of draft conventions were submitted to the Contact Group of the Chairman of 
the Conference for further consideration. These included: Draft Wheat Trade Convention: 
Economic Provisions, Addendum; Draft Coarse Grains Trade Convention; and the Draft 
World Wheat Trade Convention: Administration and Final Provisions. 1.111 
In summarising the status of the negotiations, the Conference Chairman noted that as of 
8 February 1979, reserve stock commitments totalled 18 to 19 mmt, with the possibility of 
further build ups in the future. Despite intensive efforts to reconcile positions on price level 
action points, a compromise was still not achieved, A new proposal which would subject 
the second falling price point to transitional arrangements for the first year of operation was 
being explored. Another provision that required additional discussions related to the price 
level at which developing countries would accumulate stocks. A $10 differential remained 
between the proposed price and the price developing countries were willing to accept. Al-
though the second rising price point also remained unresolved, agreement had been reached 
on most other substantive issues. In concluding his report, the Chairman declared that "a 
compromise was clearly possible, and that reconciliation of positions on stocks and price 
levels at various action points remained". As the conference was approaching its final stage 
he urged delegates to "demonstrate their political will to reach an agreement.,,1.112 
7.S. The Breakdown 
The UNCTAD Conference had achieved a remarkable degree of success in reaching agree-
ment on the technical aspects of a new International Wheat Agreement. It was, however, 
a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
Paris in early 1979 that led to the adjournment of the Conference. Private interviews with 
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Robert Bergland, and the Undersecretary of Agriculture 
7.111 "Preparation of an International Arrangement: Draft Wheat Trade Convention: Economic Pro-
visions, Addendum', UNCTAD, TD.WHEAT.6/EX/R.1l/Add.l, 7 February 1979; "Preparation of an In-
ternational Arrangement: Draft Coarse Grains Trade Convention", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/EX/R.13, 9 
February 1979; and "Preparation of an International Arrangement: Draft World Wheat Trade Convention: 
Administration and Final Provisions", UNCTAD, TD/Wheat.6/EX/R.14. These draft conventions were 
largdy complete, with only a few remaining unresolved articles. 
7.
112 This summary was taken from "Preparation of an International Agreement: Draft Wheat Trade 
Convention: Chairman's Contact group, Status of the Negotiations. Notes by the Chairman", UNCTAD, 
TD/WHEAT.6/EX/R.12, 8 February 1979. 
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for International Affairs and Commodity Programmes (1979-81) Dale Hathaway revealed 
that the decision to terminate the UNCTAD conference was taken at the OECD meeting. 
Robert Bergland described the meetings as an attempt to reach political consensus before 
concluding the technical discussions. He said that he left the Paris meetings convinced that 
an agreement in principle had been reached. He added that he thought in the end the 
French had scuttled it.7 . ll3 Mr. Hathaway was able to be more specific about the end of 
the negotiations. He described an evening in which, after a long session without making 
much progress, delegates adjourned and agreed to meet at midnight again. The heads of 
the delegations convened for dinner, and at the dinner, Claude Villain, head of the EEC 
delegation asked Mr. Hathaway if the U.S. Administration would survive politically if no 
agreement was reached. Mr. Hathaway replied that it would. Mr. Villain said "Good, then 
you have no agreement" .7.114 
The next day, the Chairman of the UNCTAD adjourned the Conference, requested 
that the IWC extend the Wheat Trade Convention, 1971; requested that the Food Aid 
Committee extend the Food Aid Convention, 1971 in light of the work accomplished at 
the Conference; instructed the Secretariat of the conference, in consultation with the IWC 
to prepare a summary of the present status of the work of the Conference, with a view 
to the resumption of the negotiations and requested that the IWC, once satisfied that 
the necessary conditions exist for a resumption of the negotiations, recomended that the 
Secretary general of UNCTAD fix a date for reconvening the Conference.7. llS The conference 
was not reconvened. 
The failure to reconvene the conference meant that Claude Villain of France was correct 
that there would be no international wheat agreement. In the 1980's there were periodic 
attempts by some to revive the momentum of the 1970's, but circumstances were different 
and the enormous grain surpluses of the period together with the free market orientation of 
T.1U Private Interview: Mr. Robert Bergland, U.S. Undersecretary of Agriculture (1977-81) Washington, 
19 August, 1992 
T.1U Private Interview: Mr. Dale Hathaway, Undersecretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and 
Commodity Programmes (1977-81), Washington, 21 August, 1992. 
7.1ti "Preparation of an International Arrangement: Draft Decision submitted by the Chairman of the 
Conference", UNCTAD, TD/WHEAT.6/L.8, 14 February, 1979. 
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the American and other Western governments made the notion of an international reserve 
agreement impossible. 
The preceding case study has illuminated several important aspects of the int('rnational 
wheat trade and, indeed, international political economy of the 1970's. In the case of the 
wheat trade, one sees immediately the fundamental shifts that occurred after the collapse of 
the International Wheat Agreement in 1968 and the end of the Canadian-American duopoly 
which, in effect, acted to maintain stability in the mmarket through the maintenance of 
reserve stocks. The full extent of these changes became evident only at the end of the 
1970's; policy makers during that decade continued to act upon assumptions which in some 
cases derived from earlier periods. Nevertheless, the "shocks" of the decade, ranging from 
the sudden changes in United States economic policy in the early 1970's to the OPEC crisis 
following in 1973, and the almost simultaneous "World Food Crisis", seemingly shattered 
many of the bases upon which policy had been made in earlier decades. We see the influence 
of these events in the negotiations described above. They were also seen in domestic and 
international politics. 
In describing this period, Daniel Yergin, the historian of the energy crisis, noted how the 
quadrupling of oil prices created by the Arab embargo and the exporters' surprising success 
in setting oil prices dramatically affected western economies and western assumptions: 
For the developed countries of the industrial West, the sudden hike in 
oil prices brought profound dislocations. The oil rents flooding into the 
treasuries of the exporters added up to a huge withdrawal of their purchas-
ing power - what became known as the "OPEC Tax". The imposition of 
this "tax" sent the industrial countries into deep recession. The U.S. gross 
national product plunged 6% between 1973 and 1975, while unemployment 
doubled to 9%. Japan's GNP declined in 1974 for the first time since the end 
of World War II. As the Japanese worried that their economic miracle might 
be over, sobered students in Tokyo stopped chanting "Goddamn GNP" at 
demonstrations and instead found new virtue in hard work and the promise 
of lifetime employment. At the same time, the price increases delivered a 
powerful inflationary shock to economies in which inflationary forces had al-
ready taken hold. While economic growth resumed in 1976 in the industrial 
world, inflation had become so embedded in the fabric of the West that it 
came to he seen as the intractable problem of the modern age. 7. U6 
r. u8 Daniei Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Que8t for Oil, Money, and Power, (New York, Touchstone: 
1991), p.635 
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These seemingly fundamental changes around the negotiations for an international reserve 
swirled. What, then, are the most striking characteristics of the negotiations and what does 
each revear? 
1 The so-called developing countries played a much more significant part in the ne-
gotiations than they had in earlier or, for that matter, later periods. UNCTAD 
in which they had considerably more influence than in the GATT was central to 
the wheat reserve negotiations. It is evident throughout the negotiations that the 
success of the OPEC cartel deeply influenced the understanding of international po-
litical economy on the part of all ofthe principal actors. Moreover, the OPEC cartel 
and the food crisis seemed to combine to create a greater sense of interdependence. 
The first Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the economist Raul Prebisch, had argued 
at UNCTAD I and II that, over the long term developing countries' position had 
deteriorated relative to that of developed countries because of a long-range trend to-
wards a deteriorating trade position for commodity producers. Developed countries 
could protect their primary producers through subsidies and did so, but develop-
ing countries could not. To prevent this deterioration, Prebisch saw two sets of 
convergent measures commodity agreements and compensatory financing, but first, 
he declared, must come the political decision to recognise that deterioration was 
harmful to all. Then came the oil and food crises. "All of a sudden," one observer 
recalled, "the world was full of talk of producers' cartels." 7. 117 
2 Wheat was a commodity where the developed world was the major producer, and, 
unlike oil, sugar, cocoa and coffee, it was the developed nations that took the lead 
in reacting to the new understanding of the possibility of commodity agreements. 
In doing this, the leading producers were careful to avoid talk of cartels because at 
the same time they were attacking the cartelisation that was occuring in the case 
of oil and that was so deeply affecting their own economic systems. Furth<'fmore. 
there was a sense that the developing world was changing dramatically and that 
7.117Marcelo Raffaelli, Ri8e and Demi8e of Commodity Agreemenb, (Cambridge, England, Woodhead: 
1995) 
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the West had to cooperate rather than dominate its former dependencies. These 
considerations were, of course, much enhanced by the Cold War rivalries of the 
time. There was, too, a sense of fairness on the part of some western leaders. Prime 
Minister Trudeau of Cana.da, as we have seen, refused to countenance his agriculture 
minister's suggestion that there should be a grain cartel because of its implications 
for poorer countries. Jimmy Carter had a similar sense of international obligation 
that was to be lacking in future American presidents. 
3 Despite these humanitarian sentiments, domestic political concerns were also sig-
nificant. In these negotiations, the search for stability on the part of the major 
producers was strongly present, especially in the case of the North Americans. They 
were more insistent than the Australians, for example, and certainly more desirous 
of returning to earlier times than the Europeans. This attitude is hardly surprising 
since the Europeans had only just become a major grain exporter, and their do-
mestic agricultural problems meant that international solutions requiring a revision 
of the CAP were exceedingly difficult to implement because the CAP was probably 
the most important glue holding the EEC together. The controversy over coarse 
grains, the inclusion of coarse grain in an agreement, revealed the significance of the 
new export thrust of European agriculture policy and to a larger extent provided 
an insight into future developments. 
4 Finally and most importantly, it must be recognised that it was not the technical 
barriers that held back the creation of an international grain reserve or a new sub-
stantive International Wheat Agreement. Indeed, all of the major actors agreed in 
1978 that the technical obstacles were minimal. Most also recognised the economic 
advantages of an efficiently operating reserve system. What led to failure were two 
major factors: domestic political influences, notably in the case of the EEC; and 
changing perceptions of international political economy or, more fundamentally, of 
the interdependence of continents and peoples. By the end of the 1970's, free mar-
ket orientations were reasserting themselves in domestic politics and in international 
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the interdependence of continents and peoples. By the end of the 1970's, free mar-
ket orientations were reasserting themselves in domestic politics and ill international 
agencies. The Carter administration was in its last stages soon to be replaced by a 
Republican administration which distrusted international agreements, agencies, and 
actors. The 1970's paradigms shifted quite dramatically and international agencies 
administrating market allocation schemes were no longer acceptable to the Ameri-
cans, the British, and many others. In the 1980's, a period of enormous surpluses 
and subsidies in the grain trade, many came to see that opportunities had been lost 




The proposal to establish an international grain reserve represented an attempt by the in-
ternational community to establish a mechanism that would provide a degree of stability to 
the grain market, in terms of both supply and prices in the wake of the world food crisis of 
the mid 1970's.The crisis had illuminated the vulnerability of consumers world-wide to the 
extreme volatility of the international grain market. Western consumer groups campaigned 
for regulations to control food price inflation; however, it was the poorest developing coun-
tries that were particularly hard hit. With food aid commitments drastically reduced and 
remaining allocations furthering foreign policy objectives, essential but costly, food imports 
exacerbated the spiralling debt load of many of the poorest developing countries. 
The combination of domestic and international pressure culminated in the World Food 
Conference of 1974 and the subsequent negotiations in 1978-79 which sought to address 
the needs of those seeking stabilisation. During the course of these talks, however, ever 
increasing pressure was exerted by powerful constituencies within and between the major 
grain exporting countries whose interests would not be served by government regulation. 
In looking back on the negotiations those involved concur that once the talks had been 
adjourned, there would be no return to the bargaining table. Changes in market trends, 
political alliances and leadership had destroyed the foundations upon which the attempt 
to establish an international grain reserve had been based. The adjournment marked the 
end of an era of international collaboration in food security and market stabilisation and 
the beginning of a new era in the international grain trade characterised by cutthroat 
competition, unprecedented government intervention and trade wars. 
The thesis has focused on the period 1920-1990 during which time the world wheat 
trade has suffered many convulsions and fundamental changes. Nevertheless, the nature 
of the commodity has remained largely constant throughout the period. In terms of the 
international trade in grain, the question of balancing production levels with consumption 
210 
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demands has been central. That there have been few moments when an effective balance 
has been reached refiects the sensitivity of the "thinly-traded" market. In addition, the 
dependence of agricultural production on weather and other biological variables precludes 
any reliable long-term predictions regarding crop yields. Because the removal or addition 
of so little grain can so greatly affect price and markets, both states and market actors 
have tended to treat wheat as a special case. Thus, Canada and Australia moved early to 
intervene with the establishment of wheat boards. In the United States, the Henningson 
documents clearly reveal how American agricultural policy-makers regarded wheat as a 
particular commodity meriting exceptional treatment. Wars and the worldwide depression 
heightened this perception of the exceptionality of grain in overall economic planning. 
Not surprisingly, in this century, grain assumed a deliberate political status as food was 
often used, if not as a weapon, then as a subject of political interventions to achieve one or 
all three of the following objectives: 
1. the expansion of agricultural production and the maintenance of domestic farm 
income; 
2. the maximisation of international market share; and 
3. the achievement of foreign policy objectives. 
Political intervention by states has been shown to have been the key to the development 
of the grain industry on the part of the five major exporters. The grain trading companies, 
for their part, sought confidentiality and wherever possible, influenced the development of 
the industry indirectly. That the influence was enormous becomes dear as the history of 
the grain crisis of the 1970's has indicated. Dan Morgan's Merchants of Grain judged that 
the role of the companies had been central in the grain shortages that d('veloped in the 
early 1970's. It had a great influence, especially in his suggestion that the companies may 
have benefitted from the instability of the trade whereas consumers, importing nations, 
and, usually, producing nations often paid a considerable price. More recent studies offer 
mixed views. Michael Atkin in his 1995 study of the intenatiollal grain trade concluded 
that the competetive tension between the companies limits the infiu(,lIce of companil\S on 
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The period between 1920 and 1960 might best be described as "tile searcil for stability". 
The impact of the depression, World Wars I and II, and the Cold War made food security 
a goal widely shared. The first attempts at an international wheat agreement sought to 
obtain stability for both producing and consuming nations. After World War II as Western 
policymakers created the new multilateral institutions, negoiators from exporting and im-
porting countries signed an international wheat agreement that brought more stability in 
terms of prices and supply to the world the grain market then had been previously known 
in the twentieth century. In this respect the role of the United States was central. 
Despite a history marked by extraordinary vulnerability, rapid growth, sudden stagna-
tion, and intense political disruptions, the United States emerged as the major actor, and a 
catalytic one in the international grain trade and, later, in food aid. The Berton Hennigson 
material revealed clearly that the U.S. policymakers in framing U.S. agricultural policies in 
the 1940's and early 1950's were committed to the notion of the exceptionality of agriculture 
within the emerging world trade system. Depression and war had left the sense that stability 
in the prices of essential commodities was desirable and that a free trade orientation can not 
apply in agriculture where adjustments to market changes are slow and the threat of climate 
changes and infestation make output management impossible. Exceptionality of agriculture 
became a cornerstone of the policy formulation of the five exporters who, among them ac-
counted for, roughly, one-third of global wheat production and 90% of global trade. The 
importance of the United States hegemony as a stabilising force, particularly in the period 
1950-1968 was considerable. In periods of extreme market fluctuations the U.S. responded 
to the needs of domestic producers as well as international pressures through domestic 
adjustment programmes and through the initiation of international planning mechanisms. 
But the Americans brought instability as well. In 1968 the Intenational Wheat Agree-
ment collapsed, and it is clear that the other exporters largely blamed the U.S. for the 
ensuing instability. At this time, the middle powers - Canada, Australia and Argentina 
- played a particularly significant role. 
As was indicated above, they tried to save the International Wheat Agreement in the 
1960's and acted together to resist the increasing tendency towards independent action by 
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the United States, and the trend towards subsidisation (notably by the European Commu-
nity). The middle powers adjusted to the changes in United States and European Com-
munity policies with difficulty. They developed a number of common difficulties which 
included; lower market share (especially for the Canadians who had at one time formed a 
duopoly with the Americans in maintaining reserves and thus providing stability); limited 
resources to provide subsidisation (especially for the Argentians who in fact used grain to 
subsidise the urban working class); and a sense that the rules-based regime of the postwar 
era was disappearing. 
This set of circumstances set the stage for the discussions about the establishment of an 
international grain reserve in response to the most serious food crisis since postwar recon-
struction. This thesis has provided considerable new information and insights about these 
negotiations. What we learned is that the U.S. paramountcy remained. Nevertheless, it 
is also clear that American interests were perceived differently at different times. Bureau-
cratic politics, domestic politics, and broader foreign policy objectives were all evident. The 
United States, more than other national actors, is subject to the competing pressures of 
various domestic and foreign pressures. The Kissinger initiative to convene the World Food 
Conference in Rome in 1974 while inconsistent with the international trade policy orien-
tation of the Administration was clearly a quick and personal response to such competing 
domestic and international pressures. Private interviews done for this thesis have confirmed 
that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took this initiative without the knowledge of 
either his staff or, most significantly, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz. The relevant in-
ternational organisation, the FAO, was only informed after the fact that they would host 
the meeting that Kissinger had publicly announced. 
The negotiations and their failure illuminate the character of the international grain 
trade while illustrating how decisive the period was for that trade. The preceding chapters 
reveal several salient themes: 
1 The major grain exporting countries in their private discussions came to realise that 
an international grain reserve was technically possible and that it could contribute 
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to stability in grain prices and, most likely, to international food security. The IWC, 
United States, and Canadian documents are in accord in this respect. 
2 In the case of a buffer stock arrangement, both producers and consumers at vari-
ous times recognised that they would benefit from participation. Nevertheless, the 
competition between developed country producer interests and domestic political 
pressures, on the one hand, and the need for a stable and fair price for importers 
whether they be developed or developing countries deeply influenced the negotia-
tions. In a recent study of the history of commodity agreements, Marcelo Raffaelli 
notes that "To perform well, an international stabilization scheme should have as 
objectives both to iron out short-term price fluctuations and to reach a long-term 
balance between increased supply and demand". This latter goal proved difficult 
as producers rushed to increase supply to take advantage of higher prices and gain 
market share.8 .4 
3 In the case of the United States, the aggressive search for new markets was a major 
source of the shortages which brought on the dramatic increase in price in 1973-
74. Foreign policy interests first shaped the response that led to the World Food 
Conference of 1974. At a time when discussions of a new world economic order 
were common and when OPEC was revealing astonishing durability with extraor-
dinary effects on the world economic system, the United States leadership, through 
Kissinger, responded. It will be recalled that confidence in American leadership was 
badly shaken not only by external forces but most notably by Watergate. It was 
Henry Kissinger not Earl Butz or Republican market enthusiasts who set the agenda 
in that time of crisis. Later, the arrival of Democrat Robert Bergland brought views 
on international agriculture, which echoed, in many ways, those of Henry Wallace 
and the New Deal when the need to achieve stability and security were deemed 
of great importance. Their election in 1976 gave the Americans a Hew impetus to 
push for an international buffer stock arrangement. The return of the Republican 
UMarcelo Raffaelli, Ri.te and Demi.te of Commodity Agreement.s (Cambridge, England. Woodhead: 
1995), p.223. 
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administration in 1980 introduced a sceptical eye towards interference with the free 
market and towards plans to help the "South". There was, it was often said, a 
paradigm shift between the 1970's and 1980's. 
4 The 1970's had begun with the publication of the World Bank's Partners in De-
velopment, commissioned by Robert McNamara, and which called for a major com-
mitment to improve the lot of the world's developing countries. The spirit of that 
report and along with many others as the cold war rivalries, then at their height 
in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, made developing countries matter more than 
they had before or would in the 1980's.8.5 The paradigm of a "global commons" was 
reflected in the comments of many leaders at the World Food Conference, even those 
leaders who were identified as conservatives. Humanitarian motives were strongly 
expressed and did influence the proposals put forward for an international reserve 
scheme. Certainly the documents reflect these motives. Recall, for example, the 
private comment of Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to his agriculture minister 
who sought to take advantage of the wheat shortages to create a cartel that would 
boost prices. Such a policy, he claimed, did not reflect Canada's views. 
5 The views of the European Community, as it then was, undoubtedly also reflected 
humanitarian sentiments. Nevertheless, the fact that France Was the granary of Eu-
rope and that agricultural policy was fundamental to the unity of the Community 
meant that, on agricultural matters, France's voice was a loud one. In this thesis, 
the rise of a significant regional trading bloc is seen to have had an enormous impact 
on the international grain trade. The "domestic" requirements of the trading bloc 
transformed the international grain market. In the 1960's, the other major actors 
recognised the transformation that was occurring. The Americans tried in the late 
1960's to insist on liberalising markets through the GATT in an attempt to prevent 
'.6 Partner6 in development: Report of the Commiuion on lnternatioanl Development, (New York, 
Praeger: 1969). The report did call for buffer stock arrangements for commodities to assure stability. 
It had an impact on UNCTAD talks in the 1970's and numerous arrangements were made for certain com-
modities on which developing countries were highly dependent. A description of these can be found in 
Raffaelli, passim. 
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European subsidisation from proceeding. An offer to freeze subsidies by the Euro-
peans was then rejected by the United States. It was, Michael Atkin observes, a 
fateful decision: "nearly 30 years later, it is easy to see that the E.C.'s offer should 
have been grabbed with both hands, but the opportunity was lost" .8.6 
6 International agencies during this period seemed to playa declining role. UNC-
TAD, FAO, the IWC, and various other food agencies participated to some extent 
in discussions and negotiations, but the states and companies remained the prin-
cipal actors. A recent article commenting on UN reform refers to contemporary 
scholarship which points to the evolution of new forms of multilateral cooperation 
which "has outflanked the activities of the traditional global intergovernmental in-
stitutions because those institutions are either defective inefficient ineffective and , , 
largely irrelevant, or a combination of all of the above" .8.7 This process is evident in 
the case of wheat as the central postwar agency, the IWC, moves more towards the 
sidelines and becomes much less significant in multilateral cooperation in wheat. 
7 Finally, the creation of the powerful E.C. with its CAP that subsidised produc-
ers heavily and the response of the United States with policies that supported its 
producers, made the other major producers - developed middle powers - seek 
to influence the process by the creation of the Cairns Group. The Cairns Group 
of Fair Trading Nations was formed at Cairns, Australia in 1986 in order to facili-
tate major reform in international agricultural trade. In a comprehensive review of 
the evolving role of middle powers in contemporary international relations, authors 
Cooper, Higgott and Nossal have examined the role and strategic importance of this 
diverse group, particularly in relation to the catalytic role in the Uruguay Round. 
Their findings indicate that the combined strength of the Cairns Group provided "a 
genuine alternative middle ground upon which the major actors could meet.8 .8 
U Atkins, The International Grain Trade, pp.25-26 
I.7W. Andy Knight, "Beyond the UN System: Critical Perspectives on Global Governance and Multila-
teeal Evolution", Global Governance (May-Aug.1995), p.240 
1.1 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Power~ p.175 
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This thesis has described an attempt to find a solution to the age old problem of interna-
tional food security. The initiative failed because numerous conditions that had permitted 
stability and security in the grain trade in the immediate postwar era collapsed in the late 
1960's and early 1970's. In this respect, the situation in wheat parallels what happened 
with the Bretton Woods system more generally. The fears of the 1970's negotiators have 
proven to be well-founded. In a 1995 speech after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
and the formation of the WTO, H.W. Singer raised the prospect of the "quasi-regime" in 
food would be unable to deal with new factors that impinge upon global food security. He 
worries that developing countries may become more dependent on food aid which preempts 
their own production while food trade with higher prices will result in more dependence on 
such aid. Moreover, the U.S. and the EU may no longer be able to raise yields; environ-
mental degredation may prevent further use of fertilisers and pesticides; and China and the 
"Tigers" may need major food imports. Singer warns: 
"It is quite possible that the initial rise in food prices predicted by the 
models will provide incentives to step up food production in the deficit coun-
tries and counteact incentives to reduce production in the surplus countries. 
But this will involve long-run adjustments. These may take longer than we 
can afford to wait. Since we are dealing with food, Keynes' statement that 
'in the long run we are all dead' may be literally true. It is as well to be 
prepared and to take the warning signals of the Uruguay Round seriously. "8.9 
Since the collapse of the Grain Reserve negotiations in the late 1970's, the world has 
limped through massive surpluses, looming shortages, huge subsidies, and general ineffi-
ciency in the area of grain. Security and stability of supply remain elusive goals. The 
Economist recently pointed to what recent decades have wrought despite freedom from 
hunger campaigns and commitments made to eradicate starvation: 
"The UN reckons that more than 700m people in poor countries are 
chronically undernourished. In 1993, 10-12m children aged under five died 
from malnutrition and related illnesses. They are victims not so much of 
food scarcity as of poverty". 
The task remains large, the prospect of challenges similar to those faced a generation 
ago looms, and the frustrations of producers and consum('rs remain. Small wonder that one 
UH.W. Singer, "The Future of Food Tra.de a.nd Food Aid in a Liberalizing Global Economy", Paper 
presented at Brown Univesity at 8th Annual Hunger Research Briefing and Exchange, 1985. 
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of the chief negotiators, a man from a developing country working for the FAO, wept when 
he recalled the lost opportunity in 1979. 
